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
***KOMMUNIST***

No 16, November 1988

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# Soviet Union KOMMUNIST

No 16, November 1988

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## CONTENTS

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The Prestige of the Party Worker [L. Kletskov; pp 3-11] .....	1
Watching Over One's Best Interest [V. Bambayev; pp 12-14] .....	6
Cooperatives: Lenin's Plan and Its Implementation [V. Lipitskiy; pp 15-22] .....	8
Cosmonautics In the Mirror of Glasnost; Journalist's Notes [Y. Golovanov; pp 23-31] .....	13
Is Economic Management Possible Without Departments? [A. Ulyukayev; pp 32-41] .....	20
'Separation of Powers' and the Experience of the Soviet State [B. Lazarev; pp 42-52] .....	26
Letters To The Editors [pp 52-54] .....	33
Humanism of Philosophy and Philosophy of Humanism; On the 18th World Philosophical Congress [pp 55-66] .....	35
On the Intelligentsia and Intelligence; Thoughts of a Philosopher [L. Smolyakov; pp 67-75] .....	46
The Big Problems of Small Ethnic Groups [A. Pika, B. Prokhorov; pp 76-83] .....	51
The Soviet Chapter In Our History [M. Pokrovskiy; pp 84-89] .....	56
Turning To the Great Experience; Contemporary Tasks and Methodology In the Study of the October Revolution [P. Volobuyev; pp 90-101] .....	62
'Erdenet.' The Lesson of Joint Enterprises; Roundtable Meeting Between the Journals KOMMUNIST and NAMYN AMDRAL [B. Arkhipov, V. Kremnev; pp 102-111] .....	69
All-Hungarian MSZMP Conference [M. Musatov; pp 111-114] .....	78
World Politics Through the Lens of the Mass Consciousness [V. Ivanov, V. Marinov; pp 115-118] .....	82
Perestroyka and Europe [E. Tuomioja; pp 119-121] .....	86
Disarmament and Security [B. Surikov, Ye.M. Primakov, et al.; pp 122-124] .....	88
Short Book Reviews [pp 125-127] .....	91
Meetings With the Editors. Chronicle [pp 127-128] .....	93
Publication Data .....	94

## KOMMUNIST

No 16, November 1988

### The Prestige of the Party Worker

18020004a Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16,  
Nov 88 (signed to press 25 Oct 88) pp 3-11

[Article by Leonid Gerasimovich Kletskov, first secretary of Grodno Obkom, Belorussian Communist Party, Hero of Socialist Labor]

[Text] Few people would be hard put to answer the question of which is the main components of this prestige. Life, however, repeatedly convinces us that simple truths frequently turn out to be the most difficult to master. Despite their simplicity, sometimes false priorities and values become established in the social consciousness and public practice, lasting long periods of time. Abandoning them is no simple matter and can even be painful. This is confirmed by the experience of the post-April reorganization of the party's own activities.

If we go by textbooks on management, the first condition for efficient work by any collective is to have a manager who is liked. Such harmony in relations appears, naturally, as a result of a most felicitous concatenation of a great variety of circumstances, about which we could only dream. It is equally true that a manager who does not enjoy the respect of those around him is a bad manager who does harm to the project. This is three times more valid in the case of a party worker.

Why conceal it, in party circles relations between a superior and a subordinate leader quite frequently develop on the basis of a bureaucratic hierarchy. It is somehow forgotten that, above all, they are party comrades, they are colleagues involved in a common project. Respect for rank, servility and favor-carrying are totally intolerable in such cases. Yet they have been tolerated! To this day, in the 4th year of perestroika, we have still not eliminated from our midst authoritarianism and official subservience or use of force. By no means is it always possible to create within the party collective an atmosphere of trust, friendliness and mutual aid and to organize relations in such a way that people will willingly approach their leader for advice and share with him their ideas or doubts. The main subject of concern of the party worker is not merely to comprehend but to adopt the simple truth that people, their moods, their needs and the organization of pleasurable joint labor should be the main subject of concern of the party worker. This must become to him the call of his conscience and the need of his heart and not an annoying obligation.

To some this may seem a ridiculous Manilovism. By no means is everyone among us truly concerned with earning through his personal qualities the respect of others. To such people it is simpler and more customary to rely on the authority of their position, backing it either by

uncouth shouting or else, polite but nonetheless essentially disgusting suppression of creative autonomy or any kind of dissidence. Fortunately, the social demand for workers who profess the cult of force, who are incurably afflicted by the leadership-principle, which endangers the party's reputation, or who are the "knights" of loud revolutionary phraseology, generous in making bare promises, seems to be declining.

Demands concerning party cadres on all levels are being tangibly increased. This was clearly detected at the very first stage of the accountability and election campaign which was held by the oblast party organization. At the beginning of October I had the opportunity to attend seven accountability and election meetings. Nowhere did I find a list of members of the presidium of the meeting or a list of speakers drafted in advance. Everything was decided by the party members themselves and the world did not turn upside down! Characteristically, no one read his statement from a piece of paper or with his eyes turned to the presidium. Criticism was substantially enlivened. It is true that criticism on the horizontal level was the weakest. For the time being many people find it more difficult to criticize their neighbor than their superiors. However, this, I believe, will also come in time. What is pleasing is that at not even a single meeting did I witness any kind of settling of accounts, quarrels and slanders. Nor did I hear speeches by demagogues.

I was pleased by the mature approach adopted by the party members in rating and electing their leaders. Wherever I went more candidacies were submitted than there were vacancies. Secretaries were elected not behind closed doors but with the participation of all party members. The party members refused their confidence to people who were weak, who found it difficult to work under contemporary conditions. They removed from their positions not only those who had been unable to deal with party work but also those who could not do party work properly, with total dedication, because of official obligations or for health or family reasons. A reality exists and it must be taken into consideration.

I realized once again during the meetings that the fears which were expressed, including some voiced in the press, concerning group egotism which, allegedly, could adversely affect the choice of leaders by the party members, had been exaggerated. I do not think that the alarm would have to be sounded on this matter. I recall, at the, that accountability and election meeting at the Komso-molets Kolkhoz, initially I heard the report submitted by the party organization secretary, followed by the address presented by the chief economist. Her statement was much more to the point, it had "teeth." And it was precisely she who was elected secretary. There are no reasons to question the common sense of the people and their interest in changes for the better. Naturally, it may happen that people tempted by a peaceful life may choose for themselves a more obliging manager, who would not be very exigent or principle-minded. To the extent to which I was able to judge, such cases were

infrequent and were the exceptions to the rule. The majority of party members are approaching today the choice of secretaries in an exigent and interested way. Our fears in this case are largely the result of past influence, of recurrences of former mistrust in the people.

Any collective, any human community needs a real and not a formal leader, someone in whom the people could entrust their faith and who could lead them. Today perestroika urgently needs such authoritative leaders. Words and expressions well remembered by my generation from the harsh war times appeared in abundance, particularly at first, in its vocabulary: "front," "break-through," "offensive," "combat reconnaissance," "confrontation," "opposition," and innumerable other terms. There was even a question of the "enemy." Let us note that standing behind such a vocabulary is a very old and not always glorious tradition. Naturally, the aspiration to express more clearly in this manner the revolutionary nature of the changes initiated in our society and the contradictory nature of the interaction among the forces participating in it are understandable. However, the time of meetings on perestroika has been replaced by a time of practical actions. As we used to say, the task of the moment is for everyone to start to work for perestroika intensively, for remaking our socialist home. This concern, it seems to me, is much more consistent with a calmer and constructive vocabulary. The basic term within it is work. Yet work cannot be successfully conducted without knowledge.

What the people would like to see in a party worker, regardless of his rank, not to mention a manager, is competence, above all. This quality may have seemed to be necessary always, it should have always been given priority in the selection and placement of cadres in all areas of party work. The trouble, however, was that for a number of years many people, some of whom totally incompetent, were appointed to head party committees, including some on the highest level. Very regretfully, to this day we have been unable fully to end such totally unsuitable practice. Poor knowledge of the work cannot be concealed from the people and becomes apparent quite quickly. The incompetent worker immediately forfeits his reputation. The trouble also is that a manager who does not enjoy a good reputation among the masses casts a shadow on the party committee he heads and on the party as a whole. This shadow becomes the more noticeable the higher the position held by such a pseudoworker is. This makes socioeconomic and moral losses even more significant.

Today the people persistently demand of us not general directives which call upon them to work honestly and responsibly, to strengthen labor discipline and to increase production efficiency, or else considerations on how this could be accomplished as best as possible, or else again tedious sermons, but prompt and competent solutions to the problems raised by life.

Competence means, above all, knowledge. From the viewpoint of its educational training, the cadre corps of the oblast party organization appears quite successful. However, any knowledge becomes obsolete and requires updating. The party workers can be helped in adding to their theoretical baggage and mastering theoretical experience through a variety of courses and seminars providing, naturally, that they are well organized. However, not even the most contemporary forms of training can replace self-training, daily work over oneself. Naturally, this demands time, time away from daily concerns, time to look and think and to read newspapers and journals, which are so rich today in new and daring ideas, and specialized and artistic literature, and going to see movies and plays. How can we speak of any competence of a party worker or of respect for him if he is poorly read, if he does not have any even a slightly developed artistic taste? Yet it is an open secret that a certain number of party workers who, in their majority are technical specialists, would look at a book or read a journal only very occasionally, not to mention going to the theater or a symphony concert.

The common explanation is lack of time. I cannot accept it. It is my deep conviction that those who take up ten projects at the same time, who try to do other people's works, who instill fear in solving any, even the most trifling problem, will not have enough time. In our circles it is considered just about the proper thing to do to stay in one's office until late in the evening and to work on Saturdays and even part of Sundays. References to perestroika are frequently quoted in this case. It is claimed that it makes work overload inevitable. It is somehow unacceptable to oppose such a practice. Yet one should object to it, for it is a question of upgrading the standards of our common work. Perestroika is not an emergency situation or a one-time campaign. What is needed here is not a cavalry charge but a persistent and mandatorily well organized work. Unquestionably, there are "peak" situations in the work in which overloading is inevitable. However, such situations could not exist on a daily basis, for in that case what inevitably suffers is the quality of the work and its efficiency.

I must say that in our obkom we do not demand of the members of the apparat or the cadres on the rayon level any evening or Sunday vigil. Even at the peak of the season, for example, I do not allow myself to ring up the raykom secretary on a Saturday or a Sunday. He himself must decide whether he should go visit the farms. In general, I try to ring up the rayon or anywhere else as little as possible. If the person is on the job, and if we trust him, why bother him with a telephone call unless this is urgently needed? Why denigrate him and ourselves with mistrust, with insistent efforts at exerting petty supervision? There is no need to ring up the people just to find out how things are developing let us say in the sowing or harvesting campaigns. Proper information can be obtained by reading the oblast press in the morning, listening to the oblast radio or looking at the local television program. The information needed for the work is contained in official statistical reports as well.



Let me note a feature in the work of many oblast party committees which, in my view, is quite important today. They have begun to trust more the rank-and-file party members and share more frequently with the people their concerns and problems and not conceal the truth from them. That is why the people's trust in the party authorities has increased and so has the latter's prestige. Personal meetings among members of the obkom, gorkom and raykom organizations and their buros with party members, the population, and labor collectives, have become more frequent.

The party obkom and raykom secretaries avoid taking with them a retinue in their regular visits to industrial enterprises and trips to farms where they meet and talk with people, determine their moods better and become more familiar with the situation. We have also long abandoned the system of collective command "raids" to the fields, where the people are working at full capacity, for this makes managers appear ridiculous to the rural working people. We have nothing to inspect there. Are we supposed to issue instructions or advice on how better to plow or sow? This is the job of the farm specialist and, if necessary, the RAPO, or the kolkhoz or sovkhoz manager. As to talking with people and jointly discussing with them the new tasks and listening to their claims, the party worker does not need in the least to take the mechanizer or the milkmaid away from their job. It is much more useful to do this during nonworking time.

The people show no tolerance for meetings or all other kinds of fussing and incompetent interference in their work. For that reason, for a number of years we have abandoned in our oblast the institution of representatives, which still exists in some areas. It is a stupid anachronism to have such people today when there are dozens of skilled specialists working in each kolkhoz and sovkhoz. Sitting next to them, what is left to do for the representatives of the chief of the rayon militia department or chairman of the rayon consumer union assigned to the village? Nothing other than to be under the feet of the rural workers, thus compromising in their eyes their very idea of the party's influence on production. We have also long abandoned the organizing of various staffs under party committees or holding all kinds of planning meetings, radio conferences and radio exchange of messages which can be described as nothing but radio bothering. As we know, this notorious "joint leadership" necessarily requires the use of an administrative whip. By disorganizing the work of labor collectives and making people unaccustomed to think and act independently, each such occasion damages the prestige of the party committees.

The demand and appeal of the practical people is being heard comprehensively and ever more persistently: "Do not block our work." This demand is addressed also to us, party workers. The oblast and rayon party committees are trying to respect it in their practical activities. "But what will they be doing then?" I can anticipate the

question of a supporter of party bureaucratic management, who does not distinguish between the ways and means of political leadership and economic management. No, it is not about noninterference that I am talking. I am talking about asserting in the party organization a political approach to the solution of the problems facing the oblast. Refusing to do the job of soviet and economic authorities does not lower the role of the party committees in ensuring the region's accelerated socioeconomic development. There can be no good politics without good economics and vice versa. If food products and commodities are in short supply in one area or another, this is a reproach addressed straight to us, the party workers. The political approach to the matter finds its concentrated and entirely specific manifestation in the thorough discussion and refining by the oblast party committee of draft 5-year and annual national economic plans, and comprehensive target programs for the development of industrial sectors, agriculture, construction, education, culture, health-care and the service industry. This is followed by organizing the work for their implementation, from individual farms and enterprises to the entire oblast.

The selection of cadres and control of implementation, as V.I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized, is the main aspect of party work. It is the most important function of the party committee as an organ of political leadership. The oblast party organization has already accomplished and is accomplishing a few things to improve cadre policy and ensure its democratization. It has also made errors and there are problems still awaiting their solution. Nonetheless, the practical organization of the work and the investigation of the implementation of resolutions remain the weakest spots in the activities of party committees and organizations. We must point out that this is a rather common disease and if we could succeed in curing it sooner and achieving the strict and precise implementation of adopted programs, our successes in accelerating the country's socioeconomic progress and in the qualitative renovation of socialism would be much more tangible. Need we mention the extent to which this would enhance the political reputation of the party in society and how greatly it would strengthen the irreversibility of perestroyka!

Let me cite a single example of the great importance of the organizational aspect of the matter. The oblast's agriculture is developing steadily and commodity output from crop growing and animal husbandry is increasing with every passing year. The first 2 years of the 12th 5-Year Plan proved to be particularly fruitful. A record-setting grain and leguminous crop in the history of the oblast was achieved in 1987. For all types of farms it averaged 40.1 quintals per hectare. This is an addition of 9 quintals per hectare compared to the 1986 level. The oblast fulfilled its plan for grain sales to the state 140 percent. The potato and beet growers were also pleased. They averaged 233 quintals of potatoes and 345 quintals of sugar beets per hectare. The plans for the sale of such commodities to the state were also overfulfilled. In 1986

the livestock breeders averaged 3,002 kilograms of milk per cow whereas last year's average was 3,216. Meat production averaged 211.7 quintals and milk production 585.8 quintals per 100 hectares of farmland. The oblast fulfilled its food program ahead of time, reaching the level stipulated for 1990 for the production of grain, potatoes, sugar beets, fruits, berries, milk and eggs and for sales of grain, potatoes, sugar beets, meat and milk to the state.

However, here are two other sets of figures which, it seems to me, are directly related to the topic of our discussion. Per capita production in the oblast last year was as follows: grain, 1,490 kilograms; potatoes, 1,515 kilograms; meat (in slaughtered weight), 166 kilograms; and milk, 901 kilograms. Meanwhile, per capita consumption figures were as follows: grain and bakery products, 135; potatoes, 184; meat and meat products, 69; and milk and dairy products, 386 kilograms. Whereas in recent years the production of agricultural commodities has been growing steadily, per capita consumption of basic food products and, which is particularly important, meat consumption, virtually remained on the same level. The fault here is above all that of the technology used in planning the amount of goods sold by the farms to the state according to the notorious "base." Every year all above-plan goods produced in the oblast are essentially appropriated as contributions to the republic and all-Union stocks. Such a procurements system strongly reminds one of the tax in kind. In the opinion of the oblast working people it is quite remote from the concept of social justice. Actually, the people keep working better and better but, with every passing year, the shelves in food stores appear more and more empty. This cannot fail adversely to affect the interests of the working people in the Agroprom in ensuring the further growth of output and production efficiency. Naturally, our people well realize that the country's food situation is stressed. However, they consider the existing practice of purchasing agricultural commodities as one of encouraging dependency. Our party cadres are forced to hear the bitter complaints of the working people that they are poorly defending their interests.

Be that as it may, the long-term factors for the growth of the agrarian sector in the oblast's economy are functioning. They include the conversion of agricultural production to intensive development, perfecting economic relations in the countryside, extensive restructuring of the villages and persistent organizational and political-education work of party committees among the masses. We are helped in combining all of this within a single system and supporting the development of initiative "from below" by the development and strengthening of measures, practiced in the oblast for a number of years, related to the technological, organizational and political support provided for the implementation of production plans and socialist obligations. Although this sounds bureaucratically ponderous, it is a very practical matter!

This protection begins with the internal farm subdivisions in kolkhozes and sovkhozes—production sections,

brigades and livestock farms. It is then applied on the level of the farms and ends on the rayon level. On each occasion it is witnessed by representatives of commissions with the participation of production frontrankers, economic managers and specialists, and party, soviet and Komsomol workers. The procedure of this "defense" is developed in such a way that even on the rayon level it takes between 1.5 and 2 hours. There is also an efficient control system over the implementation of the thus defended projects.

Why am I discussing in such detail this form of organizational work and its control? Because it is democratic. It is a very effective antidote to management methods based on orders and because it encourages the entire personnel always to keep learning, thinking and seeking new ways of developments, and because it develops practicality, exigency and a feeling of unity. This is both a technological and a human system. It has nothing in common with the still extant practice of constant "ordering" and periodic "calling on the carpet" economic managers and specialists. The entire "wisdom" of such a power influence, in such cases, is that without especially determining what is the real heart of the matter, the obkom or raykom bureau is issued a party reprimand for nonfulfillment of planned assignments or violation of field work schedules issued from above, or simply for the fact that it had dared to express its own judgment. Fortunately, we have prohibited such a "cannibalistic" phraseology. It is equally unacceptable for someone in the party club to be banging with his fist on a desk, motivated by an administrative fit of rage.

Cruelty, lack of kindness, indifference to the circumstances of specific individuals, and rudeness and unfairness were inherited by us but continue to live among us. All of this hurts the people and, sometimes, twists their destinies. And all of this causes tremendous and difficult to repair harm to our party cause and has a negative effect on the moral atmosphere in society. Every party worker must always remember this, if he wishes to be the true worker organizer of perestroika and not simply boast of that title. I am not even speaking of the top leadership, the power of which over their "subordinate" territory is truly tremendous. Therefore, they must use this power with the greatest possible discretion and must not permit themselves to carry grudges so that they may not lower their dignity and the prestige of the party they represent. Never leaving unavenged any insult ever received is a highly questionable virtue. Yet some people are proud of this quality which, allegedly, helps them to maintain their "command" reputation. Such "avengers" do not realize that the results they achieve this way are the opposite of what they wish.

Any arbitrariness shown by a party authority or individual official becomes even less tolerable when we consider that we are building today a socialist state of law. The obligation assumed by the party to society and codified in the Fundamental Law of acting within the framework of the Constitution imposes strict obligations to each one

of us. No action, whatever its motivation, must exceed the framework of the law or be committed arbitrarily, so to say. With the democratization of social life, which is gathering strength, such actions affect both party and nonparty people particularly painfully.

Anything may happen in life. No one is insured against errors. However, the use of disciplinary measures in the case of a guilty party member must be done with consideration, without any "administrative-punitive" enthusiasm. Or else, today we are speaking a great deal of the healing power of glasnost, of public criticism. It is true that all of us talk about it. However, we must not ignore the fact that under the banner of glasnost, here and there party cadres are being subjected to public and extremely insulting dressing down. Glasnost is glasnost, but we must not forget in the least things such as tactfulness, and sensitivity, not to mention elementary courtesy. I have seen repeatedly that a straight and exigent critical remark addressed to a comrade face to face, in a respectful manner, helps him to correct shortcomings in his personal behavior and eliminate errors in his work. But what about taking a person who clearly fails to cope with his obligations to task publicly, or punishing him? If we are totally convinced of his inability, he should be replaced and then given a job he can do. We must remember in this case that it is not he alone who should be blamed but also the person who put him in the wrong job.

I am convinced that the adequacy of a person for impeccable party work can be determined by the extent to which the person is well-wishing in his relations with others. We must be able to find in the person, above all, his best sides and not maliciously dig into shortcomings. We, to whom the party has entrusted to lead the people, have no right to pass the final judgment on one official or another, declaring him bad, and leaving it at that! A person may turn out to be bad in one thing or on one occasion. This, however, does not make him a thoroughly bad person!

Kindness does not make a party worker lose the necessary qualities of willpower and firmness in the implementation of the party line. The trouble appears when both firmness and willpower practice mindless obedience which ignores common sense, as they follow the "general stipulations" issued by superiors. To this day our people recall with respect the generation of workers who, at great risk, refused to obey the arbitrary requirement of removing privately owned cattle in the republic. Today the share contributed by the private auxiliary farms to the overall volume of sales to the state in the oblast is 25 percent for milk and 10 percent for meat.

The cadres in the oblast party organization equally ignored the impatient orders to increase the cattle herds, regardless of the possibilities of the feed base. To prove the obvious truth that the republic and the country do not need "lines" but milk and meat really available was no simple matter. In the final account, however, such

arguments are settled by results. If no results are obtained, referring to superior instructions will not help and one would lose the respect of the people.

For many long years moral requirements toward the party and society as a whole had been lowered. Today democratic guarantees and democratic procedures are being structured, which will help us to prevent abuses of power, recurrences of "communist boastfulness," hated by the masses, or other moral anomalies which are incompatible with the title of party member. Unquestionably, such procedures and guarantees are exceptionally important and useful. However, one must not rely on their educational influence alone and hope that with their exclusive help the low moral threshold of a certain segment of our cadres would be raised. This is not always possible, considering how neglected this moral fault had been. Unquestionably, this could enhance the criteria, including the moral criteria in cadre selection. Such cadres must, above all, be conscientious people.

Speaking of the most fundamental components of the prestige of the party worker, I personally would give priority to basic decency. This totally irreplaceable but, unfortunately, still very scarce human quality includes a great many things.

Naturally, it includes honesty in words and actions. The party worker must behave in such a way that he can never be blamed for lack of personal modesty, not to mention for favoritism or greed. With complete dedication of his forces and the highest possible responsibility, he must serve the cause of the party without expecting any particular rewards and live only on his salary. Fortunately, even at the worst of times, the Belorussian party organization had nothing resembling the Rashidov or Kunayev situations. Not even official country homes were built for the obkom personnel in the republic. Nor are such dachas in the Grodno area.

In my view, decency mandatorily includes the readiness daringly and openly to acknowledge one's own faults and courageously to assume responsibility for errors committed by one's subordinates in the course of their work. For if anyone has made a mistake it means that I too, as a party leader, failed to detect something in that person and failed to help him to develop within himself the necessary qualities and skills. Such readiness is not frequently encountered. Hearing criticism addressed at the organization he heads, the party worker rarely decides publicly to admit to any personal share for the noted shortcomings. Far more frequently we come across efforts to distance oneself from responsibility and to shift it to someone else. For some reason it is believed that the frank admission by someone to even the most minor error harms his authority. Actually, it is precisely the opposite. And as to submitting one's resignation because of one's own failures, this is something to which our people are totally unaccustomed.

The ability to share the guilt or even to assume full responsibility does not mean in the least universal forgiveness. However, "simple" taking to task is not worth very much either. It is a different matter when it is dictated by the aspiration to help the official and not to "put him in his place" but to correct the situation. In the past, the party obkom, let me be frank, bluntly criticized the Voronovskiy Party Raykom and its First Secretary Ivan Stefanovich Filimontsev for major shortcomings in the work, which hindered surmounting of the slow increase in the production of agricultural commodities and the economic efficiency of farm management. We also pointed out to the raykom the liberalism it had displayed toward insufficiently conscientious and incapable workers. I am confident that with this criticism we did not harm the authority of the secretary but helped him better to see his errors in his activities. As a result, the people of Voronovskiy Rayon straightened up, and strengthened their cadres in the RAPO and in many farms. They began to work better with the primary party organizations. This year, which was quite adverse in terms of the weather, the situation in the rayon party organization was substantially better and it completed the year with good results.

The exceptional role of the personnel on the rayon level in implementing the party policy and the strategy of perestroyka is universally acknowledged. Its experience has reemphasized the extensive opportunities available to the rayon party committees to engage in initiative-minded work and in active socioeconomic creativity. If we look at our raykom secretaries, we can note with pleasure that most if not all of them have the qualities which are needed for such work and for such creativity. Let us name here above all said Ivan Stefanovich Filimontsev and his colleague in Lidskiy Rayon, Ivan Grigoryevich Burlyko, a sincere person, wisened by practical experience. Also deserving of a great deal of credit are Sergey Aleksandrovich Matyuk, secretary of the Oshmyanskiy Raykom, Belorussian Communist Party, and delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, Mikhail Filippovich Kantorovich, head of the Zelvenskiy Rayon Party Organization, Nikolay Nikolayevich Soldatov and Vintsenty Ivanovich Kozyak, respectively secretaries of the Berestovitskiy and Shchuchinskiy Party Raykoms, and, finally, Mikhail Vikentyevich Zhebrak, secretary of the Volkovysk Gorkom.

All of them have extensive practical experience. Zhebrak began his labor career as a kolkhoz member, raising to excellent kolkhoz chairman. He has also been head of the rayon agricultural administration and rayon executive committee chairman. He knows thoroughly every single village in the rayon and can easily establish contact with any audience. He always seeks the advice of the people and engages in daring initiatives. This is a person who is unusually good hearted and finds it always difficult to admonish someone. He would think three times over before applying such a step which he considers quite harsh. The people know him as a responsive and humane

and intelligent person. These are people among whom he has spent his entire life. In my view, no higher rating could be given to a party leader.

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### Watching Over One's Best Interest

18020004b Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16, Nov 88 (signed to press 25 Oct 88) pp 12-14

[Interview with V.Kh. Bambayev, first secretary of the IKI-Burulskiy Party Raykom, Kalmyk ASSR]

[Text] A meeting with heads of kolkhozes and sovkhoozes using the leasing system, and the personnel of leasing collectives, rayon party committee secretaries, scientists and agricultural specialists was held by the CPSU Central Committee on 12 October last. One of the participants in this exchange of views was V.Kh. Bambayev, first secretary of the IKI-Burulskiy Party Raykom, Kalmyk ASSR. In a talk with the correspondent of *KOMMUNIST* he described practical experience in converting to the new contracting relations in the rayon farms.

**Question.** You spoke at the CPSU Central Committee meeting on the development of leasing relations. Clearly, one could single out the general prerequisites concerning their utilization. However, could there also be something which encourages the promotion of this system by you personally and the raykom personnel?

**Answer.** Naturally, there is. It is no secret to anyone that the overwhelming majority of rural workers cultivate their own plots much better, more zealously and more efficiently than the public farm. Regardless of all the steps we may be taking, the mortality of sheep in the public farms is higher by a factor of 3-4 compared with the private flock of that same shepherd. Yet facilities, and material conditions would appear to be the same. Wool production per sovkhooz sheep averages 4-5 kilograms, compared to 9-10 kilograms per privately owned sheep, grazing side by side. How can this be? Should we go back to private farming? How can we, when our kolkhozes and sovkhoozes have accumulated tremendous capital, which is indivisible not even legally but also technologically and materially. Yet to recreate facilities for individual farms is expensive and, frequently, quite inexpedient. We therefore decided that we must eliminate the difference between "my" sheep and "your" sheep and equalize the influence which personal and public property has on the individual, so that both can act together and create a single type of interest. This was a difficult problem which, nonetheless, had to be solved within an extremely short time, and literally on the job. It is thus that, while constantly seeking the advice of the people, the idea appeared of organizing sovkhooz-individual cooperatives for meat and wool production, based on share ownership. The sovkhooz contributes to the cooperative flock 800 head of sheep while the brigade of shepherds, consisting of four people, contributes 200; in

other words, the sovkhos share, owned by the cooperative and, therefore, its income, account for 80 percent and that of the shepherds, for 20. We realized that it would be difficult to change the attitude, the mentality of the workers. How was that: contributing entirely tangible sheep and, in exchange, receive not all that tangible percentages? We argued, explained and prompted. We recalled V.I. Lenin's advice on the material benefits of the cooperative and allowed every shepherd to keep in the public flock 50 sheep each (those who did not accept the new form, were allowed to keep 30). However, no commands or orders were issued.

Eventually, starting with September of last year, 43 of the 400 shepherd brigades in the rayon began to work in the sovkhos-individual cooperatives.

**Question.** Forgive the interruption. The result is that in terms of their form these small sovkhos-individual cooperatives are not developing on the basis of leasing but of some other, shall we say, contractual-cooperative relations?

**Answer.** That is true. We decided to try this method. Incidentally, we also applied the leasing system. But, anticipating the question, let me say that the efficiency of the work of the sovkhos-individual cooperative is higher under our conditions. Naturally, we must not pit such forms against each other. Let them compete. And let us count the number of sheep (as well as chicks) when the autumn comes.

**Question.** But then the role of the sovkhos in this cooperative should not be limited only by the share it has contributed to the cooperative herd.

**Answer.** Naturally. The kolkhoz gives to the internal farm cooperative the pen, feed, machines, equipment, housing and auxiliary premises, and ensures the availability of transportation, veterinary and consumer services.

The cooperative divides the entire cost accounting income in accordance with the share of animals in the cooperative flock. Furthermore, the shepherds receive from the sovkhos share another roughly 22 percent for servicing the sovkhos part of the flock. The cost accounting income and, therefore, the well-being of the shepherds' families have begun to depend on the care taken of each sheep, its weight and wool production. The shepherds also know that if they decide to leave the cooperative they will take with them their share not on the basis of picking out the best sheep but on the simple principle of collecting one out of five sheep. Therefore, they must be concerned with all sheep in the same way. Literally all possibilities were used. The shepherds found feed grinders, which had been gathering rust for years, and repaired them. They are bringing savings to the cooperative in all areas. Today the concentrate is not

poured into the trough out of a bucket but is evenly distributed by hand. Feed outlays in the cooperatives have declined by 40 percent and production efficiency has increased.

Today the livestock breeders themselves do minor repairs. According to the old custom, the drivers of the water trucks recorded in their travel sheets that they had brought water to the brigade over a distance of 20 kilometers. However, the shepherds began to refuse to sign such "forgeries." Why go so far when water could be found only 7 kilometers away? They perfectly realize that additional costs lower the cost accounting income and are unwilling to part with their earned rubles.

Incidentally, bookkeeping and accountability have become very simple in the shepherd brigades. The contract between the cooperative and the sovkhos administration stipulates the volume of output which the farm plans to obtain from the cooperative, and the purchase price per kilogram of mutton and wool. As a guideline, a single figure has been entered on the margin of the contract: the maximum outlays per ordered output. A record is kept on a monthly basis of outlays and, at the end of the farm year, it becomes immediately clear how much has been spent and the income can be determined with a high degree of accuracy. The computation is made by the brigade itself without waiting for the bookkeeping office. In other words, the connection between labor, economy and wages becomes tangible.

**Question.** What are the initial results of this new work method?

**Answer.** Production efficiency has increased very tangibly. Wool production has increased by 10 percent and sheep mortality has been reduced by a factor of 2.4. Labor productivity in the new cooperatives is 25 percent higher than the average for the rayon. In comparable prices gross output, compared with 1986—the best year for the rayon—increased by more than one-third (in terms of purchase prices by more than 50 percent), while wages increased by 22 percent.

Computations indicate that by the end of this 5-year period meat production in the area should increase by a factor of 1.5 and wool, by 20-30 percent. We intend to achieve this not by increasing the number of sheep but their productivity. Already this year our sheep herd has been reduced by 10 percent. Can you imagine what this represents in the case of Kalmykiya, where an ecological catastrophe is developing because of excessive overgrazing! Furthermore, the fodder is no longer used to keep the animals alive but to increase returns of meat, wool and milk.

**Question.** What about production cost? You know that everyone is excited about it in connection with the future price reform. The people are worried about whether this vicious circle in which production costs are influencing purchase prices and purchase prices are influencing retail prices will be broken.

**Answer.** Judge for yourselves. The cost per quintal of mutton has dropped to 115 rubles and that of beef to 156 rubles. Our meat is not exerting pressure on the prices. In connection with the further development of the sovkhoz-individual cooperatives, we are estimating that the cost of mutton will average 100 rubles. We already have cooperatives which have lowered that price to 90 or less rubles.

**Question.** The impression is that these are people without problems. Is this the case?

**Answer.** Actually, we have more than enough problems. The conversion to leasing and cooperatives cost some 250 rayon workers their jobs. How to employ them? We could set up an intrafarm production processing facility, which could mean jobs for the people and better satisfaction of demand and, in general, something which would benefit everyone. However, there is no place where to buy the necessary equipment. If the opportunity presents itself, we should sell something to be able to purchase such equipment. Yet we have no such rights, although the plan for production and marketing is being overfulfilled. Incidentally, we would also like to purchase consumer goods but so far we have no possibility of purchasing such goods on the basis of direct contractual relations. This means that incentives to work will once again begin to decline: Why would a shepherd work hard and earn yet another thousand rubles if he cannot spend it? We are suggesting an association of state-individual cooperatives in the rayon, which would be prepared to meet the state order which would considerably exceed the present plan. But then, anything over and above it would be ours and we would be able to sell it on a contractual basis.

There is yet another problem, which is a calamity: neither the rayon branch of the Agroprombank, nor the State Statistical Committee, nor Glavsnab are prepared to recognize the cooperatives and they refuse to consider their work indicators, to finance and to supply them. If, let us say, we would like to solve the problem of financing by creating a rayon cooperative bank, according to the State Statistical Committee we have no funds with which to do it. It is not a question that its personnel are bad. It is that the entire system of these departments has still not found its place in the cooperative movement and these people are not ready to help us to create civilized members of cooperatives.

Strange though it might seem, nor are the trade unions ready for this. For example, we tried to revive the socialist competition and purge it from the restraints of formalism. We decided that the bonuses to the winning collectives would be paid out of funds which the lagging collectives would contribute to the bonus fund. For incentive is not only a carrot but also a stick. It is not only a reward but also a penalty, through the ruble, naturally. We asked the people and they all voted in favor and were enthusiastic. No one is willing to part with money coming out of his own pocket. There were

virtually no laggards. This implies not only a material but also a moral effect and, if you wish, the elements of a game and all of this creates true competitiveness. Yet we are being told by the trade unions, your competition is improperly organized, we do not have such an instruction. Let us all determine what is the case: Is it that papers are drawn up for the sake of the competition or the competition for the sake of papers?!

Matters will develop well even without papers. The people have ambitions, and so do I. We wish to prove that we can work truly well, for the time has come when, in Lenin's words, a person can truly do one's best for his own interests.

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**Cooperatives: Lenin's Plan and Its Implementation**  
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[Article by Vasilii Semenovich Lipitskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences, associate, Marxist-Leninist History Sector, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism]

[Text] Of late we have begun to understand better how difficult was the fate of many of Lenin's most important plans. This fully applies to the ideas contained in his article "On the Cooperative."

The purpose of this work and its meaning and aim were not suitably assessed by the majority of his contemporaries. The avowed purpose of the article was not reached and it did not have a long-term impact on practical policy. The profound reworking of the problem of cooperatives under socialism, initiated by Lenin, was also not developed further. This is confirmed by the methods applied in the collectivization of agriculture, the disappearance of the industrial cooperatives and the manifestation of a scornful attitude toward the cooperative form of ownership and production organization and, for many years, the lack of serious studies in this area.

It is only now, aware of the need for perestroyka, that we are increasingly recapturing the true significance of Lenin's article, to which he related the "radical change of the entire viewpoint on socialism."

The article "On the Cooperative" begins with words which puzzled his contemporaries: "It seems to me that we pay insufficient attention to the cooperative" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 369; subsequent references to Lenin's Complete Collected Works will indicate volume and page only). Everything seemed to indicate that in the first years of the Soviet system there was tremendous interest in the cooperative. As early as April 1918 the consumer cooperative became actively involved in the vitally important matter of food

distribution; between March 1919 and the end of 1923, it held a virtual monopoly in this area. Problems of activities of the cooperative were constantly considered by the RKP(b) Central Committee, the Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom and discussed at party congresses. Special resolutions and decrees were promulgated on the cooperatives. A special newspaper, and then a journal, were published along with hundreds of different books on the history, theory and practice of the movement. Briefly, Lenin's evaluation was unexpected. In thinking of its reasons, in January 1924 V.V. Kuybyshev noted that "obviously, when Vladimir Ilich speaks of the need to pay greater attention to the cooperatives, what he has in mind is not simply a quantitative attention to cooperatives in the sense of appropriating funds for them but in the sense of benefits granted to cooperatives and the attention and efforts dedicated to them."

Indeed, in the last months of his life, Lenin was concerned above all with the strategy of the building of socialism. That is why in his article "On the Cooperative" he bypasses organizational-financial problems. Instead, he turns to the ideas of the "old cooperative members," the founders of the so-called cooperative socialism. In his preliminary work on the writing of this article, Lenin tried to restore the history of the development of the cooperative concept as a whole. Six of the seven books he requested for this work dealt exclusively with the history and theory of cooperatives.<sup>1</sup> The study of these publications could provide a key to the better understanding of Lenin's ideas.

What did Lenin mean when he spoke of the lack of attention paid to the cooperative? The answer, we believe, may be found in the book by A. Chayanov. "...In undertaking to define the cooperative," Chayanov wrote, "we are dealing not with one but two definitions. On the one hand, the cooperative, as an organizational-economic formula, which could not set itself any social tasks whatsoever.... On the other, we see a broad social movement or, rather, a movement with its specific ideology, using cooperative forms as one of the instruments... of its specific embodiment. Such movements deliberately set themselves specific social objectives and are inconceivable without them."

Actually, the founders of the concept of cooperatives gave priority precisely to the socially transforming function of the cooperative, considering its specific forms only a means of establishing a just and sensible social system. A sum of ideas which, to this day, seems relevant was accumulated through the efforts of R. Owen, J. Bucher, L. Blanc, and F. Lassalle, in the mid-19th century: the use in the advance toward socialism and communism, as a transitional step, of associations (cooperatives) of working people under the aegis of a truly democratic state. However, at that time these ideas were premature. They could not be implemented under the existing political and economic power of the bourgeoisie.

Practical experience increasingly deprived the cooperatives of their initial ideals, turning them primarily into a line of economic activities which, furthermore, was adapted to capitalist conditions. Lenin's address to the "old cooperative members" was a turn to the ideological origins of the movement within which the cooperative was not conceived as something separate from socialism.

Therefore the cooperative to which, in Lenin's view, insufficient attention was being paid, meant not only an abundance of agricultural, industrial and consumer cooperatives. It meant above all the cooperative as a social movement aimed at attaining socialism. Lenin made a discovery of essential significance: combined with the political power of the working class and the social ownership of the means of production, the program of the "old cooperative members" was the true way to socialism. It became the result of a long and occasionally conflicting creative quest.

Lenin's initial attitude toward the cooperative developed under the influence of a number of factors. Let us name among them, first, the Marxist theoretical tradition. We know that Marx and Engels recognized the positive role of the cooperative in the practical advance toward socialism. Nonetheless, Marx emphasized that under capitalism "everywhere, in their actual organization, naturally, the cooperatives reproduce and should reproduce all the shortcomings of the existing system" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 25, part I, p 483). Naturally, the idea of the peaceful growth of capitalism into socialism through the cooperative, which was the foundation of traditional cooperative ideology, was totally unacceptable to Marx and Engels.

Subsequently, in connection with the need to criticize such views, Marx repeatedly pointed out precisely the shortcomings of the cooperative forms of organization of the proletariat and their unsuitability as a means of conversion to socialism. This provided I. Zassen, whose book was used by Lenin, with the argument that in terms of the cooperative "Marxism played a purely negative role." In reality, the question of the cooperative was simply on the periphery of Marx's and Engels' activities. Convinced that the cooperative is unable to provide the high road in the struggle of the proletariat for power, they postponed the study of its possibilities for the future. "As to the fact that in converting to a full communist economy we shall have to use cooperative production as an intermediary link, was something that neither Marx nor I ever doubted," wrote Engels in 1886, in summing up the Marxist view on this problem (op. cit., vol 36, p 361).

The actual condition of the cooperative movement in Russia by the turn of the 20th century played a substantial role in the development of Lenin's views. "It is common knowledge," he wrote in 1897, "that compared with any Western European country, in Russia 'all sorts of associations' are **incredibly few, phenomenally few...**" (vol 2, p 429).



Numerous facts confirmed this conclusion. Even 12 years later, in 1909, in Petersburg there were no more than 19 production associations averaging 17 members each; in 1911 there were only seven such cooperatives in Moscow Guberniya and nine in Perm Guberniya. Let us note that this applies to areas considered industrially advanced. The reasons for the weak development of cooperatives were clear. In a production association, S. Prokopovich noted in the book familiar to Lenin, "The capital needed to organize a production facility averages 470 rubles per worker. To the poor artisan such a contribution is beyond his forces...."

At the start of the 19th century the consumer cooperative as well had not as yet developed extensively. The reason was similar: the extreme poverty of the popular masses. "...The successes of a proletarian consumer cooperative were held back in Russia by an entire series of adverse circumstances," summed up M.I. Tugan-Baranovskii, the author of yet another book which had drawn Lenin's attention. "...Given the extremely low wage level in Russia, our factory worker is a poor customer. Thus, for example, according to a budgetary study of the living conditions of workers in Petrograd, more than one-third of the workers have never purchased new clothes, satisfied with buying second-hand clothing."

Nor did Lenin ignore the social consequences of this situation. Since the overwhelming majority of the urban proletariat and the peasantry was unable to join associations and cooperatives, inevitably cooperatives fell into the hands of the more prosperous segment of the population. As a result, the use of cooperative forms actually contributed to the property polarization and social stratification, which was manifested with particular clarity in the countryside. As Lenin repeatedly noted, these processes were, during a given stage, progressive (in terms of Russia's progress along the path of capitalism). However, they were far distant from the objectives of the revolutionary struggle.

Another circumstance which influenced the shaping of Lenin's approach to the cooperative was the sharp debate with ideological trends which, to one extent or another, used cooperative slogans and phraseology and exaggerated the significance of the cooperative forms of relations and production organization (populists, S.R.). Lenin summed up his views, at that time, in 1918, in his article "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System:" "The cooperative is a shop and whatever changes, improvements and reforms may be made it will not change the fact that it is a shop. It is the capitalist age that led the socialists to adopt this view" (vol 36, p 161). Understandably, the surmounting of this stereotype and the development of a different view on the cooperative could be neither quick nor simple. Four more years had to pass before the new possibilities of the cooperative could be fully realized and before it could be seen precisely as representing the future of socialism.

This last thesis could trigger certain objections. Usually it is believed that Lenin developed his theory of the cooperative at the beginning of 1918. Indeed, an entire series of new views were outlined by him at that time. However, during the period of "war communism" Lenin focused essentially on the consumer cooperative, which performed the function of a distributor of food. Furthermore, frequently the label "cooperative" at that time indicated an ordinary territorial system of ration distribution with the mandatory universal cooperativization, characteristic of the period of "war communism." Yet an essential feature of a real cooperative is its voluntary nature.

We should, however, stipulate that in terms of the production cooperative, particularly in the countryside, Lenin rapidly reinterpreted the coercion concept. The resolution adopted at the 8th RKP(b) Congress, which he drafted, concerning the attitude toward the middle peasantry, read as follows: "While encouraging associations of all kinds as well as agricultural communes of middle peasants, the representatives of the Soviet system must not allow even the slightest coercion in their creation. It is only associations which have been set up by the peasants themselves, on their own free initiative, that are valuable...." (vol 38, p 208). Therefore, the mandatory cooperativization of production associations was not being promoted.

As a whole, however, in the first postrevolutionary years, the view that the cooperative was a combination of an economic form and a socialist idea did not develop. This was due less to the objective circumstances of the time although, naturally, they played a determining role, than to the characteristics of the prevalent ideology at that time. Full communism seemed to many people close and directly attainable, which motivated them to neglect the social forms which had been inherited from the past. "The cooperative appeared under the capitalist system and developed along with it. It will also perish with it," wrote in 1919 N. Meshcheryakov, who was at that time one of the heads of the Soviet cooperative Movement. "...It is now living its final days."

However, the study of the situation which developed under the conditions of the NEP led Lenin to different conclusions. He reconsidered not only the views of others but also his own. Such a reinterpretation was based on the previous structure of Lenin's thoughts, the traditional Marxist acknowledgment of the potential of the cooperative after the victory of the proletariat.

What motivated Lenin to acknowledge in his article "On the Cooperative" the "radical change of our entire viewpoint on socialism" (vol 45, p 376)? He himself interpreted this extraordinary formulation as follows: "The radical change is that previously we considered as the center of gravity, and had to do so, the political struggle, the revolution, the seizure of power, and so on. Now the center of gravity shifts to a peaceful organizational 'cultural' work" (ibid.). Previously the question of



socialism was one of **revolution**, a question of **power**. From this viewpoint the cooperative could provide nothing or almost nothing. After this primary question had been resolved and had been replaced by the task of **building** the new society, the cooperative determined everything or, in any case, a great deal. "Indeed, after the state power had passed into the hands of the working class in our country, and after said state power had assumed ownership of all the means of production, indeed, it was only the cooperativization of the population that remained" (ibid., p 369).

This thought runs throughout Lenin's entire article. It is as though, repeating it in different variants, he tried to convince the readers better and even to make them memorize this like a lesson: "...Under the rule of the NEP we have everything we need to be able to promote the cooperativization of the Russian population extensively and profoundly, to a sufficient extent...;" "...Is all this not necessary..., is all of this not required in order to build a full socialist society?" "...Under our circumstances, the cooperative closely coincides with socialism" (ibid., pp 370, 375). Lenin described socialism as the "system of civilized members of cooperatives" (ibid., p 373). "We must now realize and implement the fact that at the present time the social system which we must support more than anything else is the cooperative system," he wrote (ibid., p 371).

Therefore, according to Lenin, in its development socialism should pass through a separate cooperative stage. In our domestic theory of socialism, in the past this concept had not been seriously considered. Yet it is of an essential nature for it truly changes the persistent viewpoint on socialism which, for the past 60 years, has invariably been linked to the determining and exceptional role of centralized state forms of exercise of ownership.

As we know, Lenin supported the idea of large socialist enterprises and forms of economic management and repeatedly substantiated their advantages. However, the NEP clearly proved that the possibilities of small enterprises were by no means exhausted. Clearly, Lenin was also familiar with Chayanov's thought that by virtue of the biologically specific nature of some agricultural processes, they are naturally more productive on the individual-family level of farming. Chayanov considered the advantage of cooperatives precisely in the fact that "a considerable part of production is most successful in petty forms of output, allowing the latter, meanwhile, to organize on a broader scale all the economic sectors where large-scale production or turnover provides unquestionable and clearly manifested results." Subsequent developments indicated the accuracy of this thought and not only as applicable to agriculture alone.

According to Lenin, "we found in the cooperative the level of combining private interest, private commercial interest, supervision and control of it by the state, and extent of subordinating it to the common interests

which, in the past, had been the stumbling stone for many socialists." (ibid., p 370). **Interest** is the key word in understanding the role of the cooperative. In this case we must not forget Lenin's appeal to build socialism "on the basis of individual interests," "on the basis of cost accounting" (vol 44, p 151), and his words which sounded like an ultimatum: "Without personal interest nothing can succeed. One must be able to interest the people" (vol 53, p 269). Lenin was able to see in the cooperative the way of combining personal, collective and public interests which would guarantee efficient work and economic growth as internal sources for the development of socialism.

Thus, as a cooperative system, socialism is a society in which, with the political power held by the working people, the national property is manifested essentially in its collective aspects. A more specific blueprint for such a system and the ways of achieving it remained undeveloped. Lenin deemed necessary to continue to work in this direction. In completing, on 4 January 1923, the first part of his article "On the Cooperative," he pointed out that "however, this task has merely been set in its general outlines, for which reason the entire practical nature of this task remains as yet undefined and not described in detail..." (vol 45, p 373).

Obviously, this radical shift in the viewpoint on socialism should have affected literally all components of the concept of the new society. The collective forms of exercise of ownership necessarily presume a variety of interests and adequate means of representing them and of their organization, i.e., a high-level democratization of the social system. It is no accident that problems of democracy and cooperativization have been so greatly emphasized by Lenin in his last articles and letters which constituted the leader's political testament. The view of socialism as a process of peaceful construction presumed the existence of a broad front of cooperating social forces and the construction utilization of economic and cultural traditions of the past. It was precisely this that confirms, in my view, the reason for Lenin's addressing himself in his article "On the Cooperative" to the question of state capitalism.

In considering the future social system, Lenin deemed necessary to go back to his previous thoughts concerning state capitalism and to relate them to the problems of the cooperative. In this case he relied on his work "On the 'Leftist' Childishness and the Petit-Bourgeois Trend," which he had written in 1918. Lenin deemed important to emphasize that the actual economics of the transitional period included both capitalist and socialist elements. The movement toward socialism, in his view, was not simply one of pushing the capitalist elements out. Conversely, Lenin was convinced that "Russia cannot advance from its present economic situation without going through what is common to both state capitalism and to socialism" (vol 36, p 302). "For socialism is not

fiction but the mastery by the proletarian vanguard, which has seized the power, the mastery and use of that which has been created by the trusts" (ibid, p 311).

Therefore, at a given stage, Lenin linked the progress of socialism to mastering the experience of its historical predecessor, capitalism. This makes groundless swaying from one form or another of relations and activities merely because they were born during or are used by capitalism. Lenin's approach was that some means of economic management, production organization, incentives, and so on, used by capitalism can, precisely under the conditions of the new society, provide the greatest efficiency and reveal their full potential.

In Lenin's view, all of this applies to the cooperative as well. "It is unquestionable that, under the circumstances of a capitalist state the cooperative is a collective capitalist institution," he wrote. However "on publicly owned land, and not otherwise but under the control of the state system belonging to the working class," cooperative enterprises are not different from enterprises of a "consistently socialist type" (vol 45, p 374). Public ownership of the means of production reveals a new quality in the cooperative, which allows it to display its best possibilities.

Consequently, the cooperative can be classified as one of the social forms which, appearing and maturing under capitalism, carry within themselves a socialist potential and are the embryos of new relations. Lenin reached this conclusion through the "change of his entire viewpoint on socialism." As early as 1921 he thought differently, pointing out that "the cooperative is also a type of state capitalism....," "...'Cooperative' capitalism, unlike private ownership capitalism is, under the Soviet system, a variety of state capitalism and, as such, it is suitable and useful to us today naturally, to a certain extent" (vol 43, p 225), i.e., he fully classified the cooperative as part of the capitalist system, which was suitable and useful only from the tactical viewpoint. From the new viewpoint, this approach to the cooperative turned out one-sided. That is why in his article "On the Cooperative," Lenin went back to his old debate with the "left-wing communists" and substantiated the promising nature of cooperativization.

To this day we come across the view of the nonsocialist or not entirely socialist nature of the cooperative movement. This view is based, on the one hand, on support (or the habit) of the dogmatic concepts of socialism which developed essentially in the 1930s. As we know, the new Leninist viewpoint on socialism could not be asserted at that time. The concept of peaceful building did not satisfy those who needed a theoretical substantiation for the struggle for power which had developed. Lenin's ideas were replaced by the postulates of the intensification of the class struggle and the polarization of social forces, which justified the establishment of a

repressive regime of personal power. The concept that socialism is the continuing struggle against the internal enemy was consolidated in the minds of entire generations.

On the other hand, this type of historical development preserved the actually existing double nature of the cooperative. Let us recall that the previous term of its existence, under socialist conditions, was quite brief. From the end of the 1920s to the mid-1980s this movement had been suppressed and had been unable to prove its advantages, to become an integral part of the socialist economic system and to influence its shape.

To this day in the minds of many the cooperative is a vestige of the past, which entails rivalry, uncontrolled market forces, unusual forms of earning and distribution of profits, thoroughly forgetting enterprise, commercial initiative and other phenomena which in the mass awareness are unjustifiably related exclusively to capitalism. It would be difficult to predict the nature of the development of this movement and of our entire society had it been possible to implement the Leninist cooperative program. What is important to emphasize now, however, is that the attributes of cooperative production, inherited from capitalism are, to begin with, according to Lenin common to capitalism and socialism both, and that their mastery contributes to the development of our system and, secondly, that they will inevitably change as they interact with the social objective. Lenin's conclusion that the growth of the cooperative is, in our case, identical to the growth of socialism, remains accurate to this day.

Returning to Lenin's legacy and viewing it through the lens of subsequent historical experience, we are forced to note that the radical change of our entire viewpoints on socialism, as noted in the article "On the Cooperative" did not become a turning point in its further development. Instead, there was an impoverishment and distortion of the Leninist theory of the cooperative. An administrative-command management system was established, the consequence of which was the violation of the very idea of the cooperative, the belittling of its role and the loss of variety of its forms.

Profound processes have now developed in our society, which could be described as a shift from primarily state-centralized to increasingly and primarily collective forms of exercise of nationwide ownership. This is manifested in the assertion of the principles of cost accounting, leasing, democratic forms of management, enterprise autonomy, and increased role of collectives in solving production and social problems. The cooperative movement itself has been given a significant impetus, and new opportunities which are being created with the Law on the Cooperative in the USSR. Possibilities have appeared for the interaction and reciprocal enrichment of the various forms of socialist ownership and a division of labor among them, as well as the appearance of

state-cooperative, cooperative-state and other mixed-type enterprises. Meanwhile, also noticeable is the opposition to the growth of the cooperative, the source of which is not only the bureaucratic distortions but also the bias shown by rather broad segment of the population.

Under these circumstances, Lenin's ideas on the cooperative are becoming not only a target of historical study but a program for action for the immediate future. The task of creating in our country a system of civilized members of cooperatives should be understood today in the broadest possible meaning of the term, as a profound restructuring of the entire system of production relations, with the use on its different levels of cooperative principles, the strengthening of the collectivistic principles of our way of life, the identification of the potential of socialism and a return to its Leninist interpretation. In other words, it is a task which coincides, in terms of content and objectives, with achieving a new qualitative status in society. It is only the broadest possible economic initiative, scope for which is provided by the flexible combination of the forms of exercise of public ownership, that can provide an economic foundation for the application of all the advantages of socialism. The systematic interpretation of the concept of its development as a process of peaceful construction will provide an impetus to the new style of political thinking and, on the level of greater integration within the world economic system, also in terms of the pluralism of interests and views within the country and their democratic representation. Finally, purposeful progress toward the peaks of culture and civilization presumes taking radical steps in the areas of education and public upbringing. Lenin's legacy concerning the cooperation continues to work and to serve the cause of perestroika and the renovation of our society.

#### Footnote

1. This includes the following books: "*Kooperatsiya i Sotsializm*" [The Cooperative and Socialism] by N. Meshcheryakov (Moscow, 1920); "*Marksizm i Potrebnaya kooperatsiya*" [Marxism and the Consumer Cooperative] and "*Ot Shultse-Delicha k Kreysnakh*" [From Schultze-Delich to Kreutznach] by F. Staudinger (both published in Moscow, 1919); "*Razvitiye Teorii Kooperatsii v Epokhu Kapitalizma*" [Development of the Theory of the Cooperative in the Age of Capitalism] by I. Zassen (Moscow, 1919); "*Osnovnyye Idei i Formy Organizatsii Krestyanskoy Kooperatsii*" [Basic Ideas and Forms of Organization of the Peasant Cooperative] by A. Chayanov (Moscow, 1919); "*Sotsialnyye Osnovy Kooperatsii*" [The Social Foundations of the Cooperative] by M.I. Tugan-Baranovskiy (Moscow, 1916) and "*Kooperativnoye Dvizheniye v Rossii, Yego Teoriya i Praktika*" [The Cooperative Movement in Russia and Its Theory and Practice] by S.N. Prokopovich (Moscow, 1913). Somewhat earlier, Lenin had also requested the galleys of the book by L.M. Khinchuk "*Tsentrosoyuz v Usloviyakh Novoy Ekonomicheskoy Politiki*" [Tsentrosoyuz Under

the Conditions of the NEP] (Moscow, 1922) and had written remarks on the book, which were taken into consideration by the author in its publication (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 54, p 281, 285 and 655).

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#### Cosmonautics In the Mirror of Glasnost; Journalist's Notes

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[Article by Yaroslav Kirillovich Golovanov, writer, journalist]

[Text]

1

In the past 10 years the contribution of outer space to earth has been the subject of extensive discussions and publications. In this article I shall discuss that very same topic: what could outer space give the earth, on the spiritual rather than the material or economic level, for in that area as well there should be moral and psychological returns.

The sociopolitical aspect of space achievements, starting with 1957, have been discussed quite thoroughly and convincingly. It has been the topic of serious reports at scientific meetings and of special articles, pamphlets and books. This topic has become the virtually main theme in space documentaries. If there is anything for which we could blame our propaganda it is, precisely, that we journalists have been occasionally unable to deal with the slight dizziness caused by success and have adopted a tonality of unseemly enthusiasms, inventing all sorts of niceties, such as "galactic ports," or "the ports of the universe," although we are still very far from the stars and, for the time being, have been building dry galactic docks. The biggest hotheads, particularly after the first photographs of the moon and Gagarin's flight, even claimed that the successes of Soviet cosmonautics were clearly built-in features of the socialist system itself and were its exclusive possession. All of this was explainable, for it was indeed difficult to refrain from exaggeration, when one's country was described by its ill-wishers as technically backward and scientifically helpless, and unable to win such convincing global victories. To retain a worthy modesty precisely during days of victories is a great art which we have not always been able to master, whether it is a question of outer space, ballet, or skiing.

Nonetheless, despite all such exaggerations, a great deal was indeed accomplished. The work of our scientists—historians of science and technology—was enhanced in the 1960s. The sector on the history of aviation and cosmonautics of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the Natural Sciences and Technology,

headed by V.N. Sokolskiy, began regularly to hold scientific seminars on the history of rocket technology and cosmonautics and to produce collections (more than 50 have already been written) on such matters. An entire group of young historians of cosmonautics has written interesting works.

They are being greatly assisted by the veterans of missile technology, headed by Academician B.V. Raushenbakh, rallied in a specially organized Veterans' Council. Monographs and books are being published, describing the various space programs, such as manned flights, orbital stations, the moon and the planets. There has been a particularly active increase in the size of publications and in the presentation of the works by Izdatelstvo Mashinostroyeniye. Many interesting books are being published by Izdatelstvo Nauka, Molodaya Gvardiya, Sovetskaya Rossiya and other publishing houses.

The objection may be raised that so far we do not have a detailed creative biography of S.P. Korolev, and that the prevalent features in the books about K.E. Tsiolkovskiy concern the scientific and technical aspects of his works, based on the complex and occasionally contradictory philosophical views of the scientist, which have still not been properly reflected in works about him. Naturally, "blank spots" remain. Otherwise there would be no history. Furthermore, to be in a hurry when it is a matter which affects such significant problems and people, such major problems, is hardly profitable. It is better not to write a book than to write it and, several years later, to "review" it, changing one's "idols" in accordance with the new situation and, several years after that, once again to "revise" it.

Speaking of history, let us point out something else as well. Any tendentiousness, cliquishness or subjectivism could harm any kind of project, particularly in the field of history. We cannot tolerate the fact that under the pretext of supervising the scientific accuracy and historical truths, manuscripts on the history of cosmonautics are being subjected to tendentious editing by individuals who have their own views on various problems and on authors of such works as to the manner in which events should be interpreted, what should be the position of specific individuals in various areas, and what should be the sympathies or antipathies of the author relative to specific men of science and technology. Today no one any longer objects to the fact that an honest and objective assessment of historical events is necessary. This fully applies to the history of cosmonautics.

In noting the most outstanding victories of our cosmonautics (on the spiritual rather than the technical level), let us mention above all Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin's flight. He gave a soul to our cosmonautics, he humanized it. Today what is expected of us, journalists and writers, is a story on who are they, our cosmonauts, what kind of people are they, what kind of life do they lead, how do they study and work, and how the long years of toil on earth are crystallized in the hours and days of a space

flight. Bearing in mind the existence of dozens of personalities, we should have depicted the uniform character of the contemporary young person who has chosen this outer space profession while nonetheless remaining a person of the earth, a romantic and a pragmatist, both silent and merry, lover of ballet and hockey. This person has his own weaknesses, he is like us and must be similar to us, for he was born and grew up among us and studied and worked with us. He is us. Nonetheless, we should have depicted this new character typical specifically of our time, a character shaped in the course of constant contacts with actions and dreams and aspirations for the future, for the cosmonaut is always, to a certain extent, a man from the future.

That is the way we—journalists, writers and cinematographers—understood our tasks. In the final account, the individual solution to all of these problems were to lead to the solution of the common problem: learning patriotism, pride in one's country, and confidence in the rightness of the chosen path.

## 2

Elsewhere I have already written that we were very lucky, starting with our first cosmonaut. He was a truly intelligent and truly modest person. Neither he nor his comrades expected the type of reaction to his flight and the welcoming he was given in Moscow. Gagarin told me that he has a poor recollection of what happened to him on 14 April 1961, from the time that, under the sound of the old air force march "We Were Born to Make a Legend..." he stepped onto the red carpet at the airfield to the time that he and his wife, after the reception of the Kremlin, were taken to a neat private house on Lenin Hills and, looking at a big mirror, he saw himself, happily amazed, in the unaccustomed uniform of a major, with the Gold Star pinned on his chest.

In itself, Gagarin's flight was so eloquent that no explanation or persuasion were necessary. Actually, after 9 May 1945 there has been no such sincere nationwide patriotic outburst, such total enthusiasm, such a clear manifestation of civic optimism as there had been in the days of Gagarin's victory.

And yet....

On the 4th day after his historic flight, Gagarin met with journalists in the big hall of the Club of Scientists, on Kropotkinskaya. Applause followed virtually each one of his sentences. A pile of notes reached the presidium. Academician Ye.K. Fedorov began to "sift" through them. He laid most of them aside and wrote something on others. Why? Did he mistrust Gagarin? Why? Those of us who were present in the hall did not know him. However, those who were sitting at the podium had known him for some time and knew that he was not only a rarely charming but also an intelligent person, whose knowledge, convictions and tactfulness needed no sifting.

"When were you told that you were the leading candidate?" Gagarin read the latest noted handed over to him. He smiled somewhat apologetically and answered:

"I was informed of this at the proper time."

The audience laughed. It continued to love this short, amazingly pleasant major and, with its laughter, wanted to cheer him up, to help him cope with this feeling of embarrassment which the imposed answer had triggered. Many years later, Gagarin and I recalled this press conference, and he admitted that at that time he was not quite himself. It was later, at one of the "space" anniversaries, which had been celebrated within a rather narrow circle, that there had been a gay "teasing," where such meetings were parodied.

**Question:** You said that in space you ate currant jam. What were they—red or black?

**Cosmonaut** (After a long whispering consultation with Academician Ye.K. Fedorov): the currant was good....

I remember that Sergey Pavlovich Korolev was laughing to the point of tears. If we think about it, however, there were few reasons to laugh....

Could an honest answer, without obfuscation, by Yu. Gagarin at the press conference weaken the defense capability of our country? Hardly. At that time it was believed that Gagarin himself had requested to be added to the crew of cosmonauts. He had not submitted such a request perhaps for the fact alone that at that time no one could even conceive of the fact that such a request was possible in principle. Then Gagarin was ordered to say that he had landed not with a parachute after ejecting but inside the spaceship. Someone must have believed that the very fact of ejecting would diminish the heroism of Gagarin's flight and could hinder his official setting of an international record. This stupid version persisted several years. In the final account, however, truth triumphed but the feeling of confusion remained. Gagarin was always nervous when this was mentioned. Why had it been done? I do not know. I know precisely, however, that it was not as a result of great intelligence.

Astronaut Donald Slayton, who took part in the Soyuz-Apollo Soviet-American program (EPAS), knew his Soviet colleagues well. He had stayed in Zvezdnyy Gorodok. "They are heroes, they are almost saintly," he said after the flight. "The Russians claim that they are atheists and the cosmonauts somehow fill up a certain vacuum."

Slayton is wrong. Religion or atheism have nothing to do with this. We sought in Gagarin and his comrades the heroes of our time, the men who would embody our age. This age was not perfect in everything as, probably, the heroes which reflected it were not all of them perfect in everything. However, mention of this was unacceptable. I had the occasion to work with very many cosmonauts.

On a purely human basis, I have liked some more than other. Although articles and reports were published under my exclusive byline, I was not allowed to make public my subjective likes and dislikes. There was a planned hero in all articles and reports. If a cosmonaut flew he had to be a hero.

Yes, the hero had been planned. He had to be ruddy and strong, like an apple dipped in wax. Any spots on the apple were either touched up or cut out. However, no one wants to be a wax lining! What appeared in the people was a spontaneous and sometimes subconscious protest: they felt that they were being made stupid, that their inner convictions were not being trusted, and nor was their simple ability to think and separate by themselves black from white. It was precisely equalization, making everyone fit the same pattern, that led to the fact that already by the end of the 1960s interest in cosmonautics had become undermined. The people showed little interest in the latest take-offs: "They are flying? Well, let them fly...." Children stopped playing at cosmonauts, which is an accurate symptom of the lack of public interest.

The story of the flight of the Voskhod-2 Spaceship could serve as an example of the way the clumsy pursuit of a good objective could do more harm than good. After Aleksey Leonov had walked in open space, for the first time in the world(!) the failure of automated guidance instruments forced Pavel Belyayev, the ship's commander, to use manual controls in landing. Both cosmonauts brilliantly withstood this difficult test by successfully landing the spaceship in the tayga, in the Perm area. Once again the official report contained the cheerful cliché: "All systems, equipment and apparatus of the ship worked normally and impeccably throughout the entire flight." Even children could understand that the tayga in winter is not the best place for landing a spaceship and that this could not be related to the previous seven landings which had taken place roughly on the same steppe area in Kazakhstan. However, at that time no explanations whatsoever were given on this matter.

Let us try to consider these facts from the standpoint of logic and ordinary common sense. An action should be aimed at a specific objective. What positive features, from the educational viewpoint, did we obtain from such space "information?" None! In all likelihood, it was exactly the opposite of what was desirable: people stopped believing official reports. Such reports gave birth to various rumors and fabrications and, above all, belittled the true exploits of our cosmonauts who quite frequently displayed outstanding courage and true heroism in precisely so-called extraordinary situations when, simply put, something breaks down and no longer works. Was it all that difficult to realize that any kind of possible breakdown of equipment is also a test—both unexpected and serious—for the cosmonauts and the ground services? In the overwhelming majority of cases they honorably passed this exam. It was precisely the

prompt and truthful description of difficulties which had appeared, and of the dedicated efforts to eliminate them that could not diminish but, conversely, enhance the reputation of our cosmonauts.

The story of the search and evacuation of the crew of Voskhod-2, full of heroism and romanticism, could have become a new compressed variant of the epic of the "Sibiryakov" and the "Chelyuskin," in which the courage and heroism of the people, their dedication and feeling of collectivism and, in short, the best features of the Soviet character, were vividly displayed.

In all times and in all nations heroes have been hammered out through struggle. Icarus, Heraclitus and Ilya Muromets all had to surmount something. One cannot consider as an example of a hero worthy of emulation someone who calmly takes off, fulfills his program without any particular difficulties and lands successfully. In such cases it becomes difficult to prove that he is a hero.

And, as is always the case, despite our best wishes, one untruth inevitably led to another. For example, when in the summer of 1985 the Salyut-7 Orbital Station became uncontrollable and cosmonauts Vladimir Dzhanibekov and Viktor Savinykh, displaying unparalleled skill in space navigation and true courage, brought it back to life, initially nothing was said on this subject. It was only many days later that incomprehensible articles with vague hints appeared, indicating what great people Dzhanibekov and Savinykh were. Had we described in advance the way it was precisely they who had been chosen among many other most experienced cosmonauts, explained why they were flying to an orbital station, described in advance how difficult and dangerous their task was, and immediately warned of the difficulties which awaited them on the dead orbital station, holding its breath, the entire country would have sat by its radio and television sets and on the streets strangers would ask each other: "Well, what is their situation?..." General concern and general worry would have united the people even more closely within our single family, sharing joys and concerns.

It was not the fault of V. Titov and A. Serebrov that at the moment of the launching of their spaceship the equipment failed. The emergency rescue system was activated and the cosmonauts survived but rumors spread, and this was immediately reported by the foreign "voices." Meanwhile, we kept silent. It was only 1 month later that Academician V.A. Kotelnikov reported the incident at a meeting of the International Astronautical Federation. The foreign journalists published the information but even after that we remained silent.

Today we openly mention past errors in industry and agriculture. Here it is a question of propaganda and ideological errors. As to how costly they are, we are as yet to determine that....

3

Possibly the beginning of our errors may be traced precisely to that beautiful sunny April day when the happiest man in the world—Yuriy Gagarin—was touring exultant Moscow. This incredible spiritual upsurge, this spontaneous emotional enthusiasm could have become even greater had we immediately indicated that Gagarin was at the peak of a pyramid built through the efforts of those who had not flown and would not fly in space, those who tightened the nuts of the hatch for the sake of some unknown lieutenants, whose names, half-an-hour later, would be repeated throughout the world, those who do not wear their medals publicly, medals awarded on the basis of an unpublished ukase, those who come home from work in the morning or, if they are on the space platform, who do not come home for several months, dreaming in the heat of the Kazakhstan desert of a sip of ice-cold borzhomi. It was precisely then, and not on the day of his death, that the name of Sergey Pavlovich Korolev should have been mentioned. It was precisely then, on 17 June 1961, when the decision was made to present high awards for Gagarin's flight to our scientists, engineers and workers, that his outstanding fellow workers should have been described. Why was this not done? What prevented it? Secrecy? Yes, above all secrecy.

In a historical movie, when the vizier pours out of his ring poison into the cup of an unsuspecting shah, I realize that secrecy in such a situation could be preserved. But how could one keep secret the name of that same Korolev if he headed (together with all the people involved) the work of hundreds of thousands of people?! How can one keep secret the location of a cosmodrome with a big city, with a railroad and highways, with huge launching facilities and test buildings, the largest ever built by man, when the optical power of reconnaissance satellites can be computed to a few dozen centimeters? In good weather such a satellite would "see" this journal if left on the shoulder of the Baykonur Highway....

Let me cite two examples from my own journalistic practice. At that time, for reasons which I shall discuss later, the time of the launching and the landing of spaceships could not be mentioned. I could not mention my assignment to the cosmodrome to anyone other than the editor-in-chief, and not even to my wife. But then, I would meet a friend who would invite me to his home but then would suddenly catch himself:

"I am sorry, it will not work out, you will already be at the cosmodrome...."

This particular friend was a physician and had nothing to do with cosmonautics. I asked him:

"How come you know this?"

"My wife works where food for the cosmonauts is put in tubes. These tubes are shipped out precisely 20 (30, 10, I do not recall exactly) days before the start, so that everyone knows when the launching will take place...."

Here is another example. We reached Karaganda before the latest space crew was to land. The time—the day and the hour—of the landing were also kept secret. That evening, we sat in the hotel and talked to the local journalists. They said:

"Well, we had better go, it is getting late and tomorrow you will have to get up early, the ship will land...."

"How do you know this?!"

"At the time of the landing the power plant is instructed to cut off the electricity along the high-tension cables. Naturally, the enterprises must be informed of this in advance, for which reason the entire city knows the planned time of the landing...."

Who needs such "secrecy?" Nobody. It is even harmful, for it creates an ironic attitude toward real secrecy, toward necessary secrecy, and people begin to blab even where they truly should not. Why then did such secrecy exist? Why is it that to this day, here and there, its grains which, although seemingly profoundly buried under glasnost, nonetheless germinate from time to time?

The wish, which was so typical of the leadership at that time, to see everything that was taking place through rose-tinted glasses, and the deep-rooted practice of not to sadden the command, if possible, with reports on failures met with a lively response among the immediate performers as well. False secrecy was less needed than convenient. If the date of the launching had been announced, it had to be met. If not the people would ask why? But if a date is not announced there was nothing to ask. I recall the "unfortunate" Monday of 13 January 1969 when, for technical reasons, several minutes prior to the launching of Soyuz-4, the launching was postponed for a day but no one was told about it! Let a few excessively observant viewers be puzzled as to why Vladimir Shatalov was shown at one point wearing his shoes (this was televised on 13 January) and elsewhere wearing aviator's boots (this was added on 14 January).

Having announced the date of the landing, meant guaranteeing that the technical facilities and manpower will be ready to meet the deadline. But what if there is breakdown? Once again one should explain the reason and name the culprits. Why such unnecessary trouble if the date is not announced in advance? A program would be announced yet people would be unable to carry it out. This meant failure. Something broke down. This is a new project, anything could happen. However, in any case someone would have to be held responsible and the culprit would have to be identified. And what if nothing is announced? Or else if it is announced in most general terms? This would be quite convenient! But what if the

name of the cosmonaut is made public in advance and the cosmonaut falls ill. Once again an explanation has to be provided as to why he was not taken care of. And if nothing is being said in advance, the result will be that the scheduled person will fly as planned....

After technical failures in orbit by the earth satellites from which automatic stations start their trip to the moon and the planets, they were described as ordinary satellites, although simple trajectory computations made by foreign specialists quite quickly exposed such fabrications. But, as the saying goes, shame is not like smoke, it does not burn the eyes. "....All of this began as early as January 1959, when the Luna-1 Space Station failed to fulfill its mission and did not reach the moon, after which it was renamed "Dream."

At that time the first strike at this vicious system of secrecy was dealt by EPAS but, alas, it remained an isolated case. The entire program of the flight, the main and backup crews, the support crews, the heads of the national programs, and the leading specialists in the individual assemblies and systems, were announced in advance. Even Leninsk, the "space" city on the Syrdarya River, was finally named in the press. And nothing terrible happened! The city was there, the river kept flowing, and the previously totally unknown Dzhanibekov was identified for the first time, and over the next 10 years was able to make another five space flights. All deadlines for the flight were met and all points of the program were covered. This openness neither caused nor could cause any harm to our state or to its defense capability.

But after the end of the celebrations on the occasion of the successful completion of this international flight everything quietly became business as usual: no deadline and no names....

Is it worth talking about all of this now, the more so since these are "matters of the distant past?" We must, for if we merely describe a certain segment of our history as the period of stagnation without bringing to light the essence of this phenomenon in the various areas of life, this word simply becomes a formal label. Let us say honestly and frankly: this is something that even then was good and must be developed and improved and given a new meaning. And that is that. Let us name it, let us describe the phenomenon itself and thus prevent it from moving from the past into the present.

The resulting picture is amazing and totally unique. Let us say, for example, that I would like to write a critical article in the newspaper about the Ministry of Railways or the Ministry of Health. No one would conceive of sending such criticism, prior to its publication, to said establishments to obtain the ministerial blessing to criticize. Furthermore, what normal person would encourage public criticism of himself?! In the area of cosmonautics it was not a question even of criticism (although why should this area of our activities be free from



criticism? And does it benefit from such "freedom?"), but merely a matter of information. With references to that same notorious "secrecy," some managers had quietly asserted for themselves the right to decide what is good and what is bad, what should be mentioned and what would be better concealed or, if something is discussed at all, what and how to discuss it.

Instead of acting as consultants and advisers, they decided to assume the role of some kind of ideological law enforcers, who maintain order and guide the entire life of our space propaganda. However, in order to have the right to manage something, that "something" must be known. Propaganda is also a science, a more complex than, shall we say, resistance of materials. And having decided to do this, in this case even knowledge of higher mathematics would not compensate for lack of knowledge of editorial work and the psychology of journalism. It was impossible to prove to such managers that in cosmonautics as well failures are possible, as they are in any other difficult and absolutely new project, and that here as well one could not be insured against them. The great K.E. Tsiolkovskiy himself had written about flights in space that "those who work in this field should expect great disappointments, for the favorable solution of a problem is much more difficult than even the most penetrating minds could conceive." The entire trouble, however, was that things about which one could or could not write were being decided by minds which were by no means among the most perspicacious. They threatened us with the scourge of fictitious secrecy while, in fact, they were trying to protect themselves from criticism and to secure for themselves a peaceful life.

4

Naturally, a decline in the interest shown in cosmonautics was caused not only by the fact that clumsy journalistic methods led the readers to a loss of interest in space matters. To a large extent, this is also an objective process: human nature is such that man quite quickly becomes accustomed to miracles. The day Astronaut Edward White went into outer space aboard the Gemini-4 and the visor of his helmet became fogged, he shouted for the entire world to hear: "I can see nothing!!! And all America trembled, until the control center calmly advised him to change the system of ventilating the space suit or, if worse came to worse, to wipe the fogged visor with his nose. Regardless of what White did subsequently, and this courageous person did a great deal and paid for his loyalty to space with his life, in the imagination of the people he remained a hero for all times.

Occasionally, such a "danger enhancement" became the type of bait which we too swallowed, actively enumerating all breakdowns and failures of foreign vehicles. Sometimes, all that happened was that the main event in the latest expedition to the moon was the fact that on a panel some kind of light failed to light up on time. What

could such reports trigger in a thinking person other than a feeling of propaganda clumsiness, psychological illiteracy and professional ineptness?

Concealing the successes of others and overemphasizing foreign failures also triggered an opposite reaction. Our people are knowledgeable and educated and when they read in our press how frequently everything breaks down in the Americans and the way they keep postponing their launchings, they could hardly believe that nothing in our country breaks down or nothing is ever postponed! Patriotism is reluctant to grow in a field plowed with such propaganda fertilizer. Conversely, it was various rumors and rather unpleasant fabrications that resulted.

The people would read that the entire world was applauding the Soviet cosmonauts and were proud. However, on 21 July 1969, when they turned on their television sets to see how man stepped on the moon for the first time, they were shown an old movie comedy. Astronaut Michael Collins, who was waiting, while orbiting the moon, for his comrades to return, complained to the Houston Control Center:

"I am the closest to them and I cannot see what is going on...."

He was comforted:

"Relax, Michael, nor are the Russians and the Chinese...."

What a sad joke!

"Do you really think," a teacher from Omsk wrote to me, "that I would love Yuriy Gagarin any less if you were to publish in the newspaper a big photograph of Neil Armstrong?"

I do not intend to answer this question anymore than I intend to explain why we so stubbornly and for so many years sought faults in the design of the American space shuttle. Although the tragedy with the Challenger, which took place some 3 years ago, revealed many faults in that system, we must acknowledge that the shuttle is an outstanding technical achievement. The problem lies elsewhere. We already witnessed the fact that the shuttle could become a powerful means of militarization of outer space and one of the principal weapons in the implementation of the vicious "Star Wars" program. We must write not only about the unreliability of its solid-fuel boosters and its ceramic tiles but also the fact that of 311 flights for the shuttle, planned through 1994, 113 were farmed out to the Pentagon. We should criticize not the design of talented engineers but its militaristic use. Today we are able to build a reusable spaceship. Does this mean that the American one will be poor and that ours will be necessarily good? This is a primitive approach.



The wind of perestroika has blown off the launching pads of our journalism a great deal of dust and garbage. Let me frankly say that I never expected to live to see the type of change when, in advance, at open press conferences, journalists would meet the space crews and when television correspondents would be broadcasting "live" directly from the launching area, and when the picture in color of only yesterday's secret Energiya Rocket Boosting System would be on the cover of *NAUKA I ZHIZN* while its system would be described in *PRAVDA*. And look: nothing terrible happened! We did not become weaker. We became stronger because truth always means strength. We have now realized in fact the far-fetchedness of many concepts of this notorious "secrecy," and clearly seen behind its sealing-wax seals merely efforts at covering shortcomings in the work and protecting oneself from criticism.

I have included in this article many negative examples and now, believe me, I would like to quote with a great deal of pleasure positive examples of complete and fruitful recent information about space research. The Kvant Astrophysical Module "was unwilling" to be coupled with the Mir Orbital Station. "Efforts to couple these space projects will be continued....," the press reported. Immediately everyone began to discuss outer space! Will this succeed or will it not? Would several tons of one-of-a-kind equipment burn out, in the final account, in the upper atmospheric strata? Could the cosmonauts dock this obstreperous module to the station? There were dozens of questions and a torrent of telephone calls to the newspapers and the television. At that point outer space became something close, something shared and something affecting people: What was happening now in orbit, what was the situation?

People who had absolutely nothing to do with cosmonautics became involved in this complex and difficult work. A most important process of spiritual unification of society occurred. The sole reason for this process was glasnost. No one feared to tell the truth: yes, initially there was no docking. This was stated openly and did not belittle in the least the merits of our cosmonautics. Conversely, after the fact that through joint planned actions by the ground systems and the cosmonauts this space epic ended successfully, millions of people the world over became convinced not only of the high professional standards of our specialists but also of how strong-willed and persistent they were and how dedicated to their work.

There was no apprehension to announce that one of the cosmonauts had become ill in orbit and that the crew was returning to Earth ahead of schedule. What did this indicate? That the medics had not been thorough? No. Any healthy person could become ill. What this proves, above all, is the humanness, the fact that human life to us is more precious than any space program.

No apprehension was displayed in naming the cosmonauts who were preparing for launching and describing the international crews in advance. This was yet another

demonstration of the open steps, understood by all people, leading to cooperation in the noble cause of the peaceful conquest of outer space.

No fear was expressed in describing preparations for the second Energiya flight despite the fact that this type of flight was something absolutely new and that anything could have happened.

We provided a description of the way, in accordance with specific international agreements, that we prepared for the launching of the Indian IRS-1A Satellite. We invited at its launching business people from the FRG: look, this is the first try of our commercial cosmonautics. We are prepared to place into orbit your apparatus at an advantageous price, substantially lower than the price charged for similar services by other countries. The launching from the cosmodrome was televised live. Was this a responsible action? Unquestionably, it was. However, it was precisely such a transmission that is the best possible publicity for our rocket technology.

The requirements of glasnost, full and truthful and, above all, constructive, useful to the cause of perestroika, cannot fail to affect cosmonautics, above all because in our economic, scientific and spiritual life cosmonautics is assuming an increasingly important place. We shall not tolerate today that which we tolerated yesterday.

Does this mean that everything is fine? Perestroika is in full swing and one could only rejoice? A great deal is good but there should be more of it. There is obstruction and opposition and, actually, why should there not be? What reasons do we have to hope that things will go smoothly? None. Here as well as we can see, the old situation guaranteed a more peaceful life. Again, unless we point out, unless we note, unless we discuss and condemn any case of such hindrance this would create favorable conditions for similar cases. This applies not to the past, for we did make an error, and what can we do now about it, but to the future!

It was very good to see live on television the launching of Yu. Romanenko and A. Laveykin. Nonetheless we could not bring ourselves to report that this crew was the backup for the "unlucky" V. Titov and A. Serebrov, and the fact that one of the members of that crew had been grounded on the recommendation of the physicians: Cosmonaut G.M. Grechko was not allowed to tell the viewers of this fact although, however hard I may think, I cannot imagine at all what kind of state secret would such a simple ordinary matter contain? Conversely, is it not obvious from the very fact of the replacement of the crew how exigent are the "space" physicians in their work? And does the excellent work which Romanenko and Laveykin did in orbit not prove that the backup crew is not a formality? In answer to G.M. Grechko's puzzlement as to why he could not tell the truth about his comrade and his former commander, he was answered by another question: "What for?"

It immediately becomes clear that a great deal of very difficult but important and necessary work lies ahead. This accursed "What for?" I have heard for many long years. It was very difficult each time to find a proper answer and a convincing explanation. But then I found the most accurate, the most specific answer: "Because it is the truth!" Today we realize with increasing clarity the beneficial results of the democratic changes which are being so systematically implemented by our party and we realize increasingly the accuracy of the chosen course of glasnost. We realize ever more clearly that telling the truth may be more difficult but can never be worse.

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### Is Economic Management Possible Without Departments?

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[Article by Aleksey Valentinovich Ulyukayev, candidate of economic sciences, KOMMUNIST consultant]

[Text] *"Honestly speaking, I do not need the ministry. We can do without it entirely. We are now procuring our own fodder and earning our own foreign currency. What can a minister give us? Nothing! This is not to say that we do not need coordinating sectors. We need them. However, they must work and be paid by us and not out of the state budget. If the minister can 'catch mice' we shall feed him; if he does not, we shall not"* (V.P. Kabaidze, conference delegate and general director of the Ivanovo Machine-Tool Building Production Association imeni 50-Letiya SSSR).

Similar thoughts were expressed from the rostrum of the party conference in the speeches of a number of delegates, including V.I. Postnikov, general director of the Stavropolskoye Industrial Broiler Association; V.A. Starodubtsev, chairman of the Novomoskovskoye Agroindustrial Association, and others. Until recently such a view would not have met with the extensive support of enterprise managers.

Under the existing economic management system, the interests of producers and the administrative superstructure most frequently coincided. Ministries made decisions and, therefore, bore responsibility for them. It was with their help that a share from the "government pie" consisting of investments, funds, and ceilings was ensured, which depended very little on the efficiency of the work or, in general, on the usefulness of such work to society. All of this created a most beneficial system for the middle management.

The situation is now changing. The radical economic reform is weakening the grounds for economic dependency. A feeling of enterprise and actions based on the principle of "I take over" are already becoming not

isolated cases of revolutionary-minded economic managers. It is literally under our own eyes that a new, a cost accounting economic standard is being created. It is consistent with the new type of economic manager. Whereas in the past one could say that "the circle of such revolutionaries was small," today it is becoming increasingly wider. Speaking in a single voice, enterprise managers are saying that today they do not need departments and that without them they could work more efficiently and with better returns.

What alternative exists to the usual "superior-subordinate" relationship? While scientists and journalists are arguing about departmentalism and its features and ways of surmounting it, practical experience is seeking the real, the operational forms of nondepartmental economic management. The alternative is provided by the association of independent producers based on cost accounting (agrocombines and associations), discussed by V. Postnikov at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Today the process of creating such combines and associations is turning into a real avalanche. There were 13 such units in the RSFSR in 1986; last year they totaled 43. They sold 522,000 tons of meat, 1,751,000 tons of milk and 1,175,000 tons of vegetables, and earned 1,367,100,000 rubles. This year the republic had 78 combines and 47 associations. As a whole, respectively, there are 121 and 66 for the country. In this case the initiative is indeed coming from below with no one pushing it (sometimes it must even be restrained).

Why is this happening? What makes the agrocombine attractive? The traditional evaluation of its advantages as a means of surmounting organizational barriers and combining the production, processing and trade in agricultural commodities is unconvincing. We have had many such concentrations in single hands, many such "single bosses," including the RAPO! Essentially it is not a question of the fact that everything has been gathered within a single pair of hands but the fact that, albeit not entirely, such hands have now been untied. This is because the mandatory procurements, this perennial scourge of agriculture, were eliminated for the agrocombines, with the exception of four items (meat, milk, wool and eggs). And even in the case of such items procurements cannot be arbitrarily increased. Finally the possibility appears of producing precisely that which is profitable under local conditions and what one can and wants to produce and not what is being ordered. Potatoes can be grown in Belorussia and not in Central Asia; strong and hard wheats in the Stavropol area and soft grain in the Nonchernozem. The producer is also given the right to engage in "free trade." He chooses freely where to sell his goods and at what price. For example, in Stavropol Kray it was above all thanks to this factor that in 2 years marketable meat stocks increased by 33 percent. The producer is beginning to be oriented toward the market, the real market with real customers, and not toward the conventional market developed in the offices of procurement personnel or the Mintorg.

Previously it was the grain silo that dictated to the grain producer when, what and how much to deliver. Huge waiting lines were formed. The silo demanded and displayed temper, becoming a kind of temple for the administrative cult of delivering grain to the state, of the "battle for grain." Now this is not a mystical and omnipotent grain elevator a temple of "nonmarketable fetishism," but simply a container for grain, which does not dictate anything to anyone but simply performs a specific technological function.

The rejection of departmental supervision is particularly important precisely in the case of agriculture, for it was the focal point of simultaneous administrative diktat by several powerful departmental monopolies. Their combined power field performed for many years, and still does, the functions of an economic pump. But whereas in the 1930s and the beginning of the 1950s it acted in a single direction: pumping out of the countryside the added and some of the necessary products, today it operates in both directions: the Mintorg or the procurement agencies take while the Minvudkhov, Gosagroprom and Minselkhoz mash give. However, since these monopolies appeared and exist on noneconomic grounds, and since neither financial-material outflow or inflow have any relationship to an equivalent exchange, economic responsibility, incentives and interests, they are strictly administrative and totally oriented toward report figures, which makes the outflow economically useless to the state budget and the inflow useless to the farms. That which the budget receives as a result of manipulating the prices of the delivered grain and the mixed feeds purchased by the farms (that same grain but bought at a much higher price), it loses by writing off loans and adding supplements or benefits to low-profitability farms. Meanwhile, the huge funds which are invested in the kolkhoz and sovkhoz economy merely strengthen dependency. Neither autonomy nor incentives for their thrifty utilization essentially exist. Such free gifts presume an imposition of forms of their utilization (reclamation, agricultural equipment, chemicalization or rural construction) and supervision over such utilization. It was natural, therefore, for this to turn merely into "development" and be accompanied by a rapidly declining return. For example, in order to obtain the same percentage of increased output, in the 11th 5-year period the APK had to invest 2.4 times more funds than during the 9th.

If economically and technologically efficient investments which provide incentives and presume economic responsibility could be likened to an injection of vitamins, the existing form of budget financing of agroindustrial complexes is like injecting kerosene under the skin: the tissue swells and a boil appears (which includes reinforced concrete palaces for cows and huge water reclamation systems, and dumps of obsolete agricultural machinery); the temperature rises (i.e., what rises is the fuss created by the "utilization of funds," which gives the appearance of economic management but makes no real economic sense), and the health of the patient worsens rather than improves.

An example of economic management of this kind (a pump working in both directions) was cited by Marx in "*Das Kapital*." The Romans paid very generous prices for goods they purchased in the cities of Asia Minor with funds they had stolen (see K. Marx and F. Engels "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 23, p 173).

The creation of agrocombines and associations is the first step to abandoning the field of action of the administrative-departmental pump. Three of them—Stavropolskoye, Ramenskoye and Kuban—formed their own foreign trade firms which independently purchase and sell virtually any commodity, have their own accounts in the Vneshekonombank, have full control over their foreign exchange income and set up enterprises with foreign companies.

Such freeing of hands and commercial autonomy (albeit by no means complete and consistent) give real economic content to Lenin's principle of relations with the peasantry: "It does not pay to command!" The administrative vertical is beginning to be pushed aside by the economic horizontal. Gradually this is eliminating the middlemen between the general secretary and the Arkhangelsk muzhik, who emasculate the ideas of the former, hinder the efforts of the latter and charge society a huge fee merely for turning their pump on and off. Thus, for each ton of meat sold by the Stavropolskoye Association, the commercial organizations earn (essentially for issuing a sale order and allocating funds) commercial discounts worth more than 500 rubles (such discounts for the country at large totaled 15.8 percent of marketing prices, whereas sales by the association stores are entirely content with a 5 percent discount).

The orientation toward the market is strengthening. The new cost accounting horizontal relations demand of the economic manager new qualities. Whereas previously his main qualification was his ability to report and "collect" resources, now he must follow the situation, study the consumer, be able to compete and to predict economic developments and, above all, be a merchant, be able to show a profit and to reinvest funds.

Do you remember Kostanzhoglo, from Gogol's "*Dead Souls*," who, from fish scales dumped on his shore by his neighbors, was able to earn 40,000 rubles by turning them into glue? We seem to have lost the ability to turn waste into income. But not entirely. Thus, Viktor Ivanovich Postnikov, from the Stavropolskoye Association, will sell this year to the FRG 2,000 tons of byproducts; he will sell to Denmark 60 tons of goose feathers. It turns out that byproducts and waste are a most marketable commodity. Although domestic broilers are still non-competitive on the Western market (the production cost of poultry meat is in excess of 2,000 rubles per ton but sells on the European markets for no more than \$800), it turns out that canned chicken livers are in tremendous demand. Everything can be used and everything can be profitable. Annual exports by the association exceeded 4

million foreign exchange rubles. Foreign exchange earnings are being reinvested in items such as imported equipment for the manufacturing of chicken sausages, canned goose liver, deep freezers, and even containers and labels (if you want to sell on the Western market you must have proper packaging and presentation), or else used to bring in additional earnings. This year, for example, earnings from the sale of goods to Austria were used to purchase coffee which the association is selling in the USSR through its own commercial outlets.

The next natural commercial step is production diversification. The association has started a profitable breeding of animals for fur, participates in fur auctions and earns a great deal of foreign exchange. Talks are underway on opening jointly with an Italian company enterprises for making and selling fur coats and hats.

In addition to direct deals and joint production activities, the people of Stavropol have begun to act as middlemen. They purchase from local producers and sell to the West horses, honey, and sunflower oil, charging a 10 percent commission for their services. The area of such activity is quite vast, from Brest to Siberia. Based on an agreement concluded with the Austrian Agromit Company, the association represents it in the USSR. It looks for partners, provides organizational facilities for talks and helps in the negotiations. For such services as well it charges 10 percent of the amount of each signed contract. It is planning to open a hotel for Western businessmen in Moscow and to set up its own computer center (for itself and for services to others against payment), and many others.

But is it possible that the Stavropol people have become carried away by foreign trade and middlemen activities and so have we, by describing them? Saturating the domestic food market remains the most important project. I believe that in this case everything is interrelated. By becoming a powerful European-class company, the association, first of all, acquires an economic-legal (true commercial autonomy) and, second, economic-technological (contemporary production, trade, transportation, information-control base) base for drastically increasing trade on the domestic market, upgrading production quality and broadening variety.

Technologically, the association is already able to produce as much as 100 different poultry-meat products, although in reality approximately 30 varieties are produced, for so far there has been no demand for other. Incidentally, it is precisely this type of knowledge of what the market needs today and preparedness for what it will demand tomorrow that are, in my view, the most important features of the new cost accounting standard of economic management.

The association markets about 10,000 tons of cleaned and packaged and more extensively processed poultry in the Stavropol area and approximately 30,000 tons beyond it. The share of sales through its own commercial

outlets is increasing steadily. There are eight company stores in the kray and, as a whole, here the problem of supplying the population with poultry meat and eggs has been solved. This year the association opened two company stores in Moscow. In the second half of the year 10,000 tons of meat will have been sold in the capital, including 3,000 prepackaged, 300 tons of poultry sausage goods and 2.5 million tins of canned food. The plans for next year call for the marketing of 25,000 tons here (10,000 tons packaged, 500 tons sausages, and 6 million tins of canned goods) and the opening of another six stores.

Economic results match such business initiatives. Last year alone the association's profit increased by one-half, totaling 44 million rubles. It has not made use of long-term bank loans since 1983 and operates on the basis of full self-financing.

Equally good is the situation at the Kuban and Ramenskoye Agrocombines. Last year they earned, respectively, 113.7 and 50.3 million rubles with a profitability of 23 and 19.3 percent. They too are selling extensively their goods through their company stores and are exporting abroad.

However, it would be erroneous and even dangerous to stop at welcoming enthusiastically their achievements. These initial results of the economic reform are adequate only if looked at from the point of view of our present situation which does not involve normal trade and good services and where both intensive work and competent management are low. Compared to the work standards of Western partners and the tasks set by perestroyka, it becomes clear that the grapes are still too sour! The cost of output remains high and yields, milk production and weight increases remain low.

There is a lack of production standards and services, knowledge of the market and marketing skills. Let us assume that this should not be expected after only 2 or 3 years of work under constantly changing conditions. The point is, however, that the commercial autonomy of the agrocombines is very insecure and unstable. It is simply calamitous. This year, for example, state orders for sugar and vegetable oil accounted for 100 percent of the total output. We are lucky that this did not apply to the agrocombines, for otherwise their initiative and feeling of enterprise would have suffered. I am convinced that economic independence based on the market and orientation toward the consumers, on the one hand, and administrative subordination (to the Gosagroprom, for example), on the other, are "two incompatible matters." Departmental management is not only the fifth wheel which is not only unnecessary to but directly obstructs progress. The producer must obey only the law. Furthermore, the Law on the Cooperative provides extensively greater possibilities for untying the hands than the Law on the State Enterprise. In order to circumvent the obstacles created by the latter, the Stavropolskoye Association, for example, was forced to create a cooperative

consisting of its seven poultry farms. This is a case of necessity becoming the mother of invention. This legal disparity must be corrected: we must either amend the Law on the Enterprise wherever necessary, or else replace these two laws with a new one.

Does this mean that the existing national economic structure and the level of real socialization of production do not require the coordination and management of activities of cost accounting producers? I believe that it does not. Economic management is necessary. It must be provided not only through centralized regulatory instruments for setting prices, taxes, interest rates and standards. This is one aspect of economic management based on national economic interests and personified in the state authorities of a "state budgetary-centric" nature. There should be another side as well, based on orienting the interests of the producer toward the market through independently created economic structures of an "economic-centric" nature. This form and management method, consisting of services and contracts based on cost accounting, are the most important principles for the efficient implementation of the radical reform.

A service management, unlike a command management, does not trigger in the producer an orientation toward accountability reports, which eliminate any concern for real end results. An entire layer of relations between manager and managed disappears, dealing with the allocation of resources, assignments and reporting on their implementation. They are replaced by relations of partnership and cost accounting responsibility. The service management is based not on the sacred authority of power, in which at all times "criticism from below is poison and criticism from above is medicine," but on competence, managerial skills and orientation of all management activities toward the interest of the producer. Whereas the command management is monopolistic by definition, the service management presumes extensive opportunity for competition among its subjects, and the free choice on the part of the managed concerning the specific type of management they prefer.

Anything which the producer operating on the basis of cost accounting could resolve and accomplish independently (the agrocombine, in our case), he does and decides. As to whatever he cannot do, he turns to the managerial structure which he has created himself and which materially depends on him. The study of market situations, progressive experience, scientific developments, new technologies, representation of his interests in different areas, computer services, pursuing a standardized price and foreign trade policy, exchange of commodities among combines, organization of joint enterprises, deals, projects, loans and contemporary cadre training are not within the scope of the individual combine. All of this could be accomplished by an association, a syndicate, a consortium of combines (today such words create an impression similar to the one we had in our childhood when we pronounced words such as

Kalimantan, Madagascar or the Amazon. Not astonishingly, and although belatedly, the age of great economic discoveries has dawned for us).

Logically, the first step of coordinating and establishing cost accounting horizontal ties among producers should be their informal association, a "telephone club" of managers. For example, Kuban supplies beef to the Stavropol stores; in turn they supply the Kuban stores with poultry. This leads to a reciprocal enrichment of variety. They could also engage in reciprocal opening of departments in the stores of their partners, reciprocal use of temporarily available warehousing facilities and refrigerators, leasing refrigeration space, granting commercial loans and providing cadre training. This year Kuban will commission the largest European facility for the production of containers (corrugated cardboard, Eurocans, Tetrapack, etc.), which will far exceed its own requirements; Stavropolskoye will become its steady and, possibly, preferred customer. Stavropolskoye has already opened a network of its stores in Moscow but has no refrigeration facilities (for the time being it is leasing refrigeration capacities for 300 tons of products). Ramenskoye and Kuban are also beginning to show up on the Moscow market. Through their joint efforts they could install their own refrigeration capacities. The same method could be applied in establishing refrigeration and storing facilities in the resort centers on the Black Sea and in Kavkazskiy Mineralnyye Vody. The people of Stavropol intend to create and equip their own agency and hotel in Moscow. Clearly, their partners would be able to lease from them some of their premises.

It is thus that gradually, step by step, the association partners will set up an entire network of reciprocal agreements, deals and projects (formal and informal) as well as joint enterprises. Whereas previously their commerce could be described as "invisible tears" today they can be described as invisible connections. Gradually the range of partners could be broadened. Forms of cooperation would become more complex and the interdependence and intercoordination of actions would increase which, as I understand it, is the essence of real socialization, in the course of which the economic management by an entity becomes also part of the economic management of another entity and, consequently, becomes an area of joint economic management.

I repeat, such a development would be entirely consistent with the logic of economic life. At the present time, however, changes in economic life are becoming increasingly faster. Organizational and regulatory changes could outstrip the economic-psychological grounds required for their functioning. A simple solution to this would be difficult. On the one hand, the departmental system must be developed as quickly as possible. This is assisted by the creation of alternate economic structures. On the other, there is a great risk that a new administrative spiral would develop and that one more authority for administration by mandate would be created.

Such circumstances must be borne in mind in discussing the pluses and minuses in the creation of an agroconsortium. The creation of such a consortium, requested by the Kuban and Ramenskoye Combines and Stavropolskoye Association was approved with the RSFSR Council of Ministers Order of 27 June 1988. A draft regulation on the agroconsortium was formulated and submitted for discussion by the constituent council of its participants. Preliminary readiness to join the consortium has already been expressed by more than 30 combines and associations in the Russian federation (i.e., approximately 25 percent of their total number). Participation in such a consortium is truly voluntary. Some combines considered such participation inexpedient and refused to join it. No pressure has been applied on them. Conversely, the problem has been the excessive number of candidates. Many of them, obviously, are not prepared for this because of their inadequate material and financial base and the lack of conditions for extensively selling on the domestic and foreign food markets. Understandably, they are attracted by the possibility of getting out from under the control of departmental supervision and acquiring real cost accounting autonomy.

Obviously, they are also relying on the help of the stronger partners. However, at this point we must clearly distinguish between mutually profitable intermediary, information, crediting and application services and a new form of economic dependency (redistribution of foreign currency, for instance).

According to the draft regulation, the combines and associations will join the agroconsortium on the basis of democratic cooperative principles, retaining their full juridical and economic autonomy. Their main tasks are to coordinate production and commercial activities, the study and practical application of the achievements of contemporary science, technology, equipment and progressive experience, the creation of joint enterprises, the organization of commodity trade among combines, and interaction with a view to broadening trade in food products in Moscow and other industrial centers and resort areas, and the application of a unified technical and foreign trade policy. These stipulations are incontestable.

Practical experience makes us adopt a cautious attitude toward the suggestion of creating centralized funds, including a reserve fund and a fund for support of the management apparatus, based on withholdings from the profits of participants. Officially everything seems entirely democratic: the amounts of withholdings and the procedure for the utilization of the funds are set at the meeting of the legally entitled members of the agroconsortium. In reality, however, judging by the legal documents, the RAPO itself should be considered as a totally democratic organization. It is important to see to it that this point does not become a loophole for inflating the consortium's apparatus or for creating a potential possibility of dominating the participants, limiting their independence and encouraging economic dependency.

That is precisely why it is so important to ensure the strictly voluntary nature of participation in any type of fund and the right on the part of any participant to veto any decision on withholding any of its funds, regardless of the method used.

According to the tasks of the consortium, its apparatus should be minimal. It must be temporary, organized on a contractual basis, for the purpose of implementing specific projects. It is precisely thus that essentially matters have been organized within the Stavropolskoye Association itself. Currently its services are the following: legal, auditing, automated control, planning and foreign economic activities (all of them set up on a cost accounting basis). No internal planning and accountability services have been set up. Each sovkhov carries out its production activities independently. The principle followed here is to limit centralization to what is necessary and to grant autonomy to the extent of the possible. In the past, for example, material and technical supplies and feed procurements were centralized. This was necessary, for, alone, the sovkhoves could not fight the diktat of suppliers and were harmed by time and variety breakdowns of deliveries. The association as a whole proved to be a very serious partner. A procurement system was organized and suppliers were "taught" promptness. The need for centralizing such functions disappeared, and they were shifted to the sovkhoves.

Should the agroconsortium display a tendency, by hook or by crook, to preserve the opposite administrative principle of granting autonomy only as much as is necessary and to practice centralization as much as is possible, the "founding fathers" of the agroconsortium would be forced to repeat after Taras Bulba: "I created you and I shall destroy you!"

The strict and punctual implementation of the requirements of voluntary participation, mutual profitability and democracy in the activities of the agroconsortium would make it possible to convert to a servicing management from two sides: through direct interaction and interdependence of combines and the creation of coordinating cost accounting structures. For example, the idea was brought forth of opening in Moscow a big modern store by the agroconsortium, with its specialized branches and foreign currency department. Naturally, this is both attractive and advantageous to the participants. In this case as well refrigeration facilities could be shared with the stores of the Stavropolskoye Association. The creation of its own bank by the agroconsortium will not replace but expand the development of reciprocal commercial credit among the participants. A great variety of forms could develop also through cooperation in foreign economic activities, such as coordination, providing middlemen services, or commission sales. It is already clear that the founding agrocombines do not intend in the least to give up their right directly to export to the foreign market, for they have already been able to assess its advantages.

Many specialists justifiably consider our economy as being the most monopolized in the world. However, the powerful monopolies which exist in our country presently (Aeroflot, MPS, Minsvyaz, Mintorg and others) are of a strictly administrative origin. They developed not as a result of competition but of its total suppression; strangely interwoven in their activities are economic and noneconomic aspects. All of them are branches off a single trunk—governmental monopoly in the appropriation and distribution of the national income. The agroconsortium is something else. Here the monopoly is established not from above but from below. It has a clearly marked economic nature and does not display around its head the “governmental halo.” However, one cannot say that it (like a monopoly in a market oriented economy) is the result of competition. What kind of competition is there for the ruble of the customer, given the present situation in the consumer and, specifically, the food market! Such competition, however, is promising and making possible the currently implemented principles of freeing the hands. Therefore, in our case the monopoly is shaping along with competition but not instead of it. Does this monopoly create a tangible threat to the consumer? I believe that, for the time being, it does not. The real level of socialization will long remain such as to prevent a monopoly, which is economic in its nature, to become sufficiently broad and comprehensive. On a parallel basis, the real competition among producers will be developing. The process of intensified integration of our economy within the system of global economic relations itself and bringing the domestic and foreign markets close to each other substantially limit the real influence of monopoly structures. Above all, today the voluntary associations present a much greater threat to the administrative-departmental monopoly and are contributing to its dismantling.

Nonetheless, we should not forget the negative aspects of a market monopoly. Therefore, it would be hardly expedient to accelerate the creation of agrocombines and associations where no objective conditions for their joining of agroconsortiums exist. The purpose of the existence of the agroconsortium is not to organize production or the redistribution of assets (which would make any participant “acceptable”), but to coordinate their commercial policy. This means that the participants must include only those which are both interested and ready (materially, organizationally, and psychologically) for an orientation toward the market, working for the market, and subordinating their activities to market requirements. Therefore, in the initial stages any excessive expansion of the consortium should even be restrained. Naturally, this should be the work of the participants themselves, who would accomplish this through suitable democratic ways. Furthermore, it would be expedient to create subsequently several consortiums on a sectorial, regional or any other basis, in order to increase the potential of socialist competitiveness rather than to weaken it.

Obviously, many enterprises today will try to use the new economic forms to solve their own problems without

excessively worrying about how consistent they are with their economic nature. Following is a characteristic example. Four organizations: The Novyy Mir Sovkhoz, near Moscow; the oblast administration of Agroprombank, the Agrostroy Association and the Gidromontazh Trust decided to create a cattle feeding complex for 5,000 head on a share holding basis, enticingly named an agroconsortium. In itself the idea of setting up an actual share holding enterprise with limited liability, which would attract investments by other sectors in agriculture, creates no objections. However, a closer look would indicate that here we have the very same case of a monopoly that (not purely economic but administrative-economic) outstrips competitiveness and prevents its development. To begin with, this is a monopoly of construction funds. Just try at this point to reach an agreement with the contractor who, in this case, would be an interested party. The concentration of capacities on this project would lengthen construction time for a number of other projects. Secondly, the complex would become an actual monopoly of concentrated fodder in Naro-Fominskiy Rayon.

Generally speaking, in this case market and commercial orientation is by no means the main feature. The Novyy Mir Sovkhoz is an underprofitable enterprise which liabilities totaling several million rubles. Outside of such a consortium it would have simply been unable to obtain funds and in each case construction (incidentally, not all that well technologically and economically planned) would have been a new form of dependency. To rural construction workers a consortium is simply a lesser evil, for otherwise that same Novyy Mir Kolkhoz would have become their auxiliary enterprise. But who needs this burden—a chronically lagging farm! Now they will be able to provide their personnel with inexpensive meat and, under the conditions of limited liability, the losses would be clearly lesser than had they taken over the entire “economy” of the sovkhoz.

The possibilities of an autonomous cost accounting economic management, including an innovative form such as the agroconsortium, are extensive. I believe that their implementation will allow us to solve the production problem as it is formulated today: supplying food to the consumer. However, the problem will not disappear but will manifest itself differently: How and with what to feed the person who has satisfied his basic needs for food (i.e., in the aspect in which this problem exists today in Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, for instance). Obviously, what will become aggravated is not the problem of marketing, which is currently the most relevant to us. This is a problem which will be faced by the agricultural combines within the consortium. V.I. Postnikov believes that this problem is already facing us and he reacts to this as should a merchant, a civilized member of cooperatives, oriented toward the market: by expanding the variety of output, intensifying the processing of products and giving them an attractive appearance. For example, the Stavropolskoye Association produces chicken fillet which it sells at a loss, at 3.90 rubles per



kilogram (with a production cost of 4.80 rubles). Why? Because once the market has been saturated with the usual packaged poultry meat, the customer will become attracted by the more extensively processed product and the Stavropol people are preparing in advance their positions on the market for this product (which, naturally, does not exclude the need to lower its production cost). The same purpose is served by increasing the technological possibilities of increasing variety at the first sign of demand on the market and creating in the customer an attractive image of the Stavropol firm. For example, eggs are sold only in a plastic wrapping, although also at a loss (6 kopeks per 10 eggs). However, this loss is covered by profits from other types of activities and in the mind of the consumer the "Stavropolskoye" trademark is clearly related to accuracy, cleanliness and good packaging. Gradually we are reaching an understanding of the most important principle of the ethics of market relations: the good reputation of a company is its most valuable asset and brings real profits.

It is on this basis that we begin to understand better the desire of the Stavropol people to broaden the geographic boundaries for the marketing of their goods. The reason for which they are leasing their refrigeration facilities in Moscow (down to an hourly level of accuracy), incurring additional transportation costs and marketing thousands of tons of output is not because they have been ordered to do this by their "superiors," and also not for the sake of being able to boast about it. This is yet another way of securing firm market positions.

A market orientation demands an entirely different training of specialists, compared with the past. Normally organized trade, which should not be confused with the distribution of products, is impossible without the ability to take into consideration and to process a tremendous volume of dynamic information and flexibly to react to changes in market circumstances. Whereas today this is being done by a few self-taught people, such managers must be trained to meet the needs of the future. The Stavropolskoye Association plans to send five to seven such young specialists abroad. The organization of such a training could become one of the functions of the agroconsortium.

Naturally, in itself the consortium, like any other economic form, cannot become a panacea for all economic ills. All too frequently we have triumphantly sent off sailing on the national economic sea the latest boat bearing the flag of "innovation" although that boat never left the harbor and infamously sank to the bottom. We must not allow such fate to be inflicted on the agroconsortium. The conversion to a cost accounting management method serving the producers is too important to us and we are greatly relying on it in the course of the radical reform of the agrarian economy, aimed at solving the problem which is of the greatest importance to us today—food.

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### **'Separation of Powers' and the Experience of the Soviet State**

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[Article by Boris Mikhaylovich Lazarev, professor, head of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law]

[Text] In the course of the discussion on the reform of our political system, there have been increasingly frequent calls for implementing the principle of the "separation of powers." This is not a purely academic problem for political experts and jurists. Our attitude toward it will affect the practical solution of the basic problems of structuring the governmental mechanism and its legal controls. A number of articles in the draft Law on Amendments and Supplements to the USSR Constitution indicate a specific attitude toward the "separation of powers," taking historical experience and present requirements into consideration. However, in order to understand what "separation of powers" implies, let us go back to the origins of this question.

#### **I**

Many philosophers in the past (Aristotle, Marcellus of Padua, D. Locke, and others) have noted that the activities of the state are heterogeneous and include several areas: legislation and execution of the laws (or their management) and, frequently, justice. It has also been noted that the various state authorities specialize in one or another of these activities. Based on the ideas of his predecessors, the noted French historian and philosopher Montesquieu (1689-1755), created the theory of the "separation of powers," which was adopted and became a classic. In his view, in a properly structured state not one but three powers independent of each other should exist: legislative, executive and judicial. Any other combination in the hands of a single authority or individual, he emphasized, inevitably leads to neglect of common interests, abuses and incompatibility with the political freedom of the individual. Concentrating in the same hands legislative and executive power, he wrote, undermines the supremacy of the law; if judges not only judge but also legislate, life itself would turn out to be a victim of arbitrariness. The combination of all three powers in general would indicate "horrifying despotism." Montesquieu's system excluded the existence of an authority which would provide a general direction and would coordinate all "powers." The legislative power, he suggested, should belong to parliament, one of whose chambers would represent the "third estate," while the other would represent the aristocracy. The executive power, in his view, should be given to the monarch, while the judicial power should be embodied in a court of assessors, i.e., an authority representing the "third estate" (it is true that the existence of seigniorial courts was allowed



as well). According to Montesquieu, the executive power is bound by the law while the courts are independent and can be guided by the law only. It is also necessary, Montesquieu believed, that the powers "restrain each other." In particular, he suggested that the king be given the right to veto any law passed by parliament and even to dissolve the latter. This was a theory of political compromise between the then young bourgeoisie and the feudal ruling stratum.

Montesquieu's concept was criticized by the firmer ideologues of the bourgeoisie, who had formulated the idea of the sovereignty of the people. They rejected the division of power among the estates, for the bourgeoisie already wanted to hold full power. One of the greatest philosophers of the 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, proved, for example, that the sovereignty of the people must be the foundation of the state system. Therefore, he believed that the legislative, executive and judicial powers should be merely the specific manifestations of a single supreme power, i.e., the "separation of powers" should be interpreted in the organizational-legal sense. In Rousseau's opinion, the legislative power should be exercised by the people directly (through assemblies) and the executive power by the government, answerable to the people. It is only in large states that the creation of representative authorities should be allowed. Other bourgeois ideologues emphasized the need for a parliament.

The "separation of powers" was accepted by many constitutions of bourgeois countries, based on the thesis of the sovereignty of the people and the principle of the supremacy of the law based on it. Furthermore, a seemingly paradoxical situation developed: the widest possible application of the "separation of powers" was achieved in the United States, a country in which, to begin with, there were no problems of political compromise between the bourgeoisie and the feudal lords.

According to the U.S. Constitution, the legislative power belongs to the Congress, which consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate, while the executive power consists of the President, who is elected not by the Congress and not by the population, but by the electors. The President is both the head of the state and of the government; he must observe the laws but is not subordinate to the Congress. The House of Representatives could initiate the impeachment of a President, should he commit serious legal violations, but the final decision must be made by the Senate. The state budget is ratified by the Congress as presented by the President. The President appoints secretaries, other managers and high officials of federal departments and ambassadors with the consent of the Senate. He takes active part in the legislative process. The laws (bills) passed by Congress are submitted to the President who could either sign them or return them to the Congress with a message in which he presents his objections. The Congress could override the presidential veto and reinstate the law (by two-third vote in each of the chambers). In addition to

the Congress, the President himself can initiate a great deal of laws (decrees, directives, plans for reorganization, and so on). The U.S. Supreme Court consists of a supreme justice and members of the court appointed for life by the President with the consent of the Senate, which ensures the independence of the court from the other governmental authorities. The Supreme Court deals with a small number of matters in the first instance. It is the Supreme Court of Appeal and it is important to note, an authority on observing the Constitution. In this connection, it could consider a law anticonstitutional (in which case the law must not be applied, although the Supreme Court cannot annul it).

Other variants of the "separation of powers" exist such as, for example, in countries in which the President is granted his rights by Parliament or direct elections, as well as in countries in which there is no President but a Parliament with a government and a Constitutional Court responsible to it or to any constitutional supervisory authority. As a whole, such a governmental mechanism has allowed the bourgeoisie, for a long time, firmly to remain in power, and to take into consideration the interests of the different factions within the ruling class, reduce the threat of subjectivism and arbitrariness and abuse of power, and block any "excessive" pressure on Parliament by progressive forces.

An assessment of the principle of the "separation of powers" should require noting its positive and negative aspects. The most positive is that it presumes the existence of a supreme representative authority, which is an important democratic institution. Democracy, including socialist democracy, V.I. Lenin wrote, is inconceivable without representative institutions (see "*Poln. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 33, p 48). Also worthy of approval is the concentration of the legislative power in the hands of the supreme representative authority. This is another important democratic principle. "It is only elected officials," Lenin emphasized, "who can speak in the legislative language of the state" (op. cit., vol 35, p 109). Nonetheless, clearly undemocratic is prohibiting the legislative authorities to invade the area of the executive authorities, for this drastically limits the role of parliament and leads to the fact that problems of administration are almost entirely concentrated in the hands of the government and the departments, i.e., authorities the decisions within which are made by a small collegium or by a single person and, as a rule, behind closed doors. The independence of the courts and the fact that they are subject only to the law is yet another important democratic principle, the purpose of which is to guarantee the observance of the laws. "Checks and balances" in relations among governmental authorities may be used in the interest of democracy and legality.

The Paris Communards were the first to be faced with the practical solution of the problem of the attitude of the state of dictatorship of the proletariat toward the principle of the "separation of powers." The Commune

openly proclaimed that the power was to belong to the proletariat. Furthermore, it almost totally combined in the hands of its representative authority—the Council—both legislative activities and the execution of the laws. Sectorial management was provided by commissions under the council, which included a small number of officials. There was no government as a specific authority. The historical merit of the Commune was the creation of a representative authority of a new type. It was new not only in terms of its class nature but also the nature of its range of competence: its activities were not reduced merely to the drafting of laws but it also had the executive power, which conflicted with one of the main postulates of the “separation of powers.”

## II

The first constitutional acts of Soviet Russia proclaimed the unity of state power and the fact that it belonged to the working people, with their representative authorities. The “supreme power,” stipulated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, belongs to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets; in the period between congresses, it belongs to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee—the VTsIK (Article 12). This in itself established the primacy of representative over all other authorities.

Based on the experience of the Paris Commune, in his article “Ten Theses on the Soviet System,” (March 1918), V.I. Lenin included among them the “combination of legislative with executive state work. The merger of management with legislation” (op. cit., vol 36, p 72). However, this concept had to be implemented taking already into consideration the existence of authorities which the Commune did not have: a government (Council of People's Commissars) and people's commissariats. The total combination of legislative with executive activities on the level of the supreme representative authorities was no longer possible, for the SNK and the people's commissariats had been created especially in order to assume the bulk of executive activities. The supreme authorities—the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the VTsIK—had not only legislative rights but also the right actively to operate in the administrative area. The VTsIK provided the “overall trend of activities of the government.” The purpose of the Congress of Soviets and the VTsIK was to solve the most important governmental problems, as the Constitution clearly stipulated, and, furthermore, “all problems which they deem subject to their resolution,” i.e., including problems of management. The VTsIK, the Constitution stipulated, “combines and coordinates work related to legislation and management.” All of this was totally inconsistent with the principle of the “separation of powers,” but increased the role of representative institutions.

The principle of “separation of powers” notwithstanding, the combination of legislative with administrative functions was achieved through the SNK. Historians and jurists disagree on the fact that it was at that point that

the government was granted legislative rights. The following reasons are noted: the need for urgent legislative codification of the breakdown of the old and the creation of new social relations; the impossibility immediately and precisely to demarcate the lines of competence of the supreme authorities of the state; and the negative attitude toward the principle of the “separation between legislative and executive powers.” Obviously, the first two reasons played the main role, as confirmed by the trends in the changing correlation between legislative activities of representative authorities, on the one hand, and the government, on the other. Between 1917 and 1920 most of the laws were promulgated by the SNK. The practice, subsequently, changed: legislative activities became essentially concentrated in the hands of the VTsIK while the executive power went to the SNK. In 1922, in connection with converting to peaceful socialist construction, V.I. Lenin suggested that the VTsIK session be extended “in order to formulate the basic problems of legislation.”

The establishment of a new judicial system was initiated immediately after the victory of the Great October Revolution. On 5 December (22 November) 1917, the SNK passed Decree No 1 “On the Courts.” Local courts were set up through direct elections and, before them, elected by the local soviets. At the same time, revolutionary courts were set up, appointed by guberniya and city authorities. However, the principle of “justice is meted out only by the courts,” and that “the courts are independent and obey exclusively the law” did not develop immediately. Under the extraordinary conditions of the Civil War, conspiracies and mutinies, a considerable share of criminal cases were tried by the administrative authorities (the VChK and the militia, the local executive committees, etc.). As a result, according to 1919-1920 data, more than 50 percent of the sentences of individuals who had been sent to forced labor camps to serve their terms, were on the basis of administrative orders. Furthermore, at that time the judicial organs acted under the overall management and control of the People's Commissariat of Justice and the local executive committees, i.e., the “executive authorities,” which was explained with the weakness of the cadres in judicial institutions and the existence among them of old jurists, who had agreed to serve the Soviet system but who had poorly mastered the meaning of its laws, as well as the absence of new laws concerning a number of problems. This frequently made it necessary to make decisions on the basis of revolutionary legality only.

The role of the courts drastically increased during the period of the NEP. By decree of the VTsIK and the SNK, dated 23 June 1921 “On the Procedure for Imposing Administrative Penalties,” the following law-principle was formulated: the administrative authorities can impose on the citizens exclusively administrative penalties while cases related to crimes shall be considered by the judicial authorities. In 1922 the VChK became the GPU, which had the exclusive right to investigate state

crimes and submit the cases to the courts. The need for the creation of a general republic court became pressing. In 1925 the People's Commissariat of Justice set up a department for superior judicial control, with the right to annul sentences and decisions by courts, should they conflict with the legislation. This was a central administrative authority which actually exercised judicial functions. However, this was a short-lasting situation. A three-step system was created in the course of the 1922 judicial reform: people's court-guberniya court-USSR Supreme Court. The revolutionary tribunals were closed down. The management authorities were forbidden to interfere in the administration of justice. It was thus that the court system was no longer under the supervision of the administrative authorities.

The USSR Supreme Court was created with the founding of the USSR, under the USSR Central Executive Commission. According to the 1923 regulation, as assigned by the Central Executive Commission Presidium of the USSR, the Supreme Court was to determine the legality of acts of the USSR SNK and the Central Executive Committees of Union Republics. This was the first attempt made in our state to institute an authority of constitutional supervision. However, it was eliminated at the beginning of the 1930s. Such supervision was incompatible with the then developing administrative-command system.

The story of the appearance of a new "authority"—prosecutor's supervision—which appeared in 1922, is interesting. It indicates that V.I. Lenin boldly took up the use of "checks" and "counterbalances," should this contribute to the strengthening of legality. Many members of the party's Central Committee and the VTsIK supported the idea that the local prosecutors obeyed not only the prosecutor of the RSFSR but also the local executive committees, i.e., be under "double jurisdiction." L. Kaganovich, who was the first to speak out on this matter, at a meeting of the VTsIK on this matter, proclaimed any other decision to be a violation of the constitutional right of the full powers of the soviets. In his letter "On the 'Double' Subordination and Legality," Lenin pointed out that the position of the supporters of the "double jurisdiction" of the prosecutors "is an expression of the interests and prejudices of the local bureaucracy and parochial influences." He firmly favored the centralized structure of the prosecutor's office, the purpose of which was to ensure uniform legality. In explaining the fact that the prosecutor does not have any administrative power, he suggested "reserving for the prosecutor's power the right and obligation to oppose any and all decisions taken by the local authorities, from the viewpoint of the legality of such resolutions or decrees, without the right to block them but with exclusive right to submit the case for resolution by the court" (op. cit., vol 45, p 201). Consequently, according to Lenin, the court should become the final authority in assessing the legality of the actions of the local authorities. These ideas were codified in the 22

May 1922 Politburo Resolution. However, at the meeting of the communist faction of the VTsIK the item relative to the courts was not adopted because of its unusual nature and opposition on the part of local personnel and, in its second decree, dated 24 May, the Politburo deleted from the draft regulation on the prosecutor's office the words "with the exceptional right to submit the case to the decision of the court" (see V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 45, p 551). The regulation stipulated that the appeal must be submitted to the superior executive authority. Therefore, Lenin's idea was by no means fully implemented.

The question of what official should head it and to whom it should be subordinated arose in the creation of the prosecutor's office. According to V.I. Lenin, this could be either the prosecutor general or a new authority—the supreme tribunal or the people's commissar of justice (see op. cit., vol 45, p 200). The RSFSR prosecutor's office was set up within the system of the People's Commissariat of Justice, which was the administrative authority. The people's commissar of justice also became the republic's prosecutor. In 1928 the RSFSR decided to separate the position of people's commissar of justice from that of the republic's prosecutor: the latter position was assumed by an individual with the rank of deputy people's commissar. That same year the Union legislation stipulated that the republic's prosecutor will be either the people's commissar of justice or his deputy. With the founding of the USSR the position of prosecutor of the USSR Supreme Soviet was established, to supervise the legality of the laws passed by Union authorities other than the USSR Central Executive Commission and its Presidium. This prosecutor was answerable to the USSR Central Executive Committee Presidium. The republic's prosecutors were not subordinate to him. In this case, therefore, the prosecutor was not under the jurisdiction of the administrative authorities but was "assigned" to the court.

Therefore, the development of the state mechanism during the first years of the Soviet system, as it strengthened, followed the following trend: increasingly, legislative activities were taken over by the heads of the high representative authorities which, meanwhile, were "invading" the management area; justice became the monopoly of the courts and their independence of the administrative organs was enhanced. Steps were taken to ensure the control of the courts over the "administrative power;" the prosecutor's office appeared—a system of authorities supervising the observance of legality by central management authorities and the local power and management bodies. Consequently, the positive aspects of the "separation of powers" were being increasingly applied while the negative ones were being rejected.

Toward the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, however, this process was halted and, furthermore, reversed. An administrative-command system of party-state management was developing. The role of the management authorities was enhanced while that of the

representative ones was reduced. Few laws were passed. The gaps created by their absence was filled by ukases, governmental resolutions and departmental instructions. Under the conditions of the strengthening regime of personal power, the role of the official state institutions declined in general. Agencies of extrajudicial repression appeared and multiplied. There was systematic interference in judicial affairs, predetermining the nature of sentences to be passed in political trials.

Increasingly, the disparity between the legally written Constitution and the actual situation worsened. Furthermore, the text of the Constitution was subjected to major changes and some of the concepts applicable to the state mechanism, although sounding democratic, in frequent cases merely concealed violations of democracy and legality, assisted by current legislation and, particularly, practice; other stipulations directly followed the path of negative features in the "separation of powers," i.e., taking only their adverse aspects. "The legislative power," stipulated Article 32 of the 1936 USSR Constitution, "is exercised exclusively by the USSR Supreme Soviet." The 1936 Constitution described the government—the USSR SNK (the Council of Ministers, since 1946) as the supreme executive organ of the state power of the USSR, i.e., as the supreme instance of the "executive power." Ignoring the traditions of the Leninist period, the government was no longer the executive authority of the supreme representative body. Furthermore, Article 31 of the USSR Constitution stipulated that the Supreme Soviet will exercise all the rights of the USSR in as much as they are not part of the competence of its subordinate authorities which included the SNK and the people's commissariats. The result was that the Supreme Soviet had no right to solve problems of governmental administration. Consequently, on Stalin's initiative, as documents indicate, the negative aspects of the "separation of powers" were used. Despite this system, however, in practice in some cases the USSR Supreme Soviet nonetheless solved some management problems.

As early as 1928 the republic prosecutor's offices were assigned the management of the investigative apparatus, which began to draw their attention away from their main function: supervision of legality. The USSR Prosecutor's General Office was created in 1933 as an authority which was organizationally independent of the Supreme Court. The prosecutor's of Union republics were under the jurisdiction of the USSR Prosecutor General and had begun to be appointed by him (with the agreement of the central executive committees of the respective republics). The USSR prosecutor general was appointed by the USSR Central Executive Committee but was also responsible to the USSR SNK. In 1936 the republic prosecutors were totally separated from the system of the people's commissariats of justice. Consequently, the "prosecutor's authority" was organizationally established as a single all-Union system and "separated" from the "judicial power" as well as from the

people's commissariat of justice, the "executive" authority. However, the ties between the prosecutor's office and the "governmental power" were not broken. The regulation on the prosecutor's supervision, which was passed in 1955, eliminated the rule of the accountability of the prosecutor general to the government (the regulation stipulated his responsibility only to the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium). Until then, as the head of the government, sometimes Stalin would address a reprimand to the prosecutor general.

The 1936 USSR Constitution was the first to codify on the high legal level the democratic principles that justice is provided by the courts (Article 102), that the judges are independent and obey exclusively the law (Article 112). However, even while the Constitution was being drafted and after its adoption in the country, a system of extrajudicial repression existed and intensified, totally conflicting with it, and the judges were by no means independent. "Justice" in political trials was meted out by the Special Conference of the OGPU and, subsequently, the NKVD and by all kinds of "threesomes" and "twosomes." Stalin and his closest circle approved the lists of individuals to be executed by firing squad or sent to jail. The judges observed these stipulations. The materials which were being drafted by the NKVD authorities and, subsequently, by the MGB, were being forged on a mass scale. Bitter experience proved how important the idea of the "separation of powers" was in having an independent "judiciary" obeying exclusively the law.

The resolutions of the 20th CPSU Congress provided an opportunity for the restoration of the Leninist principles of party and state life. To a certain extent the activities of the Soviets were revived, including those of the USSR Supreme Soviet, both in the areas of legislation and management. The extrajudicial repression authorities were abolished and the rehabilitation of those who had been innocently sentenced was initiated. The new USSR Constitution was adopted in 1977. Although it was passed during the period of stagnation, many of its articles were drafted on the democratic basis of already passed party resolutions. It eliminated the legal norms which emphasized the negative aspects of the "separation of powers." The unity of power and the fact that it belonged to the people were clearly codified; the special role of the soviets was emphasized. "The people," the Constitution stipulated, "exercise the state power through the soviets of people's deputies, which are the political foundation of the USSR." Hence also their special role in the state mechanism: all other state authorities are under the control of and accountable to the soviets (Article 2). It was thus that in the spirit of Soviet traditions, the activities of the representative authorities were defined despite the principle of the "separation of powers" as having a "unifying" nature, i.e., as influencing the activities of all other agencies representing the "specialized authorities." The soviets, as Article 93 stipulated, manage all sectors of state,

economic and sociocultural construction through their agencies. They make decisions which ensure their execution and supervise the implementation of the resolutions.

In defining the competence of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the 1977 Constitution corrected the shortcoming of the 1936 Constitution. This competence was not limited to the "legislative power." The Supreme Soviet, according to Article 108, had the right to solve all problems within the jurisdiction of the USSR. Consequently, it could assume also the solution of problems of administration which were primarily the competence of the government. It is thus that, in the spirit of the Leninist ideas, combining within the supreme representative authority legislation and management was juridically secured.

Justice, as the 1977 USSR Constitution stipulated, could be administered only by the courts (Article 151). This formulation is precise and firm. The independence both of the judges and the people's assessors was codified along with their subordination exclusively to the law. The Constitution reasserted that the USSR Supreme Court is elected by the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1977 the right of a citizen to appeal in court the illegal actions of officials (Article 58 of the USSR Constitution) was raised to a constitutional level. Consequently, it was decided to broaden the use of "checks and balances" in terms of relations between the courts and the administration. For quite some time now the USSR Ministry of Justice and its subordinate agencies have had the exclusive right to subdivide organizational guidance to the courts (to organize the selection of judges, determine the location of the courts and deal with their material and technical procurements, etc.).

However, the new Constitution, which operated under the conditions of an ossified political system, was unable to protect our society from stagnation phenomena. The concentration of state governmental functions in the hands of the party authorities essentially intensified. The role of the state administrative apparatus was increased and that of the soviets, reduced. The independence of the courts and the activeness of the prosecutors declined. On the basis of the resolutions of the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the party mounted a decisive struggle for the renovation of sociopolitical structures and the development of democracy. This process, however, as was noted at the 19th Party Conference, developed sluggishly. The question was raised of a radical reform of the political system. The recently published draft Law on Amending and Supplementing the USSR Constitution was an important juridical document aimed at solving this problem, for a number of constitutional stipulations have already become obsolete.

### III

According to the draft, legislative rights are entirely concentrated in the hands of the supreme representative authority—the Congress of People's Deputies which sets

up the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is important to emphasize that the Supreme Soviet Presidium loses its right to issue legislative ukases. The Supreme Soviet becomes the permanent legislative, executive and control authority of the state system of the USSR. It will be convened for spring and autumn sessions lasting 3 to 4 months each, which will make it possible truly to broaden the legislative regulation of social relations. The draft law, furthermore, includes a list of topics subject to legislative regulation. This is the first time that the Constitution will set up such a list. This too will contribute to the enhancement of the legislative activities of this authority consisting of people's deputies. In our view, however, it would be desirable to add to this list instructions on the procedure for planning economic and social development and establishing the responsibility of the citizen to the state (criminal, administrative and disciplinary). Otherwise the present conflicting situation may be retained according to which the plan is approved by the supreme representative authority while the planning procedure is defined by the USSR Council of Ministers. According to this idea the responsibility of the citizen to the state is to set up a legislative authority and not a management body.

Therefore, the competence of the highest level of the Soviet system will be defined in such a way that the authorities which represent it will not only promulgate laws but will actively participate in management. Thus, the soviet of people's deputies will have the right to solve any problem within the jurisdiction of the USSR, i.e., also problems which are primarily part of the competence of the USSR Council of Ministers. The resolution of the 19th Party Conference "On the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System" stipulates that "the conference deems necessary to strengthen the legislative, administrative and control functions of the soviets...." In this sense, the principle of the "separation of powers" will be once again rejected, this time with a view to upgrading the role of representative institutions, i.e., the development of democracy. A major step has been taken toward the fuller combination within the highest representative institutions of the legislative and supreme executive authority.

However, once again, the total merger of legislation with management did not take place, for the state management authorities are being retained and, as in the past, will be assigned most of the work in management without the right to promulgate laws. In our view, with a view to upgrading the role of the Supreme Soviet in the realm of management and to increase its influence on the activities of the government, it would be expedient to codify in the Constitution, in the spirit of the Leninist period of development of constitutional legislation, that the Supreme Soviet guides the activities of the government and annually (and not "regularly" as is currently stipulated) hears reports on its activities. The Council of Ministers should be depicted as the "executive authority of the Supreme Soviet and the supreme authority of state

management" (the present title of the Council of Ministers is the "Supreme Executive Authority of State Power," which was suggested by Stalin in drafting the 1936 USSR Constitution, with a view to belittling the positions of the Supreme Soviet in state management and upgrading the "autonomy" of the government from the supreme representative authority).

The draft law stipulates the existence of a high supreme official of the state—the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman (who also heads the Supreme Soviet Presidium). It is important to emphasize that the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet is not the counterpart of the soviet of people's deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. To begin with, he is elected by secret vote by the congress, for a 5 year term, and could be recalled ahead of time. Second, he is accountable to the Supreme Soviet and to the Congress. Third, in issuing legal acts he is bound by the laws of the USSR and has no right to promulgate such laws. Fourth, he does not have the right to veto laws promulgated by the Council of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Fifth, the chairman must actively participate in preparations for and holding of congresses of people's deputies and Supreme Soviet sessions, i.e., he must contribute to enhancing the role of the representative authorities. Consequently, in this case as well our legislator will not adopt that part of the system of the "separation of powers" which lowers the role of parliament by granting the president extensive rights which allow him to pit himself against the legislative authority.

The establishment of a socialist state of law is helped by the establishment of an authority which has never existed in our country before: the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision. This is an organizational form applied in a number of countries which accept the "separation of powers." However, the new authority has been designed in the spirit of the principles of Soviet democracy, for it too is not pitted against the supreme representative authority—the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, but is an instrument of it. The purpose of the committee is to see to it that the laws of the USSR, as adopted by the Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers resolutions, the constitutions and laws of Union republics and the resolutions of their councils of ministers do not conflict with the Constitution of the USSR and its laws. The committee has no right to abolish laws and other acts which conflict with the Constitution and the laws but must submit to the authority which has issued this legal act its conclusion on the elimination of violation; the adoption of such a conclusion "automatically" halts the execution of such a regulation. Such a structure deserves overall approval. However, the draft law stipulates that the committee will consist of "specialists in the area of politics and the law." We assume that the committee, as a supervisory body in charge of observing the Union Constitution and the laws of the USSR, should be guided by them and not by current politics, for which reason it consists exclusively of specialists in the area of the law. Such specialists, naturally, could also be members of the party apparatus.

The 19th Party Conference stipulated that increasing the role of the courts is one of the important tasks of perestroika. So far our courts have not assumed their proper position. Furthermore, many citizens look at the courts mainly as an authority of coercion and not of the protection of their rights. Obviously, there are reasons for this, for over a long period of time what was noted in the work of the courts was a preference given to the prosecution, and criminal legislation was, and still remains, quite rigid. The pressure on the courts by local party and soviet "authorities" has not been eliminated. The party conference stipulated that it is necessary to ensure the strict independence of the judges who must obey exclusively the law. It is presumed that the local judges will be elected by the superior soviets of people's deputies, which would strengthen their independence from "their own" local managers. However, the draft law stipulates, unfortunately, otherwise: the judges must be elected by the soviets on the same level. It would be expedient to return to the formulation found in the resolution of the 19th Party Conference. The independence of the judges will also be helped by granting them longer term of service (10 years). The party conference deemed necessary to increase the number of people's assessors in the consideration of the most complex cases. This would increase the objectiveness of the sentencing and would make more difficult to apply pressure on the court. It will also introduce specific measures of liability for interfering in court activities and for contempt of court. Perhaps it may be even worth it for the people's judges who are party members to be members not of the raykom and gorkom but of the superior party authority.

The 1987 Law on the Procedure for Appealing in Court Illegal Actions by Officials, actions which harm the rights of citizens, broadened the realm of judicial control over the administration. However, this process should not end with increasing the role of the court in strengthening legality in the management area, for a number of decisions by collective authorities can still not be appealed even though they may affect the rights of the individual. Consequently, in this area as well we have not exhausted the positive possibilities of the "separation of powers."

The 19th Conference indicated the need fully to restore the Leninist principles of prosecutor's supervision. The word "restore" was not used accidentally. In the past, a great deal of the work of the prosecutor's office was to investigate criminal cases to the detriment of an overall supervision over the observance of legality. The conference deemed necessary to concentrate investigation of most criminal cases by the investigative services of the USSR MVD system, regardless of its republic and local authorities; however, it would be useful to consider whether it would not be preferable to transfer the investigative apparatus to the Ministry of Justice, for the preference to indict remains very strong within the internal affairs organs. Furthermore, the prosecutor's office frequently becomes involved in the implementation of extraneous functions, which should be performed

by the people's control or the administrative authorities. The resolution of the party conference also mentions strengthening the independence of prosecutors and the inadmissibility of applying pressure on them. Clearly, here as well it would be useful to establish legal liability for such pressure and have prosecutors who are party members become members of the territorial party committee on the superior level.

There will be a "separation" in terms of personnel between the state authorities, on the one hand, and the authorities accountable to them, on the other. This too is in the spirit of the theory of the "separation of powers." The following principle will be applied: individuals who have been elected members of the executive committee of the local soviet and the heads of its departments and managements and members of the governments of the USSR and the republics, as well as heads of departments, judges, prosecutors and state arbiters may not be deputies. We can only approve of such a solution to the question, for it is a problem of individuals who are answerable to the representative authorities. It is true that in the draft law an exception is made for chairmen of councils of ministers and of executive committees. In our view, however, this should not take place. The principle should be universal.

Therefore, the Soviet state has borrowed from the theory of the "separation of powers" many of its general democratic ideas and is implementing them ever more consistently. However, we are not duplicating the postulates which belittle the role of the higher representative authorities and which hinder them from solving problems of administrative nature. The administrative apparatus is given a right place as an instrument in the hands of the soviets. It does not have the right to legislate. Our state acknowledges the monopoly of the court on the administration of justice and enhances the independence of the court in the fact that it is exclusively subordinated to the law. The application of the system of "checks and balances" is being expanded (as is confirmed, in particular, by the creation of the Constitutional Supervision Committee). However, all of this is being done without undermining the role of the supreme representative authority but for the sake of enhancing the prestige of the law it has promulgated. The state mechanism retains authorities which serve its epicenter and its foundations: the congresses of people's deputies and the supreme and local soviets. In order to ensure in fact the full power of the people, we must ensure the supremacy of its representative authorities. It is on this basis that the Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution operates.

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#### Letters To The Editors

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Nov 88 (signed to press 25 Oct 88) pp 52-54

[Text] S. Ponomarev, jurist, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk:  
Reserves of Democracy

The published documents reflect the course drafted by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th Party Conference. They are distinguished by their constructive-creative aim. Nonetheless, two aspects should be clarified.

Article 2 of the USSR Constitution stipulates that the soviets of people's deputies are the political foundation of the USSR. However, in addition to the soviets as forms of representative democracy, democracy can be exercised directly as well. We have long been familiar with a form of democracy such as the referendum, which is a vote by the whole nation on the most important vital problems which, incidentally, is stipulated in Article 5 of the USSR Constitution. To us, this system still seems exotic. Yet there is an urgent need for referenda. The people would like them to be held. I hope that sooner or later this form of democracy will begin to "function" in our country as well. In that case, we should, as of now, stipulate in the Constitution that referenda are a structural component of the political foundation of the Soviet state.

Next. New phenomena in our internal political life are gathering strength: movements, associations and foundations. These too are extremely rich reserves for socialist self-management by the people, and the party conference gave them a considered but nonetheless bold assessment. Under the conditions of democratization and glasnost democratization "from below" became a true manifestation of the power of the people. It is influencing the choice of cadres and contributing to the just solution of many problems. Hence my second remark: Is it sensible today not to reflect on the constitutional level the new social formations which have gained substantial strength and developed political activeness? I believe that the text of Title One of the Constitution should be refined by stipulating that the political system of our society also includes new and as yet informal movements and organizations with a progressive socialist trend.

O. Kutafin, doctor of juridical sciences, Moscow: On the Reconstruction of the Supreme Authority

The structure and rights of the supreme authorities of the state are of decisive significance in restoring the full power of the soviets. As we know, their new system, which was approved at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and submitted for nationwide discussion, includes the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which is the supreme authority of state power in the country, and its two-chamber USSR Supreme Soviet, which is a standing legislative, executive and control authority; the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, elected by the congress, and granted sufficiently broad state rights; and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which operates under his leadership. The purpose of this reconstruction of the supreme authority is to combine the advantages of the system of high authorities, which



existed in the past, under V.I. Lenin, with the advantages of their current system. It is important in practice not to let the standing Supreme Soviet to be replaced by any other authority.

We must decisively democratize the procedure of activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and, particularly, the procedure for passing legislation. It must become more extensive and include several readings of draft bills which would make it possible to take the entire range of opinions into consideration. All of this, I believe, would eliminate from the USSR Supreme Soviet the fictitious "unanimity" which prevailed within it for many long years.

The restructuring of the USSR Supreme Soviet should also bring about substantial changes in the procedure for the establishment and the functioning of its chambers. To begin with, contrary to the present situation, the Soviet of Nationalities should represent not all national-state formations in the country, the majority of which, as we know, are not subjects of the USSR Federation, but only its subjects, which are the Union republics. Such an organization of this chamber, which should be described as the Soviet of Republics, would be more consistent with the structure of our federation and the sovereignty of such republics. Furthermore, it would make it possible to ensure equal representation of all Union republics within it.

Secondly, in order to eliminate the current functional anonymity of the chambers, the chamber consisting of representatives of Union republics should be entrusted with problems of the economic and social development of these republics, relations among them, observance of legislation in this area, control over the activities of Union ministries and departments affecting the interests of Union republics, and so on. Naturally, draft bills and other resolutions on most important problems of state life must, as is presently the case, be discussed and passed by both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

R. Livshits, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, Moscow: Improving Legislation

Our laws must reflect the will of the Soviet people or, at least, of their majority. The opinion of science must become a supplement to it for, as history convincingly proves, the viewpoint of the majority is by no means always the right one. The view of the majority is influenced not only by different and, sometimes contradictory, interests of people (although this is the main thing) but also the levels of culture, information, propaganda trends, mental stereotypes, etc. Our history, from the 1937-1938 trials to the struggle against unearned income and members of cooperatives, offers numerous proofs of this fact. In such situations, the view of science must be given the status of a juridically significant expertise. Perhaps we should set up mechanisms according to which the view of the majority of the people, expressed by the deputies, becomes a law only if it coincides with

the viewpoint of science. Should there be a disparity between these two views, the search for a solution should be continued. Possibly a group of advisers or consultants—jurists, economists and sociologists with the highest qualifications—should be set up under the USSR Supreme Soviet, and its conclusions should be heard in discussing draft bills.

The shaping of the law is impossible without the party's guiding activities. That is the way it was, is and, obviously, will be. However, the existing mechanism for the participation of the CPSU in law making should be assessed critically. At the present time, in the final stages of draft bills, they must be submitted for approval by the CPSU Central Committee departments, while the most important among them are considered by the Politburo. The draft bill would then be put to a vote and ratified without changes. It is only very recently that we have had to abandon this practice but the situation has remained unchanged in terms of governmental ukases and decrees.

Naturally, law making cannot be isolated from the party authorities and the opinion and experience of the party must be mandatorily taken into consideration. However, this must not be done by directive or behind closed doors, as has been the case so far, but through the activities of communist deputies, i.e., democratically and openly.

V. Falko, candidate of philosophical sciences, member of the autonomous sociopolitical movement "Moscow People's Front in Support of Perestroika:" Proceeding on the Basis of Realities

In its new draft, the Fundamental Law is called upon to reflect the realities of the present and, at the same time, to help our society attain a qualitatively new status. Therefore, the preamble to the Constitution should provide a description of socialist society as it currently exists in the USSR (without the habitual apologetics, however), characterize the process of renovation, mention the crisis in the administrative-order system, indicate the tasks and prospects for the creation and the essential features of the new image of our society which is arising in the process of perestroika. It could be described as a democratic self-governing socialism.

Article 2 of the Constitution must be supplemented with a stipulation on the socialist self-government by the people. It must stipulate that the state power is organically combined with local self-government. This concept would constitute a major counterbalance to bureaucratic centralism. The idea of self-government could also be reflected in Article 5 which, in my view, should be supplemented with a stipulation on local and regional referenda; in Article 7, among the social formations participating in the management of the state, we must include political movements, including popular fronts in support of perestroika.



The chapter on the economic system could be expanded with a regulation on the multiplicity of economic systems and forms of ownership of means of production (cooperative, individual, etc.). We must consolidate the stipulation on leasing and other types of contracting, share holding societies, joint ownership with foreign firms and regional cost accounting.

One of the most important problems is that of changes in the electoral system. It appears expedient to stipulate that the right to nominate candidates for deputies may be granted to any group of citizens, including their associations at places of residence, informal groups, and so on. The stipulation must be introduced that all candidates for deputies must reside in the electoral district which will be electing them.

The reform of the political system stipulates direct representation of social organizations in the supreme power body. I believe that it would be expedient to stipulate the same type of representation on all levels of soviets of people's deputies. Such deputies should be elected not at congresses or plenums but with general elections for soviets; the popular vote must decide what organizations can best represent the interests of the masses and those which represent only small population groups. It is not useful to define in the Constitution a list of organizations and rates of their representation, as is proposed in the draft law. It would suffice to determine their general proportion (one-third on the level of the USSR Supreme Soviet and one-half in all other soviets, where deputies elected by councils of labor collectives could also be represented). Said measures would prevent the disparity between the actual role of various organizations in social life and their representation in the soviets.

The reform of the political system, as earmarked by the 19th Party Conference, is not limited to changes in the electoral system with which the published draft bills deal. That is why it would be necessary to raise the question of an overall new draft of the Fundamental Law, the project for which should be discussed more thoroughly.

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### **Humanism of Philosophy and Philosophy of Humanism; On the 18th World Philosophical Congress**

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[Text] E. Arab-Ogly:

World philosophy congresses, which are held once every 5 years, have always drawn the attention not only of professional philosophers but also of representatives of other sciences and the broad public. This is explained by

the nature of philosophy which, without claiming to be a science standing above other sciences, nonetheless firmly retains its traditional status as a special area of knowledge.

The status of philosophy among the other sciences, as a specific form of social awareness, is determined not only by the fact that it is called upon to sum up, to synthesize the objective knowledge of the world accumulated by mankind as well as the gathered historical experience in social practice and the ethical and esthetic achievements of culture. Philosophy is expected to answer the questions which the individual sciences cannot. Naturally, this applies to the rational substantiation and methodological foundation of our scientific knowledge in general. Perhaps even more urgent and, at the same time, eternal questions that must be answered are those of the place of man in the world, the meaning of individual human life and of history, the moral and social responsibility of the individual to society and of society to the individual and now, at the end of the 20th century, the cosmic responsibility of mankind as a whole to nature. In order to answer these eternal questions of life, as the entire history of social thought confirms, it would be contraindicated for philosophy to be the servant, either to medieval theology or the ideology of the new times, for all too frequently, in our century, this ideology became distorted into some kind of variety of "secular religion," imbued with fanaticism and intolerance of dissidence.

The great philosophers, from Plato to Marx, were convinced that the purpose of philosophy is not only to explain but also to change the world for the better. Many of them linked the hope of mankind of establishing a sensible and just social system to the mastery and dissemination of philosophical knowledge. This attractive idea forced even the tyrants of antiquity and of modern times to don the toga of "enlightened rulers-philosophers." However, despite the tremendous damage which such encroachments caused both to philosophy and society, they were unable to weaken the social prestige and humanistic calling of philosophical knowledge.

The 18th World Philosophical Congress, which was held in Brighton (England) from 21 to 27 August, was quite different from all the preceding ones in postwar decades. About 2,000 scientists from 70 countries and five continents participated in the work of the congress. Its content and nature were predetermined by the entirely different international situation and the processes of social renovation occurring in the USSR, the PRC and the other socialist countries. The thoughts of the philosophers who came to Brighton were tremendously influenced by literally tectonic shifts in the awareness of the global public, such as the new thinking, based on the priority of universal interests and values, a turn from political confrontation to cooperation in solving the

urgent global problems, and the realization of the irreversible nature of the economic, scientific and cultural integration of mankind within a single world, despite all the striking contrasts within it.

A characteristic feature of the congress was the reciprocally interested dialogue among representatives of a great variety of philosophical schools and trends, concerned not only with the condition of their science but, above all, with the future of mankind on our planet. This was greatly assisted by the main topic of the debate: "The Philosophical Understanding of Man," which had been suggested by Soviet philosophers as early as 1984. Its social and cognitive aspects were the topics of the plenary sessions on "Man As an Object of Philosophical Research," "Man: Nature, Awareness and Community," "History, Society and the Individual" and "The Present and Future of Mankind," and the main symposia "Justice and Freedom" and "Are There Universal Rules of Culture?" This topic was discussed in most of the about 100 sections and roundtable meetings; significant attention was paid to it also at the meetings of the various international philosophical societies. The simple enumeration of sociophilosophical problems raised at plenary and general meetings proves the scientific-cognitive and social relevance of the congress which, among others, triggered great interest in it on the part of the mass information media.

The representative Soviet delegation, which included more than 100 scientists, including Academicians I.T. Frolov (head of the delegation), P.N. Fedoseyev, D.M. Gvishiani and T.I. Oyzerman, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Members V.V. Mshveniyeradze, V.S. Stepin, V.I. Shinkaruk, and R.G. Yanovskiy, as well as, for the first time, a large group of young philosophers, participated most actively in virtually all activities of the congress: many Soviet philosophers were the featured speakers at the plenary sessions, symposia and roundtable meetings, headed the work of sections and spoke in the course of the debates covering a wide range of scientific problems.

This forum was a gratifying phenomenon in the development of global social thinking: it helped to eliminate a large amount of artificial barriers which hindered the fruitful exchange of views and philosophical knowledge among scientists raised in different ideological and theoretical traditions. At previous congresses the polemics between Marxists and non-Marxists frequently reminded one of scholastic discussions which were mocked by Henrich Heine himself in his poem "Debate." Furthermore, some Soviet philosophers, in their efforts to defend the dogmatically interpreted "purity" of Marxism fell into stupid extremes: the more ideas their Western colleagues borrowed from Marxism, the more dangerous they seemed, and the closer they came to Marxism the more sharply they were rejected, for they considered a heretic more dangerous than a nonbeliever. This path could only lead to an "ideological ghetto." Now, at the Brighton Congress, the aspiration to

engage in an unprejudiced comparison of views, mutual understanding and cooperation, and tendency to see in the supporters of different trends of philosophical thinking equal opponents and partners in the search for the truth and in finding constructive solutions to the problems facing mankind, clearly predominated. The leitmotif of many of the reports and addresses was the belief that the traditional philosophical topic of understanding the world by man is paralleled by the problem of reciprocal understanding among people and among philosophers. This thought was aptly expressed by Liu Shing, vice-president of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences, in his report "Some Thoughts On the Present and Future of Mankind." "In my view, the most important thing for us is a free exchange of views, a joint consideration of the realities, accepting the challenges of our time and seeking ways for combining efforts, which is so promising in terms of the future of mankind, even if, for the time being, we cannot reach unanimous conclusions."

This time appeals for a dialogue and cooperation, which are standard in international congresses, were not merely a usual diplomatic ritual. One of the obvious manifestations of the new thinking in philosophy was the aspiration of many participants to take a look at the different scientific schools and trends (phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, pragmatism, and others), less as competing and alternate trends than as reciprocally complementing approaches to the study and knowledge of the surrounding world, enriching each other and, particularly, in terms of the place of man within it. Such a theoretical synthesis was, in particular, characteristic of the papers presented by J. Habermas, the representative of the Frankfurt School, and the French existentialist P. Riqueur (incidentally, the two-volume monograph written by the latter "The Philosophy of Will," and the special issue of the journal *ESPRIT*, dedicated to his work, published on the eve of the congress, drew the attention of the participants in the debate to the concept of a "dialogue among philosophical cultures"). A confirmation of the fruitfulness of this concept was the fact that many speakers addressed themselves to the national legacy of the social thinking in different countries and areas: the Western European philosophers, to the works of Russian philosophers; the Americans, to the philosophical theories of the East; and the Chinese, not only to Confucius but also to Thomas Aquinas, K. Jaspers and Martin Luther King. The trend toward synthesizing theoretical with empirical knowledge was also manifested in a number of papers and reports.

The participants in the congress showed open interest in perestroika and in the social renovation in our country. At the concluding plenary session, I.T. Frolov, president of the USSR Philosophical Society, presented a detailed report on this topic. His report contained a sociophilosophical analysis of the topical problems of perestroika, its humanistic trend, and the growing role of universal values in our contemporary age. He also recalled that the origins of the new thinking in the West can be traced to

Bertrand Russell and A. Einstein who, three decades ago, emphasized in their manifesto that new thinking is a social imperative for mankind in the nuclear age. This appeal was supported by other outstanding philosophers of our time.

The Brighton Congress revealed the humanistic aspirations which have now become prevalent in world philosophical thinking. It also confirmed that the Marxist-Leninist outlook is the true philosophy of humanism, open for perception by others and for mastering the achievements of different philosophical trends in schools.

An international association of young philosophers was set up at the congress. An exhibit of the works of Soviet scientists enjoyed great success. It was resolved that the next, 19th World Philosophy Congress, will be held in Moscow.

**V. Stepin**, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy: The Lessons of Brighton

The development of philosophy is characterized by two interrelated aspects. On the one hand, it constantly turns to the study of a great variety of cultural phenomena in an effort to bring to light their basic conceptual structures. On the other, like any other theoretical thinking, it formulates its own problems, the solution of which ensures, along with the development of means of philosophical analysis, the structuring of essentially new visions of the human world and nonstandard concepts of man, his life and his place in the world. In the course of this internal theoretical movement related to handling concepts of maximal commonality, philosophy formulates the structure of new world conceptual orientations. The philosophical ideas, principles and category systems created in the course of this process with the help of political, legal, and religious theories, as steady concepts, artistic practical experience and publicism, can then convert into conceptual views of classes and masses, social groups and individuals and become the spiritual foundations of a new way of life.

Therefore, philosophical thinking always seems to be shifting as though between two poles: on the one, it is in close touch with the realities of contemporary life; on the other, it goes beyond their limits and creates its special "projects" for social and spiritual structures which could become the foundations for the future development of culture. In this sense philosophy acts both as the quintessence of existing culture and as the nucleus of the culture of the future, as a science on the "possibilities of the human worlds." The loss of any one of the dimensions in philosophy leads to its degeneration either into meaningless theoretical exercises, alienated from life, or else to a mythological system of justifying a reality, unable to interpret it critically.

The interaction between the two main opposites in the development of contemporary philosophy of the mind was traced at the congress quite clearly. Reports were submitted which were highly abstract and some papers were of almost entirely applied nature, addressed to the study of phenomena in contemporary political life, legal relations, achievements of scientific knowledge, moral aspects of human behavior, and so on. However, in terms of a truly professional philosophical analysis, each type was a complement to the other and a part of a single entity. In the course of the theoretical analysis of the fundamental meanings of philosophical categories a search was underway for the spiritual foundations of the developing human world. In the study of the specific contemporary phenomena of this world, philosophers tried to bring to light the profound meaning of human life.

Attention was focused on the fundamental problems of our time requiring new approaches and new conceptual orientations. The main among them were problem situations triggered by the development of human civilization in the 20th century.

The first is the problem of survival and the preservation of mankind in the nuclear age. Today preventing a nuclear suicide has become a value concept against which any program for the organization and restructuring of social life must measure itself.

Second are the global ecological problems and the need they have triggered for a radical change in our attitude toward the environment. To contemporary philosophical awareness it has become almost obvious that the main aspects of human life—the existence of man as part of nature and as an active being who is transforming nature—are in a state of dialectically conflicting dependency. In our time this contradiction has assumed the nature of a conflict, for the contemporary technogenic pressure on nature creates the danger of the degeneracy of the biosphere and, therefore, threatens mankind.

Third, the acceleration of the social development of mankind in the 20th century has raised with exceptional urgency the question of human communications and contacts, and the elimination of the alienation of man from the social structures he created. The increased complexity of the human world and the broadened field of human communications frequently turn into greater stress and the dehumanizing of social relations.

All of these absolutely vital problems of our time are of a conceptual nature and can easily be converted into the formulation of the type of philosophical questions which have been formulated and resolved by each separate age in its own way: questions of the meaning of human life, the purpose of man, problems of freedom, justice, morality, responsibility, and so on. Never before has man had

so much knowledge as now or been so well technically armed and strong. Never before, however, has he also been so vulnerable and confused in the face of the global problems which beset him.

Despite the differences in positions and approaches, the speeches and discussions at the congress revealed a certain agreement concerning the priority of human values as a prerequisite for the solution of the radical problems of our time.

This was manifested particularly clearly in the discussion of problems of sociopolitical and legal philosophy and the philosophy of culture. How to preserve and develop creative individuality, how to avoid trends toward its suppression under the conditions of a stricter social control and the growing danger of the use of the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress for purposes of manipulating the human mind? The abandonment of a manipulative attitude toward man requires a restructuring of philosophical thinking and a picture of the human world in the center of which must be the development of man himself. The latter was discussed, in particular, by P.N. Fedoseyev (USSR).

Problems of freedom, social justice and responsibility were discussed extensively. Their historical-philosophical analysis frequently developed into the discussion of sharp political problems. Thus, in his report R. DeGeorge (United States) analyzed the concept of distributive justice (starting with Aristotle) and discussed the problems of justice in the realm of international relations. S. Li, another American philosopher of Chinese origin, compared in his report the concepts of freedom, justice and law in Kantian and Confucian philosophies. The basic motive of his comparison was a search for the principles governing a new relationship between modern societies and states which find themselves at different stages of social development and are characterized by different cultural traditions.

A rather sharp dialogue took place at the "Justice and Freedom" symposium, in the course of which the report submitted by L.P. Buyeva (USSR) triggered great interest. Thanks to the papers submitted by Marxist philosophers, Soviet scientists above all, the narrow limits of the initial discussion of the basis of primarily moral philosophy were broadened to encompass the study of political and social problems of the freedom and responsibility of man in the contemporary world. The problem of human rights which, for many long years, was a field of ideological clashes and political speculations, assumed a new philosophical interpretation. Its study was concentrated on determining the conditions for the humanizing of policy and eliminating the alienation of man from political structures. Within these approaches I. Kucuradi (Turkey) and M. Dragana-Monachou (Greece) analyzed the possibility of having a power structure which would maximally guarantee the rights and interests of individual citizens and different social groups.

Contemporary social progress is highlighting new approaches to the traditional philosophical problem of the individual and society. By increasing the variety of social subsystems within which the individual is included, and with a clash among different cultural traditions, it raises particularly sharply the problems of individuality, understanding and dialogue as conditions for the development of the personality and for the accumulation of the gains of civilization by mankind.

In the report by the noted West German philosopher J. Habermas, the concept of individuality was considered as a fundamental conceptual category. He emphasized the noncomparability between the individual and the specific. The reduction of the individual to the specific defines man as a cell within the social entity, as an element subordinated to suprapersonal social structures. The individual includes the unique features of the personality and its creative activity and independence.

Habermas tried to trace the way within the framework of European cultural tradition through which the concepts of individuality are linked with those of "autonomous will," "inalienable human rights," "moral responsibility" and "ethical dialogue." Many of the ideas he expressed, particularly that of reducing the problem of individuality to an ethical relation, are debatable and require a more profound substantiation. However, we must point out that the study of these concepts is necessary in order to ensure the more profound interpretation of contemporary situations in individual life under the increased complexity of its various social relations.

The individual, by becoming part of various complexly organized systems of social action, constantly comes across the problem of retaining his individuality and integrity. The organization of such actions requires the linking of frequently conflicting alternative systems, approaches and human aspirations.

Under contemporary circumstances, when power methods for solving social contradictions could lead to global and unpredictable consequences, reciprocal understanding and the ability to engage in a constructive dialogue without abandoning conceptual positions, and establishing contacts while retaining one's individuality, assume particular importance. This set of problems was extensively clarified in the course of the discussions on the universal nature of culture. Here two approaches clashed: on the one hand, the aspiration to find in the foundations of different cultures certain natural human principles, as discussed by S. Nasr (United States) and K. Vired (Ghana) and, on the other, to find in the variety of historically changing conceptual orientations a certain universal, a humanistic content (the report by T.I. Oyzerman, USSR).

All discussions on problems of human life, the destinies of civilization and the dialogue among cultures indicated the importance to philosophy of the new stage of intensified development of its apparatus of categories and, in

particular, its "knots" which characterize the subject-object relations in human activities. In studying the activities of human nature, Marxist philosophers have always underscored that activity, as an attitude of the subject toward the object, includes a certain system of subject-subject relations (man, as he transforms the objective world, always remains included within the complex system of relations and communication with other people). In the apparatus of categories of dialectical materialism in our country, however, the emphasis was on the development of the objective categories of "essence and phenomenon," "possibility and reality," "accident and necessity," and so on. When we characterize man and his spiritual world and values in terms of these categories, we bring to light the extremely general features of human life which identify this life as a tangible reality.

Nonetheless, in order to understand human activities, other categories are important, which define man as the subject of activities and contacts (the categories "individual," "society," "freedom," "responsibility," "will," "fear," "conscience," "duty," "justice," and so on). We believe that concentrating philosophical studies on the problems of man requires the surmounting of existing traditions and the enhancement of such categories as fundamental definitions of human life.

The fact that the majority of the participants in the congress accepted the priority of humanistic values as foundations for contemporary philosophical dialogue has always created a kind of interchange with the principles of new thinking, developed and applied by the political leaders of our country as a basic approach in the area of international relations and in the efforts to solve the global problems of our time. The papers submitted by the Soviet philosophers, who used the methodology of new thinking in the discussions on the problem of survival and ways of development of contemporary civilization, triggered greater attention on the part of the audience.

Discussions on problems of war and peace took place under the sign of the ideas of new thinking, held in a number of sections and in the course of roundtable meetings at the congress. The overwhelming majority of the participants in the discussions criticized the policy of nuclear containment, noting its immoral nature and links with narrow corporate interests and with the "herd philosophy," which puts the egotistical interests of individual groups above universal human values. The need for a more profound philosophical analysis of the categories of "peace" and "friendship" as fundamental universal features of culture was emphasized.

**N. Motroshilova**, doctor of philosophical sciences, department head, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy: Philosophy and Social Imperatives

The global philosophical community, through its representatives, who engage in most profound and broad thinking, aspires to find a philosophy of a new type, a philosophy which can help to make a "breakthrough" in the world of new thinking, which must be firmly and systematically based on the contemporary synthesis of reason and humanism, i.e., the unity between truth and morality, knowledge and responsibility, and universal human needs and individual freedoms. Such a thrust toward the new is taking place on a great variety of levels of human action, manifestations of will, knowledge and awareness, and in a great variety of areas of activities of individuals, social groups, countries and nations. In our country as well, in the process of perestroika and social renovation, a social movement is broadening and gathering strength developing the principles and values of the new thinking. Progressive philosophy has long been opening a way to a new thinking and awareness. However, it is only now that such "insight" is becoming truly acknowledged and, which is particularly important, developed further. This movement toward the new involves the participation of the classical philosophical thinking of mankind but, naturally, only to the extent to which it is enhanced and updated by us, contemporary philosophers and, in general, of anyone who is led by today's spiritual thirst to seek the pure sources of the age-old wisdom of mankind. At the Brighton Congress the legacy of Kant and Hegel was paid the greatest attention among those of the philosophers of the past. It is becoming increasingly clear that the two very different philosophical traditions they initiated are not rungs on a ladder (with Hegel being "above" Kant). They are not antinomic in terms of each other but are reciprocally complementary. Other philosophers of the past, to the theories of which the participants in the congress turned most frequently were, Plato and the Neoplatonists, Aristotle and Confucius. Let us note, however, that the philosophical quest for a new thinking means, to many contemporary philosophers, also a stricter critical analysis of the contradictions, weaknesses and, in some cases, some no longer acceptable fundamental ideas of the philosophy of the past, including the concepts expressed by most outstanding philosophers.

In what precise form is contemporary Western philosophy enacting this quest for a philosophy of a new type and in the critical analysis of the past? Several sections on problems of metaphysics were at work at the Brighton Congress and the International Metaphysical Society held its meeting. The center of attention was also focused on the "new philosophy of values," the "new ethics" and the "new gnosiology."

The main principles proclaimed by the "new metaphysics," briefly speaking, are the following: the traditional philosophical models which, overtly or covertly were based on the hierarchical ideal of domination and subordination which, in turn, was borrowed from social life and subsequently projected into life as a whole, must be decisively criticized. What mankind needs today is a universally substantiated theory and systematically

implemented dialectics of equal interaction among different forces and poles and even opposites, whether it is a question of interaction between nature and man, the individual and society, the part and the whole, the single and the multiple, my I and the I of others, and different nations, races, countries, cultures and social systems. The "ethos of war," i.e., domination—subordination, suppression, dependence, hostility, rivalry and mistrust, must yield to the "ethos of peace," i.e., precisely to equal interaction, cooperation, openness, trust, respect and reciprocal interest.

Philosophy must—and this is its main task—help this "ethos of peace" to win over the "ethos of war." It seems to me entirely clear that in the still somewhat unusual to us form of "new metaphysics," and in the guise of the theory of values which has been accepted by us, to knock at the door of philosophical humanism, the need and renovation and development of which has already become universally acknowledged.

But why, someone may ask, is it that specifically the forms of metaphysics (not in the sense of a method opposed to dialectics but as a theory of the foundations for life in the world, of man and knowledge) or extremely generalized ethics and axiology are raised to the level of preferred methods precisely today, although in traditional thinking and in its contemporary variance, they frequently appear, something which no one can deny, quite abstract, as thought tailored to fit all times and, furthermore, very difficult to understand by the general reader or listener? Are contemporary philosophers not plunging into the "philosophical depths" in order to avoid serious concerns and the worries of the world surrounding them? These are entirely pertinent questions. Briefly, they could be answered as follows:

The metaphysical, ethical and axiological forms of philosophical work offer today particular advantages precisely because they are traditionally aimed at the formulation and solution of the broadest possible and most basic problems, the problems of the existence of the world and of man in this world. Until recently these problems appeared excessively speculative and abstract. It has now become clear that the ontological problem of life profoundly affects all of us, largely because, for the first time, it can be formulated as follows: Will there be or will there not be a mankind and will there be a civilization or not?

Yet another reason exists for the popularity of the metaphysical form addressed to what is common to all of us, to the essence of the world and of man as such. Some philosophers presumed that this form—in particular, thoughts on human nature—conflicts with Marxist historicism. They tried "to ignore" the fact that nowhere else but precisely in "*Das Kapital*," Marx used in an entirely positive and constructive manner the concept of "human nature" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 23, p 623). We have developed a way of arrogantly interpreting the concepts of human nature

through the classics of world philosophy and contemporary Western authors. However, the concept of human nature shared by the great philosophers, including Marx, theoretically expressed the entirely real fact that all people on earth have some common features and needs. Human nature is not unchangeable. As Marx said, it is subject to historical modifications. However, it exists and will exist as long as there are people! Today this view is more relevant than ever before.

In interpreting the concept of human nature, many of our authors arrogantly condemned the philosophical derivation from it of universal and inviolable universal human rights and freedoms as being "abstract humanism." Today we are finally realizing that the seemingly abstract support which philosophers of the past and the present gave to the fundamental universal right of people—the right to life—is the most concrete and first humane act which is linked particularly closely with the practice and theory of our time.

That is why the age-old experience of humanistic philosophy and the vital needs of contemporary mankind forced philosophers, at this congress as well, to formulate, simply and clearly, the "eternal" fundamental rights and freedoms of man and, perhaps, the initial requirements of an entirely specific humanism. For example, R. Francis (United States) summed up very relevant ideas in his paper "The Natural Rights of Human Nature" as follows: "The right to life is the primary, the fundamental human right which imposes upon us a responsibility and the obligation to protect one another. This right cannot be eliminated. It must be universal, equal and natural.... The moral community is called upon to play a historical role: to defend the life of man, and to give man means of existence...." Another United States philosopher, J. Hovey, considered the problem in the same light in his paper "World Hunger and the Moral Right to Means of Existence:" "The right to means of existence, one of the most fundamental rights, demands of the people to **avoid to deprive** those around them of means of existence and to **protect them** from anything which threatens the very existence of such means, and to **help** those who are unable to secure for themselves means of existence." The limitation of this triple rule is that it is established when individuals or nations which would like to implement it in terms of others risk to put themselves in a situation of extreme need. However, "no single one of the rich nations today is subject to this limitation."

Another thing which greatly concerns philosophers is the fact that universal human rights are more frequently postulated than observed. This, for example, was discussed in the paper submitted by E. Tilsch (FRG) on the unique role of the ethics of "human rights" in terms of other value systems of mankind. "Charters or bills of rights in the medieval and contemporary constitutions merely make it incumbent upon the ruling forces or nations and societies to guarantee such "freedoms" to their "subjects." Today it is only the United Nations that

encourages them to observe and to develop "human rights." Conversely, antique humanistic philosophy proceeded from the fact that the "ethics of human rights" (rights concerning other people and nature) is expressed above all in reciprocal obligations and virtues of citizens, codified by a social contract." In other words, Tilsch leads to the idea that along with a system of postulated constitutional human rights, we must also formulate and develop a true civic ethic of reciprocal respect for an observance of human rights. It would be hardly possible to question this. Indeed, an efficient civic ethic and constitutional guarantees are greatly needed. Also greatly needed is a **moral code for contemporary mankind**, needed both by individuals and mankind as a whole.

The drawing up and formulation of moral values and ideals and of inalienable human rights and freedoms are a vital matter in which philosophers can and must actively participate. In one of the "philosophical talks" on central television, for example, E.Yu. Solov'yev expressed what I consider a very interesting suggestion (alas, it was not telecast): drafting a "declaration of the rights of the Soviet person." In my view, all of our contemporaries are interested in having a new, detailed declaration of the rights of man and mankind. This could become a continuation of the tradition of the French Revolution with its declaration of the rights of man and the citizen, the 200th anniversary of which will be celebrated next year.

Reports by still living and respected classics of logical-linguistic philosophy were presented at the congress. The fact that they had addressed a congress dedicated to the "metaphysical" problem of man speaks for itself. However, the very fact that they had been invited and expected was also an important fact. The entire atmosphere of the congress, including the reports submitted by noted philosophers supporting other trends and schools, encourages us, again and again, to return to the question of the role of logical-linguistic analysis in contemporary philosophy.

We must point out that despite the entire contradictoriness, errors and failures in Western philosophical trends, such as neopositivism, hermeneutics, and structuralism, they were able to make a substantial contribution not only to the development of the logic and methodology of science, which is acknowledged in our country, but to philosophy as well. I believe that their development provided a previously unparalleled scope and, as it turned out, the practical applicability of **specialized philosophical knowledge**, particularly knowledge of the structures of language, the logical forms related to it, text structures, etc. This also applies to phenomenology, existentialism, and Freudianism, with the specification that these trends led to the development of a widespread **specialized philosophical knowledge of the awareness**, with its various universal internal structures and specific areas. In Western philosophy a conflicting process developed not only of critically surmounting but also thoroughly mastering the achievements of "technology" of

linguistic, structuralist, hermeneutic and phenomenological analysis. Such topics are mandatorily studied not only by future philosophers in the course of their training in European, American, Japanese and Chinese universities, but also by many mature philosophers in other areas, who have not been shy to "go into training" for the sake of acquiring new specialized knowledge. It is of essential importance that philosophers could impart such knowledge also to mathematicians, natural scientists and people in the technological sciences, who have accurately understood and adopted the words of N. Wiener from his *"Cybernetics"*: "I personally was a student of Russell's and owe a great deal to his influence." They have accepted this idea at the right time. Specialized humanitarian, including philosophical, knowledge has begun to be used even more energetically in the new—computerized—stage of scientific and technical progress. The retaining and strengthening influence of these trends which are promoting specialized philosophical knowledge, and the summations related to them were yet once again convincingly proved at the Brighton Congress.

Western philosophers in other areas did not experience even the slightest inconvenience by this "linguistic turn" taken in the reports, although they did not always agree with the conclusions and arguments of the reporters. Yet many among us, let us frankly admit, found ourselves quite uncomfortable. The real "heroes" of the congress, among the the classics of 20th century philosophy, were L. Wittgenstein and E. Husserl: many Western feature speakers and debaters referred to their ideas and texts. In our country, as we know, familiarity with these philosophers was considered the predilection of individual "eccentrics," who had selected this trend as their "narrow specialization," whereas throughout the rest of the world this was a matter of specializing in philosophy as such. In our philosophy departments the study of specialized contemporary philosophy was "optional." Texts in their Russian translation were very few. Therefore, for a long time we consolidated our own isolation from the main lines of development of global philosophy and frequently boasted of our ignorance and provincialism as being some kind of "super-Marxist" virtue.

Therefore, in my view, the congress indicates that there are at least three main trends through which new ways are being sought in Western philosophy: 1. Extensive conceptual aspirations on the part of the "new" metaphysicists, the theory of values, ethics and gnosiology; 2. Further development of specialized knowledge, through the "new synthesis" of phenomenology, logical-linguistic analysis, hermeneutics and structuralism; 3. The activities of authors who adopt Marx's theory as the main foundation of the new philosophical movement.

It is my deep conviction that Soviet philosophers can and must actively participate in developments in all three areas. Naturally, any self-respecting philosopher



here, as anywhere else, must maintain his ideological-theoretical independence, and show creative initiative rather than be at the "tail end" of foreign ideas. However, entirely intolerable, for political reasons as well, is the previous arrogant and ignorant isolationism, for in developing the sum total of contemporary universal human values and in the struggle for them, a progressive philosophical community is our active and firm ally.

More than 20 philosophical societies met in the course of the congress. The congress itself is known as the International Federation of Philosophical Societies. Many philosophical societies have developed on an international level! This includes societies which study the philosophies of Plato and the Neoplatonists, Hegel, Kant, and Kierkegaard, Husserl's phenomenology and that of his followers, the philosophy of Jaspers, Sartre, Pierce, and others. Other societies study national or regional philosophies—American, Chinese, Indian, Bulgarian, Afro-Asian, French, etc. There also is a very active International Association of Women Philosophers. There is a philosophical society for the study of sports. It is noteworthy that there is an international society of "philosophers of the world for the prevention of nuclear self-annihilation" (headed by the American Marxist philosopher J. Sommerville). However, in the 2 years of existence of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, we have not initiated the establishment of an international society for the study of the history of Russian philosophy and the philosophies of other parts of our country which, naturally, in a way reflect our wrong attitude toward our domestic philosophical heritage. Now, when the situation is changing, it is precisely we who must promote this initiative. I am confident that it will be warmly supported by the global philosophical community.

**B. Yudin**, doctor of philosophical sciences, editor-in-chief of the journal *VOPROSY ISTORII YESTESTVOZNANIYA I TEKHNIKI: The Philosophy of Science In Its 'Human Dimension'*

The philosophy of science was represented quite extensively and comprehensively at the congress. It was discussed in a separate section and in the papers submitted at other sections, such as "Theory of Knowledge," "Scientific Status of the Social Sciences," "The Function of Knowledge in Human Life," "Philosophical Problems of Artificial Intelligence," "Philosophy of Mathematics," and "Interrelationship Between Knowledge and Values," at several roundtable meetings, and so on.

As a whole, the discussions dealt with topics which have been intensively studied in at a minimum during the last 10 to 15 years although, I must point out, in this congress several quite noteworthy changes in emphasis in the formulation and means of the study of problems were noted. Thus, the trend toward the sociologization of philosophical sciences is becoming increasingly noticeable and influential. In the past it was typical above all of

many British philosophers; today it is becoming widespread in the United States and in the European countries. The closest possible attention is being paid to the social aspects of cognitive activities and, in particular, to processes leading to obtaining new scientific knowledge and its acceptance by the scientific community; the social nature of the cognitive subject himself; the consideration of the values governing scientists; and the mechanism for the utilization of scientific knowledge.

An important consequence of this trend is the aggravation of discussions on the problems of the relativism and truthfulness of scientific knowledge. On the one hand, relativistic concepts are becoming widely popular. In them scientific knowledge is raised to the status of a system of beliefs accepted by the scientific community at that point; in this case usually efforts are made to question even the pertinence of discussing its veracity as consistent with objective reality. Such a formulation of the problem is by no means new. However, contemporary relativism has its specific features as well. It is based on numerous and, as a rule, thoroughly conducted empirical studies related to the sociology of scientific knowledge, which have brought to light a great deal of new and, occasionally, unexpected features in the life of science and helped us to obtain a more realistic concept about it. It tries to take into consideration to the fullest extent the exceptionally great role played by science in the life of modern society and the profound changes occurring within scientific activities themselves, as well as the involvement of the scientist in the world of human values and the need to combine the values of science with universal human values. Thus, American philosopher T. Platt, expressed, on the basis of "conceptual relativism," arguments in support of the fact that the dividing line between judgments about facts which we consider objective and value judgments, considered subjective, is determined by the context within which we have expressed one judgment or another.

On the other hand, the concepts of relativism were harshly criticized at the congress. Thus, an antirelativistic approach to the principle of superimposition in quantum mechanics, based on the positions of realism, was defended by the noted Canadian philosopher M. Bunge. The paper by H. Munevara (United States) on "Relativism As the Foundation of Science," in which relativistic views were promoted quite directly, was met with crushing counterarguments on the part of the audience.

The critics of relativism were strongly supported by K. Popper (England) who presented a lecture entitled "The World of Predisposition: Two New Viewpoints on Causality." This lecture became one of the central events at the scientific forum. According to the lecturer, the Aristotelian theory of objective truth as a consistency with the assertion of facts is a "powerful bastion against relativism and all fashionable trends." Popper expressed the firm conviction that together with music and art

science is the greatest most beautiful and most instructive achievement of the human spirit. In accordance with his concept, with which we are well familiar, science provides knowledge which can be objectively tested but also can only be assumed. The results of science remain hypotheses which can be tested but which cannot be considered as determined once and for all; they could include real knowledge although we do not have the means which enable us to prove their unquestionable veracity. Any of the hypotheses we adopt could be refuted in the future. Actually, testing and refining or rejecting existing hypotheses and the formulation of new ones constitute, according to Popper, the main content of scientific knowledge. As a result of our investigations, knowledge develops as life develops in the course of biological evolution, by creating ever new forms and "testing" their truly natural selection. On the basis of this analogy, Popper's theory of scientific knowledge is frequently known as evolutionary epistemology.

In emphasizing the exceptional role of the probability of concepts in contemporary science, Popper spoke of the related essentially new understanding of causality. He formulated the claim of the cosmological significance of the interpretation of probability as a predisposition. If we have a statistical process which, again and again, takes place under stable conditions, we can compute the average probability of each possible outcome. This probability should be considered as a trend or predisposition toward its fulfillment. Such a predisposition is objective and internally inherent in a given situation. Consequently, a predisposition means not only possibilities but also physical realities; they are as real as forces or force fields which, strictly speaking, are nothing but predispositions toward bringing objects in motion, acceleration, and so on.

Popper went on to say that in the same way that the positivists Mach and Hertz, the followers of Bishop Berkeley, opposed the idea of force, its opponents oppose the introduction into physics of invisible and, therefore, allegedly "occult" features, such as predisposition. From the viewpoint of the theory of predisposition, the world is not a static causal machine. It is a process of creation, which implements some possibilities and triggers new ones. The future is not predetermined but is objectively open. As a whole, the predispositions which operate in the world are not something coming from the past and which coerces us but that which lures us and leads us into the future.

These ideas, I believe, deserve a special analysis rather than hasty speculations, such as appeared the next day in a number of British newspapers. We can only agree with Popper that science is one of the highest achievements of the human spirit. However, today increasingly people come across its manifestations in their so to say earthly existence and by no means are such clashes always pleasant and innocuous. We believe that the philosophy of science must take into consideration this circumstance and, respectively, must strive to see science in a

broader and more comprehensive presentation. This also means that science must be analyzed not only from the viewpoint of the theory of knowledge and methodology but also in its social, ethical and humanistic dimensions.

One of the efforts in this direction, clearly, is the so-called "naturalistic" theory of scientific knowledge, which was a subject of sharp debates at the congress. The naturalistic position presumes the study not of how scientists should act but, above all, what they actually do. Serious doubts were expressed in the course of the discussions on whether or not such an approach is truly radically new and whether a strictly naturalistic approach to the philosophical study of science is possible, i.e., an approach which would not resort to any whatsoever regulatory criteria or judgmental evaluations. One way or another, philosophy cannot abandon the assessment of science and its development from the viewpoint of human values, which is particularly important today.

At the congress a lively debate was held on problems of medical ethics, which are facing the specialists in this area. In our country this topic is being studied extremely insufficiently. Actually, it is the closest possible to practical experience, to daily life and is experiencing today perhaps the deepest changes since the time of Hippocrates. This is related above all to the various influences on medicine in the course of contemporary scientific and technical progress. The new diagnostic methods, organ transplants and nontraditional methods for the fertilization, pregnancy and giving birth to children, genetic engineering and therapy, and modern means of life support for the terminally ill are only a few of the most striking achievements of scientific and technical progress in medicine. The practical implementation of these achievements is related both to radical changes in the relationship between physician and patient and the need to solve other most pressing moral and ethical problems.

A number of problems arise in connection with the development of computer diagnosis. It is of interest to the philosophers first of all as a specific area of knowledge, with its own logical characteristics and laws and, secondly, as a special means the use of which substantially modifies the doctor-patient relationship. What should be done so that the physician may not lose track of the unique individuality of the patient behind computer readings? Does the patient have the right to hope for direct contact with the physician or should he be satisfied with playing the role of a source of objective data?

Finally, there were extensive debates on the prospects of gene therapy—intervention in the genetic constitution of man and other biological species. One of the objections to the use of the methods of gene therapy is that in the course of this action there is a change in the genetic

structure and, therefore, in many of the hereditary features of future generations, regardless of their wishes and involving generally unpredictable consequences.

**L. Mitrokhin**, doctor of philosophical sciences, interim head scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy: Dialogue of Philosophical Cultures

Toward the end of the plenary session the congress split into numerous sections, symposia, colloquiums and roundtable meetings which tempted the participants with their vital topics and fame of the speakers. The choice facing the participants was not easy. Where could they find the point from which, like an operator handling a dozen displays, they would be able to see all the philosophical views, whether planned or spontaneous? Everyone solved this problem in his own way. I had already solved it in the course of interviewing a number of well-known foreign philosophers. Let us now take a look at this forum as though from the side and try to define its place in the overall spiritual situation of the contemporary world.

No illusions are necessary: we live in a brittle world where by no means all roads lead to light and flourishing, and where the traditional conceptual systems, which ensure the blossoming of our civilization, are deteriorating. Even the unquestionable cult of reason is being questioned: If science is a direct productive force, it means that it is a mandatory coparticipant in social cataclysms and global problems, the crowing feature of which is the nuclear mushroom. Hence the demand not for an impersonal but for a "human" and humanitarian knowledge, which contains the age-old experience of human intercourse and, therefore, can guarantee a civilized world order.

Today the question of the interrelationship among different philosophical currents arises sharply. This was quite clearly expressed by R. DeGeorge (United States): "Today philosophy is experiencing a transitional period. Until recently the focal point of attention was existentialism. Today the situation has changed although, naturally, existentialism greatly enriched philosophical knowledge. Analytical philosophy is gathering strength in the United States. However, I see the new impetus above all in the development of applied philosophy, which deals with practical problems not only in the area of ethics but also the theory of knowledge, the social sciences and the natural sciences. Equally essential is the fact that philosophy becomes more open and tolerant. Thus, the analytical workers are showing a growing readiness to study Marxism and phenomenology, which reciprocates, whereas Marxists are displaying an inclination to enter in a dialogue with the phenomenologists and other schools. It is precisely this that I consider to be the main trend: ever greater openness and tolerance, and rejection of claims to holding a dominant position."

Asked "How do you imagine the philosophy of the future?" J. Hintikka (Finland) answered: "The main thing is that today philosophical knowledge is becoming increasingly independent and autonomous from other sciences and, in turn, is increasingly influencing them." There is a view, he added, that "philosophy studies problems which are too general and quite alienated from daily life and daily practice. In my view, however, this is a superficial view on philosophy, for it is well known that frequently a summing-up theory is much more practical than any specific area of knowledge." In short, we are living in an amazing time when philosophical knowledge is becoming extremely dynamic and finding ever more profound ties with all aspects of spiritual culture.

"Let me particularly single out the view expressed by P. Riquieur (France) who was constantly blamed by our critics for abstract philosophizing, alienated from real life. Recalling the significant contribution made by linguistic philosophy to human knowledge, Riquieur pointed out that 'to me these problems are actually not reduced to the problem of language but serve, I would say, as a characteristic analytical introduction to the exceptionally complex problem of the acting man and the suffering man.... In which connection the first task of philosophy is to articulate the philosophy of language within the framework of the philosophy of action. There also is the second task of linking this problem with ethical considerations. I personally relate these problems to that of coercion.... As a result, I see a person who cannot only speak and act but who is also suffering. And I assume that in the present world, full of calamities and violence, the task of philosophy is reduced, precisely, to considerations of the evil of the 20th century and such thoughts should contribute to the uprooting of the evil'." The speech by E. Agacci (Switzerland) the newly elected president of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, was quite instructive. Having emphasized the need for a close tie between philosophy and science, he also asserted that "it is impossible to solve the problem of man only through the means of science. This would mean repeating the errors of the old positivism which believed that as the positive sciences develop, philosophy is doomed to disappearance. Yet the realm of man is that of what must be done, it is that of the activities of a value-oriented being. Naturally, science could describe its objectives, standards and values. However, it is unable to define which among them are real and preferable. Therefore, science must be paralleled by specific philosophical thoughts. There was a time when one of the most serious tasks of philosophy was considered to be that of proving the existence of God. It seems difficult to question that today the important task of philosophy is to prove the existence of man."

One could say that it is precisely the topic of man which, incidentally, was suggested in its time by the Soviet side, that contributed to crystallizing the civic enthusiasm of the participants in the congress. In any case, the topics of freedom, justice, peace, democracy, high spirituality and sober judgment became the noteworthy feature of the Brighton Forum.

Having especially singled out the particular interest shown in human values and an awareness of the importance and fruitfulness of the dialogue among different schools, we are bound to mention also the problem which has now gained a global dimension, i.e., the "East-West" problem. Its sources may be traced to the profound cataclysms of present social reality and considerations of alternate ways of sociohistorical progress and forms of spirituality.

S. Murti, president of the Indian Philosophical Congress, described the various Eastern doctrines of man and said that of late the influence of the achievements of contemporary science and technology and, correspondingly, the influence of the Western concept of man are being increasingly felt in the East. "In classical Indian philosophy man," he emphasized, "was never reduced to the level of a natural phenomenon. Man was considered a being capable of the type of activities which no other being in the world could attain. He was considered a spiritual being. However, this did not mean in the least that this spiritual being was mandatorily created by God. If we remember this, i.e., if we remember the unique nature of man, I believe that we shall be able to structure the type of concept which could use the strong aspects of the Eastern and Western concepts of man. This would contribute to the realization by man of the need to protect nature and to disseminate and develop the so-called ecological ethics. If such an ecological awareness could be combined with the achievements of scientific and technical progress, it would become possible to implement the idea of man as the master of nature on earth, i.e., to create a universe in which there would be harmony between man and nature. The ecological ethic is a kind of yardstick of human dignity. By concentrating on the unity of all that is animate, it thus contributes to the preservation and extension of human and natural life."

The fruitfulness of the dialogue and the reciprocal enrichment among different cultures within the framework of the reciprocal influences between West and East were pointed out by the noted Indian philosopher R. Panikkar. In his view, the main thing is that a spiritual vacuum developed in the West and an active adsorbing ability of European culture. In other words, the dissemination of Oriental thought is explained not by its aggressiveness but by the needs of the West. A search is underway for a comprehensive understanding of human life, which cannot be reduced to a rational principle only. It does not mandatorily have to be a question of irrationalism or simply of rejecting reason but of supplementing it with other components of spiritual culture.

This viewpoint was shared also by the noted philosopher and theologian Bishop Pavel Mar Grigoriy (India). In his words, religion and philosophy are essentially dealing with the same problems: the meaning of human existence, the significance of man, the source of morality, and so on. Subsequently, however, in both religion and philosophy distorted concepts prevailed. For example, the theologians began to claim that the main purpose of

religion is to ensure the salvation of man, while philosophers, following the scientists, began to claim that the mind can answer all key problems of human life. Yet now it is becoming increasingly clear that contemporary science is unable to encompass the world as a whole and to answer the problem of "Who am I," and "Why am I in this world," and so on. Yet it is precisely such problems that face the people who need a perception of the world as a whole, an accusation which, actually, is just and applies to religion as well. No individual philosophical school can claim to have a monopoly on understanding. They must supplement each other.

Similar considerations, not so much in principle but in the details, were expressed by J. Macklin (United States). As a follower of P. Tillich, he is profoundly convinced of the need to maintain a constant dialogue between religion and philosophy in order to unravel the profound, the "end" foundations of human spirituality, the creation of an integral vision of the world which can encompass its fundamental foundations. It is no accident that he is active in organizing such discussions, including discussions with Marxist philosophers, in an effort to find common points of contact within the framework of a humanistic understanding of the world.

Such are some of the trends in contemporary philosophical knowledge. Naturally, they are backed by profound changes in the contemporary world and, above all, by the globalized problem of the human community. However, philosophers do not simply reflect objective changes. They can do a great deal in promoting the realization of the primary problems and common interests. Perhaps the time is indeed coming when a "republic of philosophers" will take shape, philosophers who would be able to offer the human community a new "spirituality" full of dignity and human wisdom.

Who could and should solve this problem? It is precisely philosophy which, ordinary views notwithstanding, is not a claim to omniscience or an invention of particularly curious individuals who have wanted to know everything, even a little of everything, but a reflection of the profound needs of history. It is a question of the special "controlling" instance which tries to reach the "maximal" foundations as motivations for behavior and cognitive acts. At each of its historical stages, philosophy assimilates available knowledge and tries to offer an integral world outlook, emphasizing the vector of the dynamics of social consciousness. This includes the mandatory mechanism of the functioning of culture as a single system, without which it cannot acquire a purpose, a realized internal enthusiasm, and a clear development guideline. Our crucial age particularly needs a socially responsible philosophy, capable of engaging in professional analysis and treating the spiritual ills of our time. Such is the challenge of our time, hurled at the congress in Brighton, regardless of the extent to which it was realized by its participants and, above all, of the parameters within which its social significance should be assessed.

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**On the Intelligentsia and Intelligence; Thoughts of a Philosopher**

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[Article by Leonid Yakovlevich Smolyakov, doctor of philosophical sciences, department of scientific communism, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences]

[Text] "People and Intelligentsia," is the title which A. Blok gave to his article, which was published 80 years ago. V. Korolenko has commented that the argument about the intelligentsia is an old one, as old as the world. The past decades have not dulled the interest in this topic or the arguments surrounding it. In the past 3 years the intelligentsia and its role in society has become one of the central problems.

The renovation of socialism and the identification of its humanistic nature are inconceivable without energizing the spiritual potential of society existing in science, education, literature and the arts. The urgent task now is to ensure unity between words and actions and theory and practice, the unification of which requires counter-moves. The problem of the immediate subject of socialist spiritual production—the Soviet intelligentsia, socially sensitive and responsive to social change—becomes particularly important. In the present time, which is one of crucial change in the country, its socio-cultural nature and humanistic vocation must be brought to light in their entirety. At the same time, this is also a time of difficult trial for the intelligentsia, concerning its true intelligence and its "independence, honesty, autonomy of convictions and pride in true knowledge" (V.I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 5, p 327). We can already see how, surmounting indifference, cynicism and passiveness, which were the reaction to the period of stagnation, today's Soviet intelligentsia is not only adopting with its mind and heart the course of democratic renovation of society but is also actively participating in the formulation of specific programs and their implementation.

Equally natural is the aspiration of social scientists to rise to a more constructive standard in their study of the intelligentsia and to abandon stereotypical concepts which, as a rule, considered it only in the context of its place within the socioclass culture of society, as an amorphous stratum or, rather, as a "stratum" of workers engaged in mental labor and possessing specialized training.

It is necessary in this connection to draw attention also to the essentially important cultural-personality analysis of the problems of the intelligentsia, for it is not only the role of the intelligentsia as a whole that is particularly important and valuable. Any worker engaged in mental labor has the right to be a representative of the intelligentsia. If the problem is formulated precisely in that

way, we enter the area of complex discussion on the correlation and connection between the concept of "intelligentsia" and "intelligence."

Today in characterizing Soviet intelligentsia, we increasingly use definitions such as "creativity," "innovation," "intellectual activeness," "moral self-awareness," "cultural standard," "humanistic mission," and "reflection." Until very recently these words could be encountered relatively rarely in publications dealing with problems of the intelligentsia. What predominated were ostentation or a set of statistical data on the number of engineers, teachers, cultural workers and so on, in the various sectors, areas, republics, cities and villages, or else degrading characteristics which were essentially not all that different from the ones which Lenin mocked: "What? Simple 'hired employees,' who intend to teach the 'representatives of the social strata!'" (op. cit., vol 5, p 328). No better were the cautious views, accompanied by innumerable stipulations, on the distinction between mental and physical labor, which would be surmounted, naturally, "by involving the intelligentsia in performing physical functions" in its working time and "in the process of creative activities in its leisure time," which turns out to be "the ability to surmount the fact that the intelligentsia was assigned to perform its spiritual activities" ("Sovetskaya Intelligentsiya i Ee Rol v Stroitelstve Kommunizma" [The Soviet Intelligentsia and Its Role in Building Communism]. Moscow, 1983, pp 97, 99).

For some reason it was accepted that lofty words addressed to the intelligentsia were bound to belittle or insult workers and peasants from whom the majority of the Soviet intelligentsia precisely originated. Belittling the labor and role of the intelligent person in society leads to a decline in the overall social standard and has a detrimental impact on its spiritual, socioeconomic and scientific and technical development.

It is pertinent to recall that in the first years of the Soviet system the bolsheviks were able (with a great deal of difficulty!) to create conditions for training the "critical mass" of the socialist intelligentsia so that, allied with the working class and the peasantry, they could ensure the daring breakthroughs in various areas of science, technology and culture. The outstanding patriots-intellectuals I.P. Pavlov, V.I. Vernadskiy, N.I. Vavilov, N.D. Kondratyev, A.V. Chayanov, A.K. Gastev, and a galaxy of most talented workers in literature and the arts, were the flower and pride of the young Republic of Soviets. Lenin's dream of the development, under the socialist system of society, of the "forces of the intellect" concealed within it, began to turn into reality. The accumulation of their "critical mass," multiplied by true morality, promised unparalleled progress of the human spirit and a real confirmation of what free labor and intellect could accomplish.

The cult of personality, followed by the years of stagnation, greatly undermined this beneficial process. During the period of Stalinist repressions alone, the people lost many thousands of the best representatives of all strata of the intelligentsia—the singed flowers of the people—which could not fail to lead to a drastic decline in the cultural potential of the society. The fear of “dissidence” and administrative arbitrary behavior against it were characteristic of the period of stagnation; dogmatism fettered literary workers, scientists and other members of the intelligentsia.

Once again the “critical mass” of the intelligentsia is increasing little by little. This is a lengthy and painstaking process. Ideas of the special, the historically responsible spiritual-constructive mission of the intelligentsia were expressed at the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union Conference. “Dissidence,” and critical thoughts are the initial, the essential qualities which must become a prerequisite for seeking the truth and must serve spiritual and scientific and technical progress.

Under present-day circumstances it is particularly important to surmount the narrow horizon of the old concepts of the intelligentsia. In the past, the moment a social scientist tried to bring to light specific features of its way of life, thinking and social mentality and to include in the very concept of “intelligentsia” ethical or psychological components, he was immediately accused of the lack of class approach and of sympathy for subjective idealism, populism and the theory of the “critically thinking individual” as described by P. Lavrov.

Naturally, in describing the social nature of the intelligentsia, we must take into consideration the framework of the socioclass structure of society and the social division of labor. However, are they sufficient? The concepts of “intelligentsia” and “intelligence” have acquired such disparate interpretation that it may seem that no reality whatsoever backs them up. For example, we are speaking of the intelligence of labor, the intellectual nature of a profession, the intelligent nature of an appearance, etc. If we think more profoundly, all of these combinations are extremely limited and also equally absurd. The intelligentsia has its own spiritual substratum which is difficult clearly to describe but which is invariably felt wherever we are dealing with a developed, a “formed” individual. Intelligence, as a synthetic, an integral manifestation of lofty sociopersonality qualities of the individual, is by no means the “privilege” merely of people engaged in mental labor. Its bearers also include progressive and creatively thinking workers and peasants. Furthermore, as the men of culture themselves note, so-called positions requiring intelligence are filled by many stupefyingly limited people with diplomas but with low cultural standards and insignificant qualities, who are frequently indifferent even to the progress achieved in the field of their VUZ studies. It is also true, we believe, that we specifically must not describe as

“intellectual” one position or another. Intelligence is not only a commonality of professional functions or an official social status but above all a type of world outlook on the part of a person and a certain attitude toward his position and the position of others in society and nature.

The same can be traced throughout the history of the concept of “intelligentsia:” thus, Cicero translated the term traced to the Greek philosopher Aristotle of *dianoesis*, which means trend of knowledge not only of the objective world but of oneself (self-reflection). In Cicero’s treatise “On the Nature of the Gods” we read that “...We have a remarkably great ability to understand (intelligentia)....”

In classical German philosophy the concept of “intelligence” became fundamental. Schelling believed that it meant both a creative and reflecting ability of the subject; Hegel considered it a condition of the “theoretical spirit,” which had reached the level of its own self-awareness. Essentially, it is a question of a developed activeness of the mind and the spirit, the ability to judge, which is a function of human awareness and which develops in the course of the social and cultural progress of mankind. It is precisely the ability for self-knowledge and self-awareness and not simply the ability of the individual to think or to have some knowledge of the outside world.

On this level the idea expressed by A. Gramsci, to the effect that in terms of the ability of a person to understand and think perhaps more people could be described as “intellectuals,” for “there is no human activity from which one could exclude any type of intellectual interference” was not always properly understood. Gramsci had expressed with this thought his deeply felt humanistic conviction that intelligence is not the monopoly of a narrow social stratum. Naturally, however, not all types of “intellectual interference” characterize the intellectual but the type of thinking and awareness which rise to the level of self-awareness. This refers to a self-critical and restless awareness, an intellect to which responsibility is inherent in his involvement with one type of activity or another. Such a nuance has a decisive, a conceptual meaning but, unfortunately, is not taken into consideration in the sociostructural approach to the intelligentsia. This blocks one of the major ways to determining its social role and impoverishes the concept of “intelligentsia” itself (reducing it to simply education or performance of mental functions). We believe that this is the reason for the largely contradictory and inconsistent views on the intelligentsia, for with such a theoretical study one of the essential characteristics of its active life and awareness—a meaningful life and meaningful creativity—is eliminated.

The supporters of the narrow sociological interpretation of the intelligentsia do not like to recall the familiar definition of it as “part of the nation which tends to

engage in independent thinking." However, it is precisely because of the ability to understand, realize and reinterpret that the great power of intelligence is concealed within the dynamism of a critical mind.

Naturally, the variety of forms of spiritual and creative activities of the intelligentsia are interpreted quite contradictorily, which has also defined the social and ideological position of those who assessed its role and behavior. Tyrants of all times and their obliging ideologues have been unable to restrain their irritation and dissatisfaction with the freedom loving intelligentsia in general and its aspiration to engage in independent judgments and display a creative freedom in general. Any "freedom" of thought and action by its democratic representatives have led to various types of persecutions and harassment, etc.

Helping society and a class to realize its purpose in the world has always been the historical prerogative of the intelligentsia. Lenin saw its vocation as one of drawing up an integral picture of reality and providing "answers to the questions of the proletariat," and as "being the ideological leaders of the proletariat in its true struggle" (op. cit., vol 1, pp 307, 309). This was in the spirit of the best traditions of Russian progressive thinking. As early as 1851 Herzen wrote that the country's intelligentsia is the organs of the people through which they try to understand their own status.

Since most ancient times, in disseminating knowledge among people of different strata, the intelligentsia has acted as the spiritual intermediary among them and has contributed to broadening culture and continuity among generations. According to Plato, the Sophists themselves were the disseminators of the "stocks" which nurture the soul. Socrates can be justifiably described as the embodiment of the ancient Greek intelligentsia. According to Cicero, he was "the first to take the philosophy down from the skies and to settle it in the cities and introduce it in the homes and make it think about the life and mores and about good and evil." These words express the humanistic principle which originated in the civilization of antiquity.

Such Socratic definition of the intelligentsia was inherent in the young Marx: as early as 1842 he spoke of the need to disseminate philosophy among the people and cautioned against loose thoughts and loud phraseology. He called for greater clarity and greater attention to specific reality which offers a variegated picture which brings to light the essential forces of man.

The concept which has developed in contemporary social science is that Marx did not pay any special attention to the problem of the intelligentsia for at that time the problem was not as yet relevant. If such were the case, there was no Marxian methodology for the study of the intelligentsia. Wittingly or unwittingly, this error was nurtured by the established view that the very concept of "intelligentsia" appeared not before the second half of

the 19th century in connection with the development of capitalism, in Russia at that. This concept essentially eliminated the spiritual-creative activity of the intelligentsia of different nations at different stages in the development of civilized societies. As to domestic history, it is as though it eliminates any outstanding activity of the Russian intelligentsia of the first half of the 19th century, including the Decembrists, most of the Raznochintsy and even the initial movements of the socialist intelligentsia, starting with the Petrashevtsy.

The assertion that a genetic link exists between the intelligentsia and the development of capitalism is not the type of petty theoretical concept unworthy of attention. It contributed to the strengthening of the narrow sociological view on the intelligentsia. However, the history of the intelligentsia is not a parade on the plaza of the socioeconomic system, by rigidly lined up battalions of "simple mercenaries" of mental labor, who enjoy the rights of an appendix to the different classes. The history of the intelligentsia is the history of human thought and culture which concentrates within itself the entire spiritual energy of the people and which, by virtue of this fact, makes the intelligentsia the bearer of the universal human principle and the guardian and disseminator of universal human values and humanistic ideals.

That is why the founders of our world outlook were not indifferent to the problem of the intelligentsia and intelligence. It is we who are occasionally indifferent and lazy in mastering the by no means exhausted intellectual legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Classics are an eternal value for them, as the poet said, are the "inhuman effort to combine what is universally human at different times." We need to address ourselves to the classics in order to engage in a live dialogue and, occasionally, even discussion, when a great deal of this legacy is rediscovered and takes a new breath in our social theory exhausted by stagnation.

In this context let us recall that in his very first works Marx turned to a characterization of the nature of the spiritual activities and role of the intelligentsia in a given process. We find the totality of the most important views on this problem in his articles known under the title "On the Estate Commissions in Prussia" (1842). Speaking of the fact that the estate system was created "by the naked need of private interests," Marx firmly opposed the interpretation of the intelligentsia as a special stratum along with that of industry and land owners. He backed his objection with outstanding thoughts on the nature of intelligence, unrelated with narrow ties to strata and group divisions but inherent in the intelligentsia as its vital nucleus. "...Intelligence... is not an egotistical interest which seeks satisfaction. It is a universal interest," Marx wrote, and goes on to say that "one could speak of intelligence not as a part of a entity but as the organizing principle" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 40, pp 287-289).



The ability of the intelligentsia to display a freedom of spirit was described by Marx as "free intelligence," which defends, "the just cause, even to the loss of its own home. Intelligence, which pursues a specific objective, and a specific item, is radically different from the type of intelligence which dominates all things and serves exclusively itself" (ibid, p 285).

Finally, we have Marx's profound prediction concerning the fate of the intelligentsia in the future: "...In order for the representative nature of the intelligentsia to have a meaning, we must interpret it as a demand for conscious representation of the intelligence of the people, which is by no means nurtured by pitting individual needs against the state but whose superior need is to implement in life the very essence of the state, considered at that as its own action...." It is a question of a state which is "self-representative of the people," and in which "spiritual forces" alone act (ibid, p 290). This outlines the historical prospects of self-government of an intelligent nation in the future society.

History has confirmed that intelligence, like culture, spirituality and civilization, becomes "free intelligence," when it is freed from serving narrowly understood class interests and, even more so, the slavish ties of serving a historically obsolete although, politically, still strong class.

In the professional activities of the people spiritual labor, regardless of the system under which they live, includes the essential "primordial" attraction toward selfless service of the truth and an aim of learning about the world as it is, on an objective basis, as well as the aspiration to humanize it.

The main feature in defining the historical role of the intelligentsia, we believe, is the subjective factor of its existence, its ideological-political tie which expresses the link between the intelligentsia and the classes and their views, ideological orientation, political position and actions, and participation in the struggle for specific interests and ideals, on the side of one class or another. It would be incorrect to reduce the tie between the intelligentsia and the classes only to socioeconomic factors, the social origin or status or sources and size of income alone. All of this, naturally, must be taken into consideration in classifying the intelligentsia. However, we must not forget the main thing which is the ideological-political standpoint of the representatives of mental labor which does not alone determine their economic status.

It would be difficult to understand anything about the aspect and role of the intelligentsia on the basis of class genealogy alone. In this case we cannot do without determining the significance of its cultural-personality qualities—intelligence as a moral imperative and a regulator and motive force of human actions. The officer Petr Shmidt, who as a member of the nobility, took over the leadership of the revolutionary Ochakov seamen.

Inessa Armand, a most highly educated woman, also broke off with her environment for the sake of the cause of the revolution; in the same way the priest Nikolay Podvoyskiy broke with the traditions of the priesthood. Multiple such examples exist. It would be erroneous to believe that it is only a member of the proletariat by origin, as some sectarians in the labor movement have believed, who could be the exclusive true defender of the cause of proletariat. Many people of nonproletarian origin struggled, consciously and with dedication, for the ideals of the working class. It is precisely they, having risen to the "theoretical understanding of the entire course of the historical movement," who took the positions of the progressive class, becoming its ideologues, organizers and leaders, and thus also models of high intelligence.

Naturally, as a synthetic, as an integral manifestation of the lofty cultural-personality qualities of the individual, intelligence is not the "privilege" of the intelligentsia alone. However, as a whole the intelligentsia, as well as its individual representatives, would be inconceivable without being intelligent. At that point numerous opponents could object, having become accustomed to consider the concept of "intelligentsia" and "intelligence" on different levels: the former defines only a stratum, a social group of workers engaged in mental labor, while the second indicates a cultural and moral standard only.

We are facing a real contradiction between the knowledge of the phenomenon of the intelligentsia, expressed in differences related to the sociological and cultural approaches. However, such approaches must not be separated but dialectically combined. We must acknowledge the twin nature of the intelligentsia which is both a social community of working people engaged in spiritual production and a cultural commonality, for it is presumed that inherent in those same working people are developed cultural-personality characteristics, i.e., intelligence. Our intelligentsia is a sociocultural commonality of socialist working people with a developed intellect and self-awareness, and high morality, who professionally and creatively perform special functions as direct subjects of spiritual production and whose activities are defined by the realized struggle for socialism.

Intelligence has always encompassed the simple norms of morality (conscientiousness, decency, tactfulness, honesty, modesty, spirituality, respect, etc.). Naturally, however, it cannot be reduced merely to them but must also include moral qualities of a higher order. This means awareness of the intrinsic value of intellectual creativity for the sake of the people, service to the universal ideals of mankind, exigency toward oneself and others, civic mindedness and civic courage, an uncompromising attitude in the struggle for truth, democracy of thought, and a feeling of personal dignity as a free individual. In terms of the present, it also means assisting in the struggle for perestroika and against

stagnation and dogmatism. If the majority of the intelligentsia were to take more firmly the path of perestroyka along with the entire people, the new qualitative status of society would come about sooner.

As we know, the intelligent person to whom intellectual creativity is an inherent feature, bases his attitude toward the world on scientific knowledge. He takes nothing on faith. To him socialism as well is not a subject of faith but a realized creativity. Views to the effect that one grain of faith is more precious than any experience of the wise man are hardly accurate: in this type of antinomy faith, deprived of reason, turns into greed and becomes blind. Fructified by reason, faith turns into conviction and loyalty to the cause of social progress. It was not in vain that Chaadayev himself wrote that "I would rather scourge my homeland, I would rather sadden it, I would rather humiliate it than deceive it."

Therefore, let us have a more critical mind and less "tearful" faith. For a developed mind, as a rule, largely determines also the moral qualities of the individual.

Incidentally, we should consider as incorrect yet another contraposition: in an effort to protect society from demagoguery, which is entirely understandable, there are those who are in favor of restricting criticism in general. However, what type of criticism are they talking about? Obviously, it is only criticism which is dialectical, such as a dialectical negation, that could be useful. However, there could be neither more nor less such criticism. It is a permanently operating method and an instrument for the knowledge and transformation of reality. By its very nature it is constructive, for it rejects that which is old and obsolete and retains what is better and more progressive. In other words, such criticism is inseparable from a constructive attitude.

We should approach important categories such as faith, wisdom, a critical attitude and a constructive behavior not on the basis of ordinary, and trivial but of scientific yardsticks. At that point we would get rid of the long appeals which possess neither an explanatory nor a constructive force and which reach neither the minds nor the hearts of the people.

Who could be classified as member of the intelligentsia? As we already pointed out, the social role of the intelligentsia, only if combined with the cultural-personality essential features (intelligence) can give to us an understanding of the "intelligentsia" in its entire indivisible complexity. If a person lacks any one of these qualities it would be improper automatically to classify him as member of the intelligentsia in terms of a sociocultural community. Naturally, one could pretend and appear to be intelligent but it is difficult to truly be such and remain one for a lifetime, for this requires permanent intellectual and moral efforts.

Here as well hardly needed are any kind of stipulations to the effect that this can be achieved not by all but only by some kind of true intelligentsia. "Untrue" intelligentsia cannot exist. Ability for self-awareness and interpretation of the destinies of the people is inherent in the intelligentsia as are creativity and spiritual freedom. A person could be a good worker who, nonetheless, limits himself to stereotypical forms of mental activity which do not require any major intellectual stress and may be satisfied only with the consumption of accumulated cultural values. All of this may not be an obstacle to the conscientious implementation of specific technological functions in spiritual production, given the present level in its development. However, such a person cannot reach the threshold of intelligence.

By virtue of his position within the system of the social division of labor, potentially he could become a member of the intelligentsia. However, this requires above all an awareness by the person **himself** of the moral trend of intellectual activities. Without such a self-awareness there can be no strictly social activity on the part of the intelligentsia. A mental worker, to the extent to which he begins to realize the need for creative activity as a means of self-realization and self-development, in the course of such a spiritual effort becomes a means of their existence and becomes a member of the intelligentsia in the full meaning of the term.

Such an awareness and such activities cannot be imposed from the outside. A person cannot "be made" a member of the intelligentsia. He may be forced to study, to acquire an education, as a result of which he may start performing mental functions in the course of the labor process. However, on this basis a person can become a member of the intelligentsia only by himself, on the basis of his own will, if favored by the social and moral environment. The socialist intelligentsia does not consist simply of individuals with higher and secondary specialized training. It consists of individuals who are imbued "with the interests of any truly social project" (Lenin) which they serve, and who implement their mission through the tangible forms of their creativity.

These forms could be exceptionally varied. They are consistent with the various professional groups of the intelligentsia with their specific functions: scientific, engineering and technical, managerial, artistic, medical, military, etc. However, what makes the Soviet intelligentsia one is its unified social nature determined by the objectives of practical activities, the interests of the whole nation and the communist ideals. It does not try to rise above the people as an untouchable elite but generates cultural-creative activities among the various population strata and reproduces, disseminates and preserves the culture developed by mankind. The ability of the intelligentsia to formulate on a scientific basis real tactical and strategic tasks and to earmark the outlines of the future society greatly depends on the potential of the Soviet intelligentsia—intellectual, cultural and moral. In turn, this influences the solution of today's problems.

This is a manifestation of the permanent role of the intelligentsia and its important conceptual function, for "more general, broader or farther-reaching views are twice as necessary to us today," in order not to be blocked facing the need to solve petty and separate problems of management and in order not to forget the general course of development" (V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 38, pp 41-42).

In this connection the as yet unstudied theory of the problem of the intelligence within the party itself, the quality which it needs so greatly to develop if it is to reach the level of the revolutionary tasks facing the party members by the objective laws of perestroika urgently arises. We have become accustomed to repeat that the party is the brain of the class and the mind, honesty and conscience of the age. These words encompass all components of intelligence, which is entirely natural, although it sounds somewhat unusual, for to begin with, socialist intelligence is an inner feature inherent in the Marxist-Leninist party. Intelligence must be both the quality of the individual party member as well as a system characteristic of the entire party as an agency of the self-awareness of the working class, of the entire Soviet people.

E. Agosti, the noted Argentine Marxist philosopher and revolutionary leader, has described the communist party as the "collective intellectual," developing A. Gramsci's idea that "all members of a political party must be classified as intellectuals," for any party member has a political, an ideological influence over a more or less wide range of people. This demands of him the performance of intellectual functions even if professionally he is not performing specifically intellectual work. The party tries to see to it that all of its members, and not only the workers engaged in mental work who are party members, participate in determining, in the ideological enrichment and the dissemination of its ideological line, in promoting the moral aspect and dignity of the party member. In this sense as well the functions of the intellectual are extended to every party member. It is only with the full elimination of divisions between intellectuals and workers within the proletarian party, and in the full consciousness of the progressive workers that we find the prerequisite for its strength (see V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 9, pp 317-318).

The party members have always been aware of the role and power of ideologues and their impact on the masses. The party ideologues could give a progressive nature to the activities of the masses or else doom them to a regression. Let us go back to A.I. Herten. As early as 1866 he formulated the important thought of the ability of intellectuals-ideologues, despite their small number, to lead the masses: "A historical act is only the act of a live understanding of that which exists. If 10 people clearly understand that which thousands of people are seeking in darkness, they will be followed by the thousands;" the entire question is the direction in which this 'understanding' minority will lead these thousands.

In turn, this depends on the conscience of the leaders-ideologues (A.I. Herten, "Soch." [Works] in two volumes. Moscow, 1986, vol 2, p 477).

In interpreting the course of the historical process from the positions of the activities of the socialist intelligentsia, one could raise the question of the future of mankind. The intelligentsia, which is aware of and knows the nature of man in his "absolute dynamics of establishment" (Marx) as well as its own nature, encompassing through its spiritual-creative activities of broad toiling strata, and contributing to their intellectual and moral enhancement, thus turns into a truly people's intelligentsia. We may assume that when people are given infinite opportunities for their individual development and the blossoming of all of their inclinations and aspirations for scientific, technical, artistic or any other type of creativity, society will lose its socioclass differentiation and become a truly intellectual society.

All of this allows us to formulate the dialectically paradoxical formula: the future of the intelligentsia is the intelligence of the future.

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**The Big Problems of Small Ethnic Groups**  
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[Article by Aleksandr Ivanovich Pika, candidate of historical sciences, scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population and USSR State Committee for Labor; and Boris Borisovich Prokhorov, doctor of geographic sciences, head of laboratory of regional problems of population health of the same institute]

[Text] Their forefathers came to these places thousands of years ago, looked over and developed these harsh lands learned about nature and acquired the skills of survival under extreme natural conditions. They were able to develop outstanding original cultures. Their roots and hopes for the future are related only to these and to no other lands. These are the peoples of the North. Their situation today is not an easy one.

For a number of years and decades a great deal was said in our country about the unparalleled progress of the native ethnic groups of the Soviet North, who were able to make a gigantic leap from a primitive communal system to socialism. However, in frequent cases a distorted and touched-up picture of reality was presented. The pressing problems which had developed were either ignored or concealed, for over a long period of time no serious economic, sociological or demographic studies were made here. This played a noticeable role in the fact that today northern nature and the related close ties between it and the native population have reached a

dangerous point beyond which their further existence and development in their integrity and historical continuity cannot be guaranteed. A great deal could change irreversibly and be lost.

In recent years alarming signals coming from the local areas and honest and concerned scientific reports, the fate of which, until recently, ended in drawers of work desks and the files of different institutions, have come out on the pages of newspapers and journals and discussed in their full magnitude at conferences and on television. Dozens of commissions of high-ranking state and party officials have visited the Extreme North to check the facts.

Therefore, what is taking place with the small ethnic groups of the North today?

The areas inhabited by the ethnic groups of the North cover about one-half of the territory of the USSR, from the Kola Peninsula to the lower reaches of the Amur and Sakhalin Island. In 1925, by special decree of the TsIK and the SNK the Saam, Nenets, Khanty, Mansi, Entsy, Nganasany, Selkupy, Kety, Evenki, Eveny, Dolgany, Yukagiry, Chuchki, Koryaky, Eskimos, Aleutians, Itelmeny, Tofalary, Ulchi, Nanaytsy, Nivkhi, Udegytsy, Negidaltzy, Oroki, Orchi and Chuvantsy were classified as a separate group of small ethnic nationalities of the North. Today their total number exceeds 160,000 people. The creation in 1930 of okrugs (today autonomous) of the peoples of the North was a major historical stage. In the postwar years the industrial development of areas where Northern ethnic groups were the native population increased rapidly. As a result of the influx of people coming from other parts of the country, the population here increased several hundred percent while the size of the native population rose insignificantly. Its share dropped drastically and is today 23 percent in Koryakskiy and down to 3 percent in Khanty-Mansi Okrug. The output of the native Northern population, essentially artisan and agricultural, has become almost insignificant in the economic balance of the area, against the background of huge industrial volumes of output.

Constitutionally, the autonomous okrugs inhabited by the ethnic groups of the North must defend their interests. However, there as well the indicators of the living standard of the native Northerners are substantially worse than those of the newcomers. It is quite clear that the social and living conditions are the most unfavorable compared with any other ethnic groups and nationalities in the USSR. We notice in the national settlements a severe shortage of housing the availability of which does not exceed an average of 4 square meters per person. Most rural settlements lack housing amenities: only 3 percent have gas, 0.4 have running water and 0.1 percent have central heating. There are no sewer systems or water collectors consistent with sanitary-ecological requirements. The housing is mainly old, built between

the end of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s. The social infrastructure of the settlement is undeveloped. Availability of products and industrial commodities is scarce.

The situation in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug is quite typical of the entire North. Both Khanty and Mansi live today in 72 national settlements. Many of them are still without electricity and, as in olden times, people use kerosene and oil lamps. Actually, even where electric power plants have been built, their capacity is frequently insufficient and light is provided only several hours daily. In a number of settlements there are no hospitals, schools, clubs, bakeries, or public baths, or sometimes, even stores. There even are settlements which are officially considered "closed down," nonexistent, although people continue to live there. In such settlements absolutely no services are provided, and the population can rely only on themselves or on the help of neighbors.

Since the end of the 1930s a state policy of converting the population to a settled way of life has been pursued in the North (although to this day more than 15,000 people or nearly 10 percent of the entire native population retain their year-round nomad way of life and have no permanent homes). The policy of converting the population to a settled way of life is not based on any kind of thought-out plan. It is not scientific and leads to the destruction of the traditional economic complex and, with it, to the dissolution of the native population and its disappearance as groups of original ethnic formations and to the loss of national-cultural originality. However, it is precisely on the basis of the concept of the "cultural insufficiency" of the nomad way of life that for the past several decades it is considered as a "temporarily existing" life style which should be eliminated. Therefore, no plans have been made to provide nomad families with contemporary living conveniences, based on the assumption that the reindeer raising population will enjoy all such amenities in its permanent settlements.

The traditional economic sectors are the foundations for the national and cultural originality of the native population of the North. Currently less than 43 percent of the able-bodied population among the native Northerners are engaged in reindeer growing, fishing and hunting (only 30 years ago more than 70 percent of them were engaged in such occupations). All of these economic sectors are in a state of crisis as a result of an unbalanced economy, inefficient economic management, and the degradation of pasture grounds and hunting areas under the influence of industry. Above all the crisis affects economic management, which has a social base.

For quite some time the resources of the Northern rivers, the forests and the tundra and domestic deer and virtually all means of production have stopped being the collective property of the native population. They were transferred to the state and became actual "departmental" property of the Gosagroprom, Minrybkhhoz, Rospotrebysoyuz, Glavokhot, etc. These organizations

are guided exclusively by their narrow departmental and short-term interests. They do not relate their activities to the vital requirements of the Northern peoples and their long-term development. A poet has clearly described the results of such economic management:

"The economy has gone to hell and in the distant Northern rivers the Khanty fishermen are purchasing little sardines caught in the South."

This is perfectly well put, considering that airplanes flying thousands of kilometers bring to the Surgut and Salekhard fish combines fish caught in the Atlantic and the Pacific. In South Yakutiya meat to feed animals raised in game farms is shipped from the Moscow area and fish comes from the Far East. The virtually entire hunting and agricultural output in the North is operating on a planned-loss basis. At the Udarnik Sovkhoz, in Chukotka, it costs 150 rubles to produce one blue fox fur, which is then sold for 65 rubles and 13 kopeks. It is very easy to compute the loss, considering that the sovkhoz delivers 5,000 pelts annually.

As a result of the lack of departmental control, the herds of domesticated reindeer in the country today totals no more than 1.8 million head, which is the lowest ever in the entire history of reindeer raising in this century (in 1965 there were 2.4 million). The intensiveness with which hunting grounds are being developed and the procurement of Northern "wild" game are also showing a steadily declining trend. The fishing resources along many domestic water reservoirs in the North are nearing exhaustion and in such rich fishing grounds as Kamchatka and Sakhalin the native population is being shunted away from coastal fishing by the more active newcomers who, in their pursuit of fast profits, are mercilessly undermining the natural potential of the area.

Plans for the industrial development of Arctic and sub-Arctic areas and other places inhabited by native ethnic groups have always been received with major concern. The social and governmental organizations demand of the firms reliable guarantees which would protect the interests of the local population. Such guarantees have been codified in the international "Convention For the Protection and Integration of the Native and Other Populations Engaged in a Tribal and Semi-tribal Way of Life In Independent Countries." Foreign experience indicates that there is real opportunity for combining the interests of the native nationalities with industrial development. This, however, requires their thorough study.

What is the situation with protecting the interests of the Northern population in our country? The only possible answer to this question is that it is stupefyingly bad. Such interests were not considered when nuclear explosion tests were conducted in the Arctic in the 1950s; nor are

they considered in the search for minerals in the taiga and the tundra, in the extraction of petroleum and natural gas and in laying huge pipelines along pasture grounds and hunting areas.

For a number of years we have conducted field studies in the Northern areas. It is painful to see how the few improvements in the life of the peoples of the North brought about by technology and the entire process of industrial development are more than offset by losses caused by the organizations in charge of developing these areas. For many years, day and night, casting a pink light around them, gas torches are burning around Nizhnevartovsk, petroleum is flowing along the tributaries of the Ob, forests are being cut down along the banks of the Taz, and reindeer moss is burning out at the reindeer pasture grounds of the Yamal under the tracks of all-terrain vehicles. And all of this is done for the sake of the never-ending haste, with indifference and, frequently, unconcealed scorn for this land whose resources are being exhausted.

Thus, the plan for laying a main gas pipeline on the Yamal Peninsula, which was rejected by experts from the USSR Gosplan, stipulated the condemnation of 36,000 hectares of reindeer pastures. Actually, had this variant been adopted, the size of the lost pastures would have been 3 to 4 times greater. It is a sad paradox that the Yamalo Nenetskiy and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrugs are world-level suppliers of fuel. Their native populations have not only not benefited in any way from this common "fuel-energy" pie but are constantly suffering from the offensive mounted by petroleum and natural gas giants.

As a result of their careless and clumsy work the Magadan reclamation workers have destroyed the plankton in many Chukotka rivers, although this is the feed base of Siberian salmon, hunchback salmon, whitefish, nelma and other gourmet fish species. When Yermak came to Siberia, a Khanty settlement had long existed along the Soba, a left tributary of the great Ob, which gradually became the Khanty Katrovzh settlement. The local population fished and hunted game and fowl. Many areas along the river valley were considered "sacred" and fishing, hunting, logging and making fires were categorically forbidden in those areas. Even taking water was prohibited. It was thus that spawning grounds, wintering pits and nests of waterfowl were being preserved. How great was the amazement, indignation and confusion of the Khanty when several years ago powerful equipment began to extract earth from the bed of the Soba. The construction workers needed a sand-gravel mixture as a result of which salmon disappeared from the rivers and hereditary fishermen lost the natural base for their subsistence.

The list of crimes committed against nature and, consequently, against the native population is endless. On the subject of the plan for the Turukhan GES, which is to be

built on his native land, the Evenk writer Alitet Nemtushkin, who was a delegate to the 19th Party Conference, wrote as follows: "Entire ethnic groups may find themselves on the brink of disappearance when, under the guise of a benefit, the best hunting grounds and reindeer pastures will be flooded or, in other words, we will be deprived of our base for living.... Any disappearance is a catastrophe. Yet here unique national features of character, an ethnic aspect, language and way of life may disappear forever from the culture of mankind and its genetic stock."

In the development of the areas inhabited by the native population, the problems appear not only as a result of the wounded land, and the eliminated pastures or poisoned fish. Two cultures clash on the taiga and tundra: the ancient, quite original and, one could also say, delicate, and the modern, which is pressure oriented, self-complacent, and technocratic. The people who are developing this harsh area are well familiar to us after living jointly on the oil fields and from long discussions by the open fires in the taiga and our meetings in the course of building new cities and laying railroads. The endurance, loyalty to their profession, courage, self-reliance, and simplicity, inherent in many among them, are worthy of admiration. It is only this type of people who could live and work in the North. The trouble, however, is that they keep hearing and reading about their own exclusivity, the fact that they are pioneers, and this apparently seems to say it all. Never, or else exceptionally rarely, are they reminded of the ecological standards and the standards of communicating with the local population and the need to respect other customs and another way of life.

The processes which are taking place in the North are having a particularly adverse effect on the young generation of the native population. Young people are unwilling to go into the traditional economic sectors because of their backward economy and poor organization. However, as the native Northerners are moved into other areas of employment, as a rule they must be satisfied only with low paid nonprestigious work. The share of individuals engaged in unskilled physical toil (cleaning women, loaders, auxiliary workers, etc.), is steadily growing within the structure of employment of the native population, already accounting for more than 30 percent of the total (13 percent in 1959). This process of "lumpenizing" of the small ethnic groups is interpreted by some "optimistic scientists" as a "new progressive phenomenon"—the growth of the working class," while the deep social alienation, passiveness and pessimism triggered by such a situation are assessed as "vestiges of a primitive-patriarchal past."

The socioeconomic phenomena which are taking place in the areas inhabited by the small ethnic groups of the North reflect clearly, as through a lens, the most important indicators of life activities—the state of health of the people and the demographic situation. They are subjects of great concern. The native population needs medical

help and is hospitalized for diseases of the circulatory system, oncological pathology, ear, throat and nose diseases significantly more frequently than people who have come from the outside but who live under considerably better social conditions. Also higher here is the mortality rate from such diseases. Infant mortality is high. The mental health of the native Northerners is also threatened. The level of their sociopsychological adaptation to rapidly changing living conditions is declining. Increased drunkenness and aggressive behavior are indicators of this process. Between 1970 and 1980 every second death among the native population was the result of an accident, at home or on the job, murder or suicide (approximately 70-90 per 100,000 population, which is 3 to 4 times higher than the average for the Union).

Starting with the mid-1960s, the small ethnic groups of the North entered the period of so-called demographic transition, in which high birthrate and mortality levels were to drop. However, for a number of years they have shown a substantial drop in the birthrate alone. All of this is based on the crisis in family-marital relations and is closely related to the overall process of cultural assimilation. The number of partial families—essentially single mothers and widows with children—is increasing in the settlements.

For the past several decades the general mortality among the ethnic groups of the North has not been declining. It has remained on an exceptionally high level which exceeds the same indicator for the Russian federation by a factor of 2 or 3. The life span of the native population in the Northern areas is 45 for men and 55 for women. This is 18 years shorter than the average for the USSR. Such low indicators may not be found in the demographic statistics of industrially developed and many developing countries throughout the world. It is precisely because of the high mortality rate that the increase in the size of the ethnic groups in the North declined by a factor of 5 between the 1970 and 1979 population censuses and in 7 of 26 ethnic groups the size of the population even decreased.

Some of the problems which are of particular concern to the small ethnic groups of the Soviet North are lack of jobs in the national settlements for the native population; poor knowledge of their native language or even total loss of such knowledge among young people; alienation of children from the family and from the traditional types of labor activity, resulting from lengthy stays in boarding schools. Also worrisome are negative phenomena such as, for example, the mentality of "dependent against one's will," which developed as a result of faulty systems of relations between the local authorities (consisting essentially of people of nonnative nationality) and the ethnic Northerners. The aspiration of the local administrators to solve problems totally unrelated to the interests of the native population, hiding behind the pretense of concern for them, is widespread.

Writer Vladimir Sangi described the way the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On the Measures For the Further Economic and Social Development of the Areas Where Ethnic Groups Live in the North" (1980) was being implemented in Sakhalin. Some 700 Nivkhi (nearly 65 percent of the entire native population of the area) live in Nogliki, which is the rayon center. In the past they were resettled there by force from their small settlements. In addition to petroleum pipelines, graders, and automobiles, which hardly fit the life style of the native Northerners, but could still be of some use to them, using the money appropriated for the economic and cultural development of the ethnic populations, the local authorities have bought thousands of pairs of plastic skis and titanium poles and 200 typewriters, 500 microcalculators and as many "compact" toilet bowls.

Academician A.P. Okladnikov wrote: "The current hunting and fishing ethnic groups in the North, who were at the origins of the development of creative work, are as involved in global cultural achievements as other nations on the planet.... To us the question is not to preserve or not to preserve the original culture of the Northern ethnic groups or their cultural heritage but how better to accomplish this under the conditions, on the one hand, of the pressure of the scientific and technical revolution and, on the other, the trend toward the internationalization of cultures." Naturally, in order to protect culture it is necessary to begin by protecting the people themselves.

All of these problems have common origins and are closely interconnected and also related to the policy (or, rather, the absence of any whatsoever purposeful and scientifically substantiated policy), which is pursued toward the native population. They can be solved only on a comprehensive basis and the main role in solving them unquestionably belongs to the original Northern population itself. Any attempt at implementing any whatsoever (even the most useful) measures taken from above, in Moscow or Tyumen, Magadan or Krasnoyarsk, is doomed to failure. Past experience has already confirmed this. It is necessary, in the capital of our country, and in the oblast, kray and okrug centers, above all, to restrain the expansion of the ministries in the North and to force them truly to respect and take into consideration the interests of the native population. Unfortunately, so far, they have been unable to accomplish this by themselves.

The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference asserted the right of each ethnic group in the USSR to its revival and development of national cultures and the acceleration of progress in previously backward areas. "It is important in each national region for economic and social progress to be paralleled by spiritual progress, based on the cultural autonomy of nationalities and ethnic groups," the resolution "On Inter-Nationality Relations" stipulates. This fully applies to the situation which has developed in the areas of the Northern ethnic groups. In the

forthcoming decades their socioeconomic and cultural development must be based on the idea of protecting the national-cultural autonomy and independence of development. The former implies the adoption of special socioeconomic and cultural forms of state ethnic policy toward the Northern ethnic groups, the purpose of which would be to provide support not simply to people living in the distant cold North but precisely to the ethnic groups in their aspiration to survive and preserve their ethnic originality.

This means something more than providing the entire Northern population with "equal rights" and "equal opportunities." Under equal circumstances it is always the one who is the strongest and most familiar with the "rules of the game" who wins. Alas, for the time being on their own native soil, the Northern peoples are no such winners. Second: their autonomous development is the only possible way and means of their survival, for unless the barriers of social passiveness and alienation are not surmounted by the native population itself, no outside support would be of any help. The mandatory participation of the ethnic Northerners in general regional and local development programs on all stages, from concept and discussion to implementation, should be realized as a most important political principle. It seems to us that these two ideas are the foundations of the "new thinking" in the approach to an old problem.

The concept of the long-term development of the economy and culture of the areas where Northern ethnic groups live is being currently formulated. This work is being done with the participation of scientists who have been asked to issue recommendations and by representatives of the state authorities. Cooperation between the management authorities and research collectives in solving the complex national-cultural and social problems can only be welcomed. This is a step forward compared to the past. However, this step as well is merely a reflection of yesterday. "State concern" for the native populations of the North is still not contemplating any manifestation of their own political will and national-cultural aspirations and wishes. No serious discussion of plans involving the native populations is being contemplated and their direct participation in their implementation is not required. It may so happen that all the legal, financial and socioeconomic instruments for the development of their "small homelands" will once again pass into the hands of ministries and departments, i.e., of those who, for decades, have proved their lack of interest in the affairs of the Northern ethnic groups.

Unquestionably, hasty and simplistic solutions should be avoided in solving complex national-political problems. This will make it even more just to involve in this project people who are active and involved, who enjoy the respect and trust of the population of the distant Northern settlements and nomad villages, the national creative intelligentsia, physicians, teachers, members of soviet and party bodies, deputies of local and okrug soviets, and representatives of the Northern autonomous



okrugs in the USSR Supreme Soviet. They should be involved not as guests at final conferences, to be informed of and to approve a "scientific concept" or a draft decree. The question is now one of creating a true representation for the Northern ethnic groups and of a national-cultural public authority which will deal on a permanent basis with existing problems.

The suggestion for the creation of such an authority—an association of ethnic groups of the North—was formulated by Vladimir Sangi at the meeting of the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union. It has also met with the approval of scientists. Furthermore, it would be expedient to put together the instructions and wishes of the local population, to discuss them in the press and at rural rallies and then to record them in a document which would reflect the true interests and hopes for the future of the peoples of the North. Any new resolution may prove to be ineffective and lead, as has already happened in the past, to the creation of new problems and to dead-end situations unless the native population itself becomes involved in the difficult and, obviously, long-term project for the solution of its own problems.

Global experience in promoting sociocultural changes among ethnic groups which, until recently, were in preindustrial stages of development, including those in the foreign North, have indicated that changes bring people nothing other than feelings of hurt and helplessness whenever they are not asked their views on the forthcoming changes but are converted into passive executors of someone else's will and consumers of "granted" benefits. All we need is to help the native population to organize itself and, in some cases, possibly, it is important to prove that one's intentions are serious. Let the people themselves decide what is best for them: traditionalism or industrial development, reindeer or petroleum, state benefits or economic opportunities.

Enhancing the self-awareness of the native population of the North is possible only against the background of the growth of its socioeconomic well-being. If the present living conditions are preserved, it would be difficult to expect any positive changes in the awareness of the peoples whose interests have been ignored for such a long time. Departments which exploit the natural resources of the North and which substantially undermine the natural foundation for the traditional employment of the native population should compensate for the harm they are doing. They should compensate not with money which, without material procurements and a construction base means little, but by building contemporary comfortable settlements, schools, hospitals, clubs and production premises and providing transport facilities. Both the leadership of the departments and the native population must clearly realize that this is not charity but only a just and by no means full compensation. This aspect of the matter is of great importance.

Unquestionably, the most important problem in organizing normal life in the North is bringing proper order to the economy of the native population. We believe that

the main objective of economic activities here should be not a strive for high plan indicators and shipping goods out of the Northern areas but, above all, the self-support of the population based on the results of its toil. Problems of commodity sales and state procurements should be given second priority. Obviously, we must gradually close down unprofitable production facilities which are not typical of the North, such as dairy farms, Arctic hog breeding, etc. It would be expedient to encourage economic independence and to promote and apply family contracting, particularly in reindeer breeding, leasing contracts and other forms of cooperation.

Once again the native population must feel that it is the full master of the taiga and the rivers, the tundra pastures and the reindeer herds and not daily laborers for the "comrade with the pocketbook." We must see to it that truly socialist cooperative ownership of means of production replaces "departmental" ownership which is a nutritive ground for specifically Northern bureaucratism and the overpopulation of the Northern settlements with a number of "specialists" and "managers" who have come from the outside. It is only economic self-management and the possibility of independently managing cooperative property in the Northern communities that could restore to the people here their personal and social meaning of life. This is the most important thing which could be given to them as aid in their aspiration for self-preservation and cultural autonomy.

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#### **The Soviet Chapter In Our History**

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[Article by Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovskiy]

[Text] "New turns in our historical path could bring to light new aspects of the October Revolution, aspects which we previously failed to notice...." These words, which were said more than half a century ago by M.N. Pokrovskiy, one of the participants in the revolution and organizer of historical science in the USSR, are entirely applicable today, a period noted by its turning toward those aspects of the October Revolution which go back to the humanistic essence of socialism.

The name Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovskiy (1868-1932) was exceptionally popular in the first 15 years which followed the October Revolution. Subsequently, particularly during the period of the cult of Stalin's personality, it was unjustifiably subjected to defamation, and his historical concepts, which were alien to circumstantial approaches, were interpreted as a "revision of Leninism," "Trotskyite prose," etc. Yes, the works of this scientist included erroneous judgments and unexpected and sometimes risky historical parallels and contradictions. However, this by no means overshadows his outstanding merits to the party, the people and science.

One of the main links in the comprehensive historical activities carried out by Pokrovskii is the study of the history of the Great October Revolution. The articles by this scientist were published in 1924 at the October anniversary issue of the journal *BOLSHEVIK*, with the editors' expressing in a note their disagreement with the authors suggested system for periodization. We believe reprinting this article (with minor abridgments) would be of interest to our contemporary readers as well.

We have still not undertaken to write the history of the October Revolution and already 7 years of postrevolutionary history have passed. And what years! The Civil War alone is worth five French Vendees, for Vendee, familiar to any educated person, was slightly bigger than our Antovism and smaller than Antovism and Makhnovism combined together. Yet every educated person has heard about Vendee while as far as our Civil War is concerned Russian emigres have written five times more than the communists, profiting from the leisure time we gave them. Even our chronicles of the revolutionary period stop, for the time being, at its first year, although we are into the 8th year since the victory of the revolution, and soon the 9th since the day the revolution started will be upon us.

Self-recriminations and regrets, naturally, will not help. The only way to achieve real progress is to make the revolutionary period a topic for seminar work in a training institution, such as the Institute for Red Professorship. This has already been done as far as the Civil War is concerned. Unless matters worsen more than they did in the 5th year of the revolution and the period between the revolutions, in 1 year we shall have a number of monographs relying partially on records. However, this will cover only one event in the history of the past 7 years although, it is true, it is the most outstanding event unless we consider the most important one: the fact that as early as 1905 Lenin predicted that defending the gains of the revolution will be more difficult than achieving them.

However, monographs will help us to understand individual events without giving us the picture of the entire period. The writer of these lines is a modest supporter of the schematizing and periodization of history. This was a favorite occupation of the Russian historians of the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, i.e., those of the pre-dialectical period of our historical publications. The moment the spirit of dialectics appeared, albeit in its idealistic form, Solovyev started saying that the job of the historian is "not to splinter, not to divide history into periods" but to try to clarify the inner connection among historical changes. Most recently a certain revival has taken place of a taste for periodization and the lover of systems, N.A. Rozhkov, is finding many supporters. One could think that this is no proof of the excessively dialectical nature of the thinking of the latter. However, we must not deny the fact that, being scientifically a very weak method, periodization is nonetheless quite useful pedagogically. If we do not turn into

a fetish the various landmarks which we ourselves have placed on the path of history but use them as landmarks should be used, for orientation purposes, they will help the beginner understand the features of the most important stages of the past.

This viewpoint provides a certain justification also to the attempt to divide into periods the "history of the past 7 years," which is a topic of what follows here. It is not based on the study of archives or even on exhaustive familiarity with printed matter. The facts I use are more or less universally familiar. All of us experienced them and blissfully forgot them the moment they were behind us. Yet, if we recall them in their chronological sequence, we obtain an interesting picture of the accretions which led to the gradual existence of today's Union of Soviet Republics.

Since a system should be based on a given basic principle, I shall consider only one aspect of the historical process which, to me, seems the most important: the status of proletarian dictatorship in terms of its attitude toward the nonproletarian elements both within the country and in the outside world, the world abroad. Someone may object to this by saying that here the starting point is not economics, and not the development of production forces but, politics. I believe, however, that in terms of that specific period, this would be entirely accurate. By 1914 Russia was already clearly an imperialist country, and the economy which determined its destinies was not local but global: it is this global economy that could explain the imperialist war (which is a political fact) which dislocated the economy of tsarist Russia and thus triggered the 1917 Revolution; one cannot explain the participation of Russia in the imperialist war on the basis of domestic economic conditions.

It is self-evident that under those circumstances, from the very beginning our revolution was to assume the nature of a socialist revolution about which in 1905 we could speak only as a more or less remote possibility. In the first years of the NEP, unquestionably, the menshevik concept of the October Revolution as a change of the essentially still bourgeois coups d'etat, which did not directly exceed the limits of a capitalist economy began to be promoted within our ranks. It is to the extent to which such thoughts are still entering our heads that a few lines should be dedicated to this matter, perhaps for the sake alone of reminding us of the true and prophetic words said by Comrade Lenin in his pamphlet "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Struggle Against It," which was written in mid-September 1917. Some of the "principal measures" needed to prevent the threatening catastrophe include, above all, the following: "1. Unification of all banks within a single bank with state control over its operations or bank nationalization.

2. Nationalization of syndicates, i.e., of the largest monopoly associations of capitalists (sugar, petroleum, coal, metallurgical and other)" (Vol 34, p 161; here and subsequently references are based on V.I. Lenin's *Poln. Sobr. Soch.* ["Complete Collected Works], editor's note).

To consider these measures (which, it goes without saying, were indeed carried out in 1918) as not exceeding the framework of the capitalist system could be the idea only of a person who gives an exceptionally "liberal" meaning to the word "capitalism." Naturally, there were people who, in general, identified any large-scale output with capitalism: with such an understanding there will always be capitalism. However, if we understand under capitalism that which it indeed represents, which is private ownership of large-scale means of production, the steps which Comrade Lenin suggested in September 1917 were, naturally, **socialist**. Lenin raised this question entirely clearly and his pamphlet has a separate chapter entitled "**Could We Go Forward Fearing That We Are Marching Toward Socialism?**" where we find the following lines: "The preceding presentation could easily trigger in a reader, raised on the popular opportunistic ideas of the S.R. and the mensheviks, the following objection: most of the steps described here are actually not democratic but are **already socialist measures...**" (ibid., p 190); furthermore, having exposed the S.R. and the mensheviks for their lack of understanding what is an imperialist monopoly, what is a state and what is revolutionary democracy, Lenin ended up as follows: "...By understanding this, we must not fail to acknowledge that one cannot go forth without marching toward socialism" (ibid., p 191). For if the largest capitalist enterprise becomes a monopoly, it means that it is serving the entire nation. If it has become a state monopoly this means that the state (i.e., the armed organization of the population, workers and peasants, above all, under the conditions of a **revolutionary** democracy), directs all enterprises, but in whose interest?

Either in the interests of the land owners and the capitalists, at which point we do not have a revolutionary-democratic but a reactionary bureaucratic state, an imperialistic republic;

Or in the interests of revolutionary democracy; at that point "**this is a step toward socialism**" (ibid., pp 191-192).

Therefore, in one and a half months prior to the seizure of power in Russia by the proletariat, its leader perfectly anticipated the social and economic consequences of this seizure, consequences which were entirely inevitable, and which derived with iron logic from the circumstance that our revolution was a rebellion against imperialism, i.e., against monopoly **capitalism**, i.e., against the form of capitalist, which for a given time, ruled the earth. Lenin, to whom my opponent referred, was naturally not against this overthrow of imperialism which he demanded, but against the immediate destruction, without any intermediate measures, of the backward premonopoly forms of private ownership production, which no longer played a determining role but which were also not ready for socialization. It was for these lagging enterprises that the following intermediate measure was suggested: "4. Mandated merger into syndicates (i.e., coerced unification) of industrialists, merchants and bosses in general" (ibid., p 161).

Naturally, it follows from this that Lenin was opposed to "war communism," in terms of its manifestation in which a militiaman would take away the milk of a peasant take it to city and pour it on the ground for the glory of the state monopoly of trade in milk. Comrade Bukharin would exclaim at the idea of such a picture that this is not socialism but God only knows what. Naturally, no one knows exactly what Lenin's plans were. However, in terms of the understanding of the word socialism and the nature of our revolution, they were **socialist** and this was described absolutely firmly and clearly.

What followed from the nature of our revolution as an **anti-imperialist rebellion** was the irreconcilable antagonism shown by the Soviet state toward the entire imperialist world. However, it would be extremely naive to consider this antagonism as a state of official and open war with this world, a viewpoint which is not alien to some of the "left-wing communists" of the time of the Brest Peace. Such a view was a clear vestige of the **ideological** interpretation of international relations which was so typical of the Second International. This ideological explanation stipulated that in its foreign policy the feudal state has always been unquestionably hostile to the bourgeois state, that the bourgeois state will always be hostile to the socialist state, etc. Naturally, real relations among countries are dictated by the real interests of the ruling classes and by no means by the ideology of the latter. Now, when we know that the nobility-ruled serfdom Russia of 1848 sought an alliance with republican, democratic or, in any case, bourgeois France of Lamartine and Cavegnac, and when we recall that the Franco-Russian alliance took place precisely at a time when in the Russia of Aleksandr III the fiercest possible reaction by the nobility raged, while the radical party had just come to power in France, the illusions of the Second International turn out to be quite naive and suitable only for the sake of facilitating the German social democratic support of Wilhelm in his struggle against tsarist Russia. There is no doubt whatsoever that the factory owners, landowners and bankers who ruled Germany in the autumn of 1917 would have shot the bolsheviks to death with the greatest possible willingness and pleasure. However, their true interests forced them not only to engage in talks with the bolsheviks but also to be extremely courteous and polite toward them. We should have had to make use of this circumstance to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, had we not been such fools. For in addition to the fact that we took over the power with the mandate to make peace at all cost, this was the mandatory condition under which we took the power, and had we failed to meet this condition it would have had the fate of Kerenskiy, not to mention the fact that the Brest Peace was a splendid **strategic** maneuver, which made the German front a shield which protected us during the most difficult time of our existence from the front of the Entente, which was much more dangerous to us. Had the British, French and American imperialists had a direct border with us, that which happened to Soviet Hungary 18 months later

could have easily happened to us. The fact that the fate of the latter did not befall us is due to the fact that the British had the possibility to land only in places distant from our vital center, places such as Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

Therefore, the Brest Peace was exceptionally salutary to us. However, this did not prevent it in the least from being not the rule but the exception in this anti-imperialist rebellion we initiated. This was neither a lasting nor, above all, a *real* peace. It was this last circumstance, the fact that this was not a true peace, that made it the *worst* peace, which was only better than a good quarrel, something which, unquestionably, escaped the attention of our broad circles in 1918. From the illusion of an inevitable formal war with imperialism, we easily slid to the illusion of the present, albeit short, peace with imperialism. That is why this period in our postrevolutionary history, which covers the time from October 1917 to approximately August 1918, could be described as the period of *pacifistic illusions*.

In our mass work these illusions assumed a great variety of aspects. We would start to give away tens of millions of arshins of fabrics from the quartermaster's service of the old army and would be negotiating with the just created Red Army for each separate million arshins; or else we would release the Moscow Cadet Party Committee, the detention of which was demanded by the workers; or else again we allowed, under our very noses, for the S.R. to conclude agreements with the French mission with the object of derailing Soviet trains and blowing up bridges along our railroads, allowing those same S.R. to take White Guard officers and generals to the Volga area and to prepare a counterrevolutionary outbreak, while the S.R. faction legally continued to sit as members of the VTsIK; we would gather academic die-hards and would try "by agreement" with them to draft new statutes for the higher schools, and so on, and so forth. In a word, we cannot enumerate all of our pacifistic stupidities of that time. It should come as no surprise that the Czechoslovak mutiny of the end of 1918 was totally unexpected to the majority of us although it was initiated on the basis of a fully thought out and long prepared intervention which, considering the German front which was blocking a direct attack against us mounted by the Entente, could not adopt any other form.

A number of strikes of the summer of 1918, the uprising of the left-wing S.R. in Moscow, the uprising of the right-wing S.R. in Samara, the uprising of the Savinkov people in Yaroslavl, the assassination of Volodarskiy and Uritskiy and, finally, the attempt made on Lenin's life on 30 August, brought our pacifism to an end. In the Autumn of 1918 we proclaimed the Red terror and hurled anything alive on the fronts of the Civil War and initiated the heroic struggle which filled the *second period* of the history of the past 7 years, the period of the Civil War, in the narrow meaning of the term, and which lasted from August 1918 to the spring of 1920. I do not set it as my task to describe this period: briefly, it is

familiar to all and its detailed study will be organized on firm grounds, we hope, by the seminar sponsored by the Institute of Red Professorship, which I mentioned at the beginning. It is important to note at this point that that period entered within our mentality, if not our ideology, certain new features which were alien to it in 1917-1918. I will never forget our young communist-educators who left for the front with the full appearance, ways and manners of men of letters and who returned from the front as manly military people, with an appearance which, to a certain extent, even unpleasantly reminded us of the ensigns and lieutenants of the good old times. May these comrades forgive me this brief mention of their appearance. Internally, naturally, they remained what they were: good communists. They even became better communists than they were before, for their previous semi-theoretical struggle with imperialism had now become to them live and harsh reality. However, they came back as *war communists*. They came back with the confidence that that which had yielded such brilliant results in terms of the Kolchaks and Denikins would make it possible to cope with all the vestiges of the old in any other area.

The period of militarization began. Everything became militarized, including public education. The people's commissariat itself was structured in a military manner, with headquarters which did the planning and deployment, a state scientific council and "operative" units, and main administrations. The higher schools were militarized, medical military commissars appeared, and so on, and so forth.

Naturally, it was the militarization of the national economy that was most emphasized. "Labor armies" and so on appeared. Finally, the entire countryside became subordinated to a factual semi-military regime and, most curiously, the initiator of this latest militarization was one of the main anti-militarizers of that period. This indicates how powerful the contamination was.

What was it that tempted and led us into this heat of militarization? In my view, two things. First, by that time it had become quite clear that a workers revolution in the West was being delayed and that to expect the appearance of a socialist economy in the capitalist countries of Western Europe would not take place from one day to the next. We were forced to create the type of socialist economy which during the first, "pacifistic," period was conceived in terms of all-European levels; Russia only "began" to create its own "national" forces. This, on the one hand. On the other, there was the speed with which the white fronts were being liquidated, along with the end of a Civil War, which threatened endless years of slaughter, within no more than 2 years, gave us hope that matters would develop just as rapidly in economic building and that all that we had to do was to use military means. All of this, put together, was what gave "war communism" its brief but nonetheless brilliant success.

The reader will see that I separate "war communism" as a special, **third period** of the past 7 years. I firmly refuse to add to "war communism" our socialist measures which were taken in 1918. There was nothing military in those steps. The most important of them—bank nationalization—was done by us at the peak of our pacifistic illusions, when the possibility of true peace, albeit short, was believed, one might think, even by Comrade Lenin. This initial socialism was accomplished by no means by military orders from above but under the pressure of the toiling masses. The planned economy was organized quite spontaneously and on a disparate basis, and was consistent with the need somehow to connect industry which was deprived of its bank guidance. In a word, everything here started **from economics** and not from **politics**. Meanwhile, a characteristic feature of true "war communism" of 1920 was also the fact that in it the economy was to be governed by politics. We forgot what Comrade Lenin, wrote in 1916: "One cannot order economics." (As written. Lenin's words as retold by the author—editor).

It was in the spring of 1921 that this statement made by Comrade Lenin became justified. The economy, which was built like a column, broke up its ranks and "started rebelling." This circumstance made it necessary to change not the **direction** which we followed, as it seemed initially to some shortsighted people, but the pace of our movement and the **means** of our actions. This also changed our attitude toward the nonproletarian world both abroad and within the country. In his speech at the 10th Congress, Comrade Lenin described the turn in our policy as the "peasant Brest" (as written. Lenin's words retold by the author—editor). This was a rather apt description, in the sense that in the same way that in 1918 Brest had put an end to the ideological and essentially idealistic approach to international relations, the new economic policy put an end to the idealistic approach to the countryside. We began to proceed not from a plan for the future countryside we had imagined but on the real possibilities of the real countryside, "the countryside as it was." This did not mean in any way that in terms of the countryside we had abandoned communism: all we abandoned were the military methods of promoting communism in the countryside, and that was all.

The new period in the history of the past 7 years, the **fourth**, was related initially to a number of illusions and, in that sense, resembled the first period. The difference was that this time the illusions were on both sides. In 1918 we erred concerning the true intentions and feelings of the bourgeoisie, the domestic bourgeoisie in particular. In 1921 we were once again mistaken, but far less than in 1918, but it was the bourgeois who was much more mistaken on our account. Our own illusions were reduced essentially to overestimating private initiative and, in this connection, private economic enterprise in enhancing industry. With a feeling which was "reactionary" in terms of "war communism," it seemed to us that all we had to do was to abandon the methods of

"war communism" and that the initiative itself would appear out of the ground and with it we would find it in industry and the clandestinely concealed private capital. This was supplemented by another illusion that both foreign and private capital would immediately jump on the opportunities opening in Russia which, once again, in contrast with "war communism" seemed to us tremendous.

Neither happened nor could happen. Private capital based on illegal profiteering shifted to legal trade, retail and semiretail trade in particular, with its fast turnover. However, private capital did not go into the relatively slow turnover of industry, with its low level of profits, nurtured as it was from fierce speculation during the preceding period. Industry had to be rebuilt by proletarian dictatorship through its own efforts, without any aid even from abroad, for European capital as well as unwilling to go into the Soviet situation, when it could operate under the customary conditions of a bourgeois community. It was only when at home the ground started being too hot that the Western capitalists began to look at the renovated Russia in terms of its economic policy: such was the case with German capital during the gravest period in the German labor movement. However, this too was a temporary and transitory phenomenon. The European and American bourgeoisies were waiting to see the "further development" of the NEP.

It was precisely at this point that the next, no longer our but their bourgeois illusion occurred. As the true attitude of private economic initiative toward the restoration of Soviet industry became clearer, naturally, the advantages provided to private capital in our country should not have been increased but reduced. The NEP was not created in the least for the sake of feeding the profiteers. To the bitter disappointment of foreign bourgeois observers, the further development of the capitalist economy in our country began to be replaced by a "communist reaction." This occurred at a time when, according to the laws governing all decent revolutions, they should have put an end to bourgeois reaction.

This saddened the bourgeois observers, who had come to take a look at "renovated" Russia, to such an extent that they literally began to hallucinate. Thus, no other explanation is possible for what American professor Golder, who spent in this country several months, wrote about Moscow. In the place where he saw in 1922, at the peak of the illusion of the NEP, the greatest possible commercial revival, in 1923 all he could see was a desert with closed stores, among which vestiges of a hungry population roamed. Since we could see nothing of the sort, one of two assumptions is accurate: either Professor Golder was suffering from hallucinations or else hallucinations were affecting 1.5 million residents of Moscow. And since individual hallucinations are nonetheless a more common phenomenon than mass hallucinations, affecting millions of people all at the same time at that, thinking quite objectively and medically, the problem should be solved not in favor of Professor Golder.

It was this professor, whose specialty was history, that gave through his chronology a base for the periodization of the NEP. The age of the New Economic Policy naturally breaks down into two periods: the period during which Professor Golder wore rose-tinted glasses, and the period when he replaced them with black ones. This applies to 1923, with his "gaps" and the financial reform. The "gaps" were a peculiar economic reaction to all preceding periods in the area of the correlation between prices of agricultural commodities and manufactured goods. The October Revolution drastically disturbed such correlations in this area, correlations to which prewar Russia had become accustomed. If we take the price of rye flour of 1913 as 100, in terms of prewar kopeks, on 1 January 1921 the figure was 139, whereas if we take as 100 the price of a pair of shoes, the corresponding figure would be no more than 130. Those same prices prevailed as late as 1922: on 1 April of that year the price of bread, in Soviet currency, was almost 3 million times above the prewar level while the prices of industrial commodities were only 2 million times higher. The inverse proportion developed in 1923 and was a characteristic reaction which indicated that essentially we had come out of the **war period** of our economy, when cities and industrial rayons had been something like besieged fortresses and the besiegers relied essentially on the outlying areas which were growing the grain. By 1923 not only the siege had been lifted but also the price correlations which had developed during the siege period had disappeared and, I repeat, what was taking place was an economic reaction and the situation had to be forcefully turned around in order to prevent the countryside from finding itself in the position of a besieged fortress.

This was by no means the only defeat inflicted on our economy during the Civil War. I do not remember anyone approaching from this viewpoint the situation of the hunger of 1921; nonetheless, if you were to put on a map the most hungry areas against the map of the White-held fronts of 1918-1920, you would obtain a most amazing and exceptionally eloquent coincidence. As a rule, it was the former Civil War theaters that were hungry, where the economy had been dislocated by the fronts which shifted repeatedly back and forth across the countryside. Conversely, that which was firmly held in the hands of the Soviet system, where neither Kolchak nor Denikin had stepped, had not only been protected from hunger but in 1921 was even showing a picture of exceptional prosperity: Moscow Guberniya and several uyezds will long remember the crop they harvested during that "hungry" year. By old custom we always take more into consideration the forces of the elements and, naturally, well we should. However, we should by no means forget the social reasons. Naturally, drought is drought. However, without Kolchak, Denikin and Vrangeli lending it a hand, drought would nonetheless not have led to cannibalism.

That which the observer with dark glasses thought to be a communist reaction was, in fact, simply the elimination of the consequences of the Civil War, an elimination

which was done totally **with our own forces**. This is the main point: had the good bourgeoisie, which was feeling sorry for the barren Moscow streets, supplied us in 1921 with capital for our recovery, unquestionably, the taste for such capital would have led us to take the NEP more into consideration than actually occurred. It was to our tremendous advantage that the first, the most difficult steps, we took exclusively with our own two feet. This particularly applied to the fact that it was exclusively through our own means that we eliminated the main vestige of the military period, **the military currency**.

The assignates—and our Soviet currency set all the records of all assignation careers of all times and peoples, leaving behind the assignates of the French Revolution so far as to make them invisible—had always and at all times been considered military currency. In virtually the entire world they were restored precisely during times of a big war and in our country, in Russia, they successfully reached one-twentieth of their nominal value even before the October Revolution: what we inherited from Kerenskiy was a ruble worth 5 kopeks. Comparing the possibilities of Kerenskiy, under which Russian industrial output still totaled 4 billion rubles, compared with the fact that today our output does not even reach 2 billion, one could assess what achievement it was to raise the value of the ruble 7 times higher than the Kerenskiy ruble. One may fear that after such a joke the dark glasses worn by some observers may drop down their noses to the point of letting them see the light.

Whereas the first period of the NEP bore the traces of some fluctuation and compromise between state and private capitalism, the second period is already a clear manifestation of true state capitalism under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship, i.e., a situation which has been always and everywhere considered normal as the first act of a socialist revolution.

Therefore, if we consider the history of the 7 postrevolutionary years in its aspect of proletarian dictatorship and its attitude toward nonproletarian strata and elements, both at home and abroad, we can classify it into the following **five periods**:

1. 1917-1918: Conversion to a socialist economy in (imagined by us) conditions of **peaceful atmosphere**.
2. 1918-1919: A break in the initiated process of peaceful socialization, suppression of the Civil War; gradual uncontrolled militarization, turning into
3. **The period of "war communism"** (1920-spring 1921).
4. The period of reaction against "war communism," and the period of the primary NEP with its illusions on both sides (1921-1923).

5. The period of gradual return to a planned economy under conditions of the no longer imaginary but truly peaceful situation, with the restraining of the NEP within the limits of what is absolutely necessary (1923-?).

Although I stipulated initially that periodization is not a dialectical matter, nonetheless no periodization can conceal historical dialectics and the periods I have indicated quite clearly show such dialectics although, unfortunately, in a subjective aspect. We have in front of us a completed triad and one which is only beginning. The first triad can be reduced to three such stages: **peaceful socialism, war, "war communism."** The second triad begins with the reaction to the "war communism," and is continuing under our own eyes as the straightening out of communism in general and should end with the final establishment of a socialist economy. This final, third member of the second triad is our immediate future. Subjectively reflected, such dialectics appears in front of us as a change, in both cases, from the time of illusions with a return to the harsh reality, so that in the following, the third stage, that which in the first stage was swaddled in illusions, will become a firmly implemented clear plan.

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### **Turning To the Great Experience; Contemporary Tasks and Methodology In the Study of the October Revolution**

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[Article by Pavel Vasilyevich Volobuyev, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council On the Comprehensive Problem of the "History Of the Great October Socialist Revolution"]

[Text] In our social sciences the history of the October Revolution is an area which is being most actively developed and which has the longest historiographic tradition, lasting over 70 years. No other period in the history of Soviet society in our country has been subject to such an abundance of books (including some definitive works), articles, or documentary publications. However critically, from the level of contemporary requirements, we may be assessing achievements in this area, one thing is unquestionable: no further progress can be achieved by the researchers without taking into consideration the work already done and the knowledge already acquired.

Nonetheless, we have more than sufficient grounds for a critical evaluation of the results of the works by Soviet scientists. Having sharply addressed itself to the science of history, perestroika exposed the areas of stagnation in the study of the problems of the October Revolution, which had been a monopoly protected by historians interested in their "inviolability." The low theoretical

level of many works, and the biased nature of historiographic summations became obvious. The situation is poor in works about the October Revolution written by the living and active participants in the events. This is being acknowledged with some embarrassment during the 71st year of the revolution. However, "*Ten Days Which Shook the World*," John Reed's famous book, nonetheless remains to us, historians, an unsurpassable model of objective and inspired approach to the greatest event of the 20th century.

However, it would be difficult to expect that in 3 years of perestroika we would be able totally to surmount the legacy of decades of stagnation in research. A number of books and articles on the history of the October Revolution, which have appeared of late, still display this strict axiomatic approach, predetermined conclusions, and avoidance of or smoothing over sharp problems, and the support of diverging systems, in the Procrustean bed of which the actual material is "made to fit," and is frequently presented in a dry and inexpressive manner. Yet the live history of the revolution is the greatest drama of the 20th century, filled with fierce clashes among people, parties, and classes, the churning of human passions, heroic accomplishments, errors, faults and sufferings and tragic outcomes for entire classes and social groups.

Nonetheless, we also note a clear rejection of stereotypes and the formulation of new problems. Thus, the study of Russian revolutionary tradition which enables us to understand more completely and profoundly the role of the spiritual prerequisites of our revolution, the reasons for the faster development of progressive social thinking in prerevolutionary Russia in terms of reality, is a promising fact. Although with tremendous difficulty, breaking the established custom of depicting the historical process as a street with a "preprogrammed" one-way traffic, the idea of the multi-variant and contradictory nature of this process is making its way and, consequently, so is the need to see in objective historical reality the different possibilities and alternatives of development, the struggle among the social forces for a choice and for solving one or another alternative problem and, above all, the main one which faced the peoples of Russia in 1917: socialism or capitalism?

The study of the historical publications which came out on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution confirms that, although it bears the features of a so-called transitional period, it nonetheless added to our specific knowledge of certain events and personalities, and enabled us to undertake to eliminate some "blank spots." The theoretical summation of the comprehensive experience of the October Revolution offers significantly greater difficulties, for it is here that, more than anywhere else, we are dragged down to the bottom by the burden of dogmatic concepts and universal systems. Unfortunately, we come across the firm support on the part of historians of a kind of "pseudo-Marxist fundamentalism," with its typical black and



white vision of history, and a methodology of vulgar sociology and simplification, not to mention cases of obvious professional incompetence.

On the other hand, nor should we ignore the fact that in 20 years of stagnation, erroneous concepts concerning our revolution appeared on the grounds of the disillusionment experienced by a certain segment of Soviet society, the young in particular. Let us sum them up in the guise of a number of sharp problems. Was the revolution legitimate, and did the bolsheviks violate history by diverting Russia's development away from the "normal," the bourgeois-democratic way? Was it unsuccessful because of the social experiments undertaken by a group of fanatics in 1917? Was there a possibility at that time, in 1917, of adopting not a revolutionary but a reformist solution to solve the crisis in Russian society? Why was a one-party system established in our country? Was the October Revolution that same "black track," via which our country directly tumbled into Stalinism? These and other questions demand substantiated scientific answers. It is the duty of Soviet historians, who specialize in the October Revolution, not only to provide the answers but also to try to recreate in the people's consciousness the accurate image of the October Revolution, and make it a firm spiritual support in our restructuring efforts today. Hence the particular significance of such research with its richest possible traditions, experience and instructive lessons.

Both the inner logic of the development of the science of the October Revolution and the new heights and horizons of historical vision urgently require new conceptual solutions and approaches. Furthermore, in a number of areas, theoretical-methodological above all, we urgently need theoretical and specific-historical breakthroughs. It is time to learn to approach the study of the history of the revolution not only responsibly but also—in both words and actions—from the positions of the Marxist principle of historicism. We must abandon the treatment of the revolution as an "icon," which had been promoted for decades, and to study it as it was, with all of its achievements, contradictions, difficulties and errors. Let us recall how biting Lenin mocked revolutionaries who raised the revolution "into something almost divine" and had begun to write the word "'revolution' with a capital R" (see *Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 223; further references to V.I. Lenin's *Complete Collected Works* will indicate volume and page only).

Existing views notwithstanding, the problems of the history of the October Revolution are truly inexhaustible. Let us point out merely those which this author considers as most important in terms of their development. I believe that we should begin with a restoration, in its entirety and purposefulness, of the Leninist concept of the revolution. Without ignoring accomplishments in this area, we must acknowledge that in the past 20 years, as described by some historians, Lenin's views had become simply unrecognizable. At one point books

were praised in which, quoting Lenin, efforts were made to prove that the bolsheviks, in the October days of 1917, actually did not have on their side the support of the majority of the popular masses and that they obtained this support only after they seized the power. An understanding of the "mechanism" of winning over the masses not as a lengthy, permanent and complex process but as a one-time act, plus extreme dogmatism, was the source of such views.

Many historians find it difficult to accept the very essence of the Leninist concept of making a socialist revolution in the country which had still not completed its formative bourgeois change and, in this connection, a revolution which was made before the necessary material prerequisites for socialism had matured. In my view, the chronological framework of the socialist revolution is also being improperly narrowed. Ignoring Lenin's views, in this case we frequently limit the period of the second bourgeois-democratic revolution (March-October 1917), the seizure of power in the course of the October armed uprising (strictly speaking, this merely marked the beginning of the socialist revolution), and the triumphant march of the Soviet system (October 1917-February 1918). However, we know that Lenin dated the beginning of the socialist revolution in the countryside to the summer of 1918 (the Kombed.) and its end, at its termination (more accurately, November). We must return to Lenin's periodization of the October Revolution and consider the entire period from February 1917 to November 1918 as a continuing revolution with its stages: initially the growth of the bourgeois-democratic into a socialist revolution, followed by an "urban" and "rural" revolution within the common trend of the socialist revolution. This will make it possible, finally, in the spirit of Lenin's evaluations, also to solve the problem of the regrouping of class and political forces in the course of the October Revolution, which, in our country, so far has frequently been based on Stalin's views. In a word, we must reread Lenin's works on the history of the revolution.

Also simplistically analyzed is the problem of the theoretical preparations for the revolution. Our books give the impression that Lenin and the bolsheviks found everything clear in advance and that the theoretical concepts and slogans formulated by the party were implemented 100 or more than 100 percent on all points. Unquestionably, no single revolution in global history was so thoroughly supported from the scientific-theoretical aspect as the October Revolution, essentially thanks to Lenin's theoretical activities, unparalleled in terms of scale, intensiveness and depth. For that reason, it is a synthesis of the revolutionary thrust of the toiling masses and scientific policy pursued by the bolshevik party. The instructive lesson of the October Revolution, when for the first time Marxism blended with the live revolutionary practice of the masses and began to be tested by this practice, was that at sharp historical turns a vanguard revolutionary party demands not simply the application

of previously formulated theoretical concepts but also a daring rejection of old concepts and the formulation of new ideas, i.e., a **qualitative renovation of revolutionary theory**.

It is at this point that the principle of "feedback" in the development of Marxist theory operates at full strength: from theory to the social practice of the masses as a source of experience and a criterion of truth. Was it not thanks to this that Lenin was able to discover in the soviets a form of proletarian statehood and, at the same time, a form people's self-rule? Let us recall the number of seemingly unquestionable Marxist concepts he had to abandon because of their inconsistency with the new historical conditions or their dogmatic degeneracy. This included the concept of the more or less simultaneous victory of the socialist revolution in Europe, the need for the victory of the revolution after a high degree of production forces had been reached, and the majority of the population had become proletarianized in each country, replacing a standing army with the universal armed nation, etc. Let us incidentally note that because of the absence of such a principle of "feedback," for a number of decades (from the start of the 1930s to the mid-1980s) we had to pay the price for having fallen behind in the creative development of Marxist theory.

In the course of the revolution events formulated new problems and demanded new theoretical and political solutions. Thus, Lenin fearlessly set aside the bolshevik agrarian problem which he had formulated in the April theses and which had been accepted at the 7th (April) All-Russian RSDWP(b) Conference, and that the base of the famous Decree on Land was peasant demands (which were essentially the program of the S.R.), all of this for the sake of strengthening the alliance between the proletariat and the toiling peasantry. In some cases harsh reality itself, asking for no agreement on the part of the theoreticians, decisively changed the bolshevik slogans as they were being implemented. Such was the case, for example, of the slogan of the alliance between the proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the socialist revolution, during its first stage. It was thanks to the practical combination of the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie with the peasant revolution against the landowners that at the decisive moment of the struggle for Soviet power the proletariat gained the support not only of its natural ally—the poor—but also of the remaining strata and groups of the peasantry—the middle and the prosperous—i.e., the support of the peasantry as a whole. That is why Lenin, who so highly valued the importance of revolutionary theory, wrote the following: "How could one make the greatest possible revolution knowing in advance how to complete it! As if such knowledge could be learned from books! No, our solution could be born only of the experience of the masses" (vol 38, p 141).

We believe that a breakthrough can be achieved in the study of the October Revolution in the next few years, in the study of the laws governing the political and socio-economic prerequisites for the socialist revolution. We

must above all abandon the teleological understanding (based on predetermination) of the historical process, on the one hand, and concepts of the automatic nature of the effect of social laws, on the other. It is important to master to the fullest extent the materialistic understanding of history as a process of probabilities and not something predetermined and preprogrammed. The options and possibilities for their choice are to be found in historical reality itself. The historian must see the entire range of real possibilities and concentrate not only on those which were used but also on lost opportunities, explaining the reasons for which this took place. At that point the laws of the revolution will no longer appear to be such abstract and impersonal systems but possibilities which appear in life through the fierce struggle among classes and parties for a choice and implementation of opportunities consistent with their interests. The results of such a struggle are manifested in the resultant force. We must convincingly prove to the mass reader that in 1917 the specific historical situation, with its inordinate complexity, dynamism and sharp turns, contained a variety of frequently changing possibilities of development. The counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, which looked not ahead but backward, and which had no political experience, was unable to channel Russia's development down the bourgeois-democratic way. Its interests were consistent with the establishment of a military-terroristic dictatorship by generals and a restoration of the monarchy.

The petit-bourgeois democratic parties—mensheviks and S.R.—who took as their ideal the Western European model of capitalism and bourgeois democracy, made very weak efforts to come out of the war, dislocation and crises the reformist way. However, even they went bankrupt, for they met with the refusal on the part of the bourgeoisie to sacrifice landed estates and some of their privileges.

In 1917 the course of events led the masses to an alternate choice: either a dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the counterrevolutionary military. Another prospect became threatening as well: the Russian anarchic rebellion, "thoughtless and merciless" (A. Pushkin). Faced with this choice, the majority of the people quite consciously made it in favor of the Soviet system, entrusting the revolutionary proletariat and the bolshevik party with the country's leadership. Consequently, the resultant force of the clashing social forces followed agreed with the interests of the toiling masses. It was thus that the historical choice of socialism or capitalism was resolved. Despite all difficulties, casualties and privations experienced by our people, history proved the accuracy of the socialist choice during the fateful days of October 1917.

However, the proper interpretation of the matter of the correlation among class forces calls for concentrating our attention on the study of the social structure of the Russian population and the position and numerical strength of classes and social strata. So far we have had a

variety of data on the size of the proletariat, with preference given to clearly exaggerated figures. We also need to compute the overall size of the proletariat together with the members of their families and their share in the active population of the country. We have no precise information on the size and composition of the petite bourgeoisie, rural as well as urban. As to the big bourgeoisie, despite some attempts to assess it, to this day we have no data on its account. More profound studies must be made also of the peasantry, for without the powerful support of its toiling majority, the victory of the October Revolution would have been simply impossible. Let us incidentally state that it is only in recent years that we have somehow begun to realize once again the fact that one of the major sources of many of our contemporary difficulties and problems lies in the peasant and petit-bourgeois nature of prerevolutionary Russia.

If we speak of the historical prerequisites for the October Revolution, in my view, this concept must be broken down into its main components: social, political, material, and cultural prerequisites, the nature of the crisis of the system, and so on. At the same time, we need a comprehensive approach to the study and, above all, a consideration of subsequent historical experience, namely the fact that the building of socialism in our country revealed the scantiness of the legacy we inherited in terms of economics, the organizational-cultural standard of the population and the class structure.

As regards the socioeconomic prerequisites, we must point out that so far the old trend toward making the level and type of capitalist development of Russia resemble the Western European model has still not been surmounted in our historiography (at the start of his scientific activities the author of this article as well paid his dues to this durable tradition). In the last decade historians sinned by exaggerating the level of development of agrarian capitalism. Ignored in this case was the fact that the establishment of the social strata of bourgeois society had not been completed at that time in our country and that the gravity of the vestiges of serfdom had worsened. If we pursue this type of research, it would turn out that the Stolypin policy of accelerated bourgeois development of the Russian countryside was close to achieving success. As we know, however, it failed and Stolypin would have hardly been able to modernize Russia and thereby to prevent the revolution.

Protracted arguments on the extent of Russia's maturity for socialism and the role of the mixed nature of its economy would be senseless unless we take at least two objective circumstances of the October Revolution into consideration. The first is related to the backwardness of the country, the difficulties caused by World War I and the economic dislocation it caused, which was the equivalent of the self-discrediting of Russian capitalism in the eyes of the popular masses. Tsarism and the bourgeoisie led the country to the brink of national catastrophe and,

in turn, had to pay for their crime. The socialist revolution, under such extreme specific historical circumstances, turned out to be the only way out of the impasse in which the ruling classes had taken the country (naturally, a solution in the interest of the popular masses). The second condition, which is poorly understood by our historians, is essentially the fact that the February bourgeois-democratic revolution was not only the prologue but also the prerequisite for the socialist revolution.

Actually, it was the impossibility or inability of bourgeois and petit bourgeois politicians to solve the gravest problems through reformist means, the problems of peace, land and bread, the struggle against economic dislocation and the democratic structure of the state, that put the socialist revolution on the agenda. Lenin expressed such dialectics of history as follows: "Since the bourgeoisie is unable to come out of the existing situation, the revolution will go forth" (vol 31, p 446). In turn, under the circumstances of a democratic revolution, when the activity, energy and initiative of the masses were the key and when the masses were seized by the insurmountable aspiration to social justice and a renovation of their lives, stopping half-way was impossible. This situation was accurately characterized by Lenin: "One cannot trample on the same spot.... One must either go forward or backward. To go forward, in Russia of the 20th century, which has achieved a republic and democracy through revolution is **impossible**, without **marching** toward socialism, without taking **steps** toward it..." (vol 34, p 192). From this viewpoint we have made insufficient study of the correlation within the October Revolution between socialist and national, general-democratic tasks. This is one of the most topical problems, for unsolved national tasks were a powerful catalyst of the revolutionary process.

We believe that in order to provide an accurate solution to the problem of the socioeconomic prerequisites for the October Revolution we should go back to Lenin's approach to Russian reality. Lenin believed that without a certain level of capitalism with its typical grouping of class forces, the socialist revolution would have been impossible. Nonetheless, he clearly saw that the country's economy could not serve as an adequate base for a socialist society. Therefore, it became necessary, relying on the maturing of the subjective factor—the tremendous power of the revolutionary classes—to chose a possible transition to laying the foundations of a civilization different from that of the then progressive countries in Western Europe, starting "not from that end," with the seizure of the power of the state. This change in the usual order of historical development was entirely legitimate in terms of world history. However, having solved problems created by the crisis in the bourgeois-land owning society and having established a new, a socialist system, it raised new problems. Their roots go back to the brevity and unfinished course of the bourgeois-capitalist "schooling," the insufficient level of civilization, the strength of the state-bureaucratic legacy,

the weakness of democratic traditions and political standards, and so on. We encountered these problems in the course of the building of socialism, the solution of which is still facing us. As historical experience indicated, combining democracy with socialism proved to be much more difficult than Lenin and the party anticipated in the first post-October years.

A great deal of criticism is being addressed today at equalization! Yet its roots may be traced, first of all, to the egalitarian traditions of peasant mentality, which exploded with tremendous power in 1917-1918 and were reflected in the Decree On Land and, second, the egalitarian trends which are part of any popular revolution. The attraction of the masses for equality and social justice turned into a demand for universal equalization. It took Lenin and the Soviet government a great deal of efforts to prove the need for higher pay for the work of skilled workers and scientific and technical personnel. It would be hardly possible for someone to start claiming that this task is not on the agenda to this day.

The problem of "the Bolshevik Party and the revolution" should be the subject of a special discussion. But let us turn to some of its aspects. Let us begin with the fact that in our books frequently the leading role of the party in the revolution is described in a declarative manner; the party itself and its organizations are presented as an impersonal mass, as some kind of monolith, acting on all levels and only on orders from above. There is nothing antihistorical in this picture! The Bolshevik Party which, in 1917, became a mass party, primarily a worker party in terms of its composition, rallied revolutionaries who acted together not only on the basis of conscious discipline but also loyalty to the common cause, the interests of the people and ideological convictions. Every single bolshevik was a truly original personality. The ability to work within the masses, to convince them and to lead them was the distinguishing feature of the Leninist party guard. The Bolshevik Party not only taught, politically educated and organized the masses, but itself learned from the masses, imbuing their revolutionary resolve, energy and experience.

After it came out of clandestinity, in March 1917, the party restructured its activities on the basis of the principles of democratic centralism. The local party organizations had great autonomy and, at decisive times, guided by the party's common strategic course, acted in amazing harmony, actively, daringly and with initiative, and in accordance with the specific circumstances. The clash of opinions and discussions within the party, both centrally and locally, were a law of intraparty life, educating the party members in a spirit of independent thinking and conscious ideological unity. In some cases, in the course of the revolution, at sharp historical turns (after the February Revolution and the Kornilov period) the party occasionally fell behind the headlong revolutionary development of events and allowed isolated

errors (such as participation in the Democratic Conference). However, rapidly and in the spirit of party self-criticism, it corrected them. Lenin ascribed great importance to the control exercised by the party masses over the activities of the party's "leadership." On the eve of the October Revolution, having pointed out that not everything was as it should be in the "parliamentary" upper levels of the party, he demanded "greater attention toward them, and greater supervision by the workers over them..." (vol 34, p 263). It was also then that he formulated a sort of rule: "...The people have the right and obligation at critical moments of the revolution to guide their representatives, even their best representatives (in reference to the members of the Central Committee—the author) rather than wait for them" (ibid., p 436).

Unfortunately, after Lenin's death, many of the bolshevik traditions were disrupted or even forgotten. Stalin's strike at the old party guard weakened the continuity between the bearers of the ideals of the Great October Revolution and the new generations of party members. Let us add to this that the long period which the party had spent in clandestinity and its forced conversion during the Civil War into a "fighting party," followed by the fierce internal party struggle in the 1920s, not to mention the very peculiar understanding of the nature of internal party democracy by Stalin, did not contribute to the development of the democratic principles in the activities of the party itself. It is only now, in the period of revolutionary perestroika, that their revival has been initiated, for a democratization of society is impossible without democracy in the ruling party.

Nor is there unity of view on an important problem, such as the regrouping of class and political forces on the eve of and during the October Revolution. Some historians believe that there were not three but two political camps fighting each other: the proletarian camp of the revolution and the bourgeois camp of the counterrevolution. In my view, such views are recurrences of sectarian-dogmatic stereotypes. They contradict both Lenin's statements as well as historical reality. In criticizing those who were waiting for a "pure" social revolution, Lenin ironically depicted their concept of revolution as follows: "...An army (a political camp—author) would concentrate and would say: 'We are for socialism;' elsewhere, another one would say 'we are for imperialism,' and that is what a social revolution would be!" (vol 30, p 54). It is equally difficult to question Lenin's analysis of the class changes which occurred in the country after the February Revolution. In his article "The Class Change" he wrote that "the Cadets (the bourgeoisie as a class—author) took the position of the monarchy. Tsereteli and Chernov (the petit bourgeois democracy—author) took the position of the cadets. The proletarian revolution took the position of the truly revolutionary democracy" (vol 32, p 386). Therefore, according to Lenin there were three basic social forces, three political camps: the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the petite bourgeoisie, represented above all by the peasantry.

Even a most general view of the revolutionary history of 1917-1921 proves that in a petit-bourgeois country such as Russia, the petit-bourgeois democracy played a tremendous and, sometimes, key political role, for which reason there are no reasons whatsoever to deny it the "status" of a third political camp. The duration, course and nature of the class struggle in the country would have been entirely different had the petite bourgeoisie not suppressed by its size both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie put together, and had it not displayed its typical huge vacillations between these two classes. The petit bourgeois nature of the Russian population left a noticeable mark on our revolution and in the socialism which was built a number of "petit bourgeois flags" could be seen. However, historians have bypassed this side of the problem. Clearly, this as well is worthy of discussion.

Without displaying any bias, we must reinterpret the role of petit-bourgeois democracy in the revolution at its different stages. Let us admit it: the concepts of "mensheviks" and "S.R.," have become curse words in our vocabulary, synonymous with treason. Naturally, as the first breakthrough from capitalism to socialism, our revolution marked a profound watershed separating the bolsheviks from the petit bourgeois democratic parties—the mensheviks and the S.R. who, essentially, put themselves on the opposite side of the barricade. Nonetheless, we must abandon the simplistic evaluations and study the mass social base of these parties and the objective and subjective reasons for their political and ideological bankruptcy. Lenin pointed out that, unlike the bourgeoisie, the S.R. and the mensheviks defended capitalism against socialism ideologically and selflessly, based on prejudice and fear of the new (see vol 39, p 169). As petit-bourgeois politicians, they frequently became victims of self-delusion. Finally, at different times, despite all of their hesitations and inconsistencies, they acted as revolutionary democrats (in the initial days of the February Revolution and the Kornilov period). It would be erroneous to dump mensheviks and S.R. in the same heap. The former were a party of workers, the reformists, the petit-bourgeois wing of the labor movement and had always enjoyed a certain influence among the workers of Petrograd, Moscow, Tula and other cities. The opinion of some historians notwithstanding, the mensheviks considered themselves the true labor party and orthodox Marxists, denying the Marxism of the bolsheviks. The S.R. were the representatives of the neopopulist, peasant socialism and even were thinking of opening in Russia a path to a "peasant socialism." On the basis of the use of new sources and in accordance with the new moral and psychological atmosphere in science, we should study the mass social foundations of these parties and their dynamics, and determine their quantitative membership. It is wrong for our literature, ignoring reality, to deny the leading role of the S.R. and the mensheviks in the democratic movement until the autumn of 1917, and their efforts, albeit timid and inconsistent, to solve the problems of the country through reformist means, and improperly to present them as the blind followers of the

bourgeoisie. Unquestionably, their loss was caused by their "conciliationist syndrome," their fear and mistrust of the creative forces of the people, dogmatism in theory and, in particular, their support of the thesis of the incompatibility between the concepts of "Russia" and "socialism." One must not forget, however, Lenin emphasized, that during the days of the struggle against the Kornilov movement, a short alliance existed between the bolsheviks, on the one hand, and the S.R. and the mensheviks, on the other (see vol 34, p 221).

Today, when the question is occasionally raised as to whether Russia could have avoided a fratricidal Civil War, the answer can be only positive. Let me refer to Lenin's authoritative view. On the very eve of the October Revolution he wrote: "If there is an absolutely unquestionable and absolutely proven lesson in revolution, based on facts, it is that only the alliance between bolsheviks and the S.R. and the mensheviks, and the exclusive and immediate transfer of all power to the soviets would have made a civil war in Russia impossible" (ibid., p 222). The S.R. and the mensheviks rejected this opportunity and not only assumed responsibility for the outbreak of the Civil War but also became the shock detachment of the "democratic counterrevolution." The other part of the historical truth is that the Civil War would not have assumed such a scope and duration without the intervention of the imperialists in internal Russian affairs.

Generally speaking, our publications have provided suitable studies of the alliance between the bolsheviks and the left-wing S.R. as a revolutionary democratic party representing the interests of the toiling peasantry. In the future as well we shall repeatedly return to the experience of this alliance, including that of cooperation within the government between two parties—a proletarian and a revolutionary-democratic—in particular. In connection with the increased role of the revolutionary democratic movement in third world countries, we believe that the literature of the 1960s properly solved the question of the limits of the governmental bloc with the left-wing S.R., which helped to solve not only democratic but also socialist problems. This, however, was followed by the rejection of such evaluations and an exaggeration of the difficulties of cooperating with the left-wing S.R. The old thesis of the impossibility of a governmental bloc with them in solving problems of building socialism predominated. Allow me to express the following idea as well: despite the infamous development of the left-wing S.R. after the Brest Peace, nonetheless we should give them their due and note their services to the October Revolution during the days of decisive importance to it, rather than exclusively pointing out their errors and fluctuations.

The withdrawal of the left-wing S.R. from the government bloc with the bolsheviks and their adventuristic mutiny against the Soviet system of 6 July 1918 put an end to the coalition form of Soviet government. The

conversion of the mensheviks and the S.R. to counter-revolutionary positions led to the fact that they gradually lost their representation in the soviets. Obviously, as a result of the increased interest of the public in such problems we should go back to the interpretation of the history of the development of a one-party system in our country.

The problem of the regrouping of class and political forces in the course of the revolution itself needs new studies. So far this was hindered by two obstacles. The first was the strong lack of understanding on the part of historians of the correlation between theoretical model and results and between logical and historical factors. The second was the attachment of some historians to the old stereotypes of the October Revolution as a "pure" social revolution made by the proletariat allied with the poorest peasantry, although Lenin wrote that in the period of the struggle for power the proletariat had the support of the entire peasantry and actually, at the political stage of the revolution, had made a bloc (alliance) with the peasantry as a whole (see vol 38, pp 176-178 and 192; vol 41, p 97). In other words, the slogan of the alliance between the proletariat and the poorest peasantry did not take place in its "pure" aspect, and achieved its full volume only during the second, the communist-poor peasantry stage of the revolution. As a result, the complex, lengthy and very difficult process of conversion from a democratic system of alliance to a socialist system cannot be considered to have been profoundly studied.

Particularly noteworthy is the study of relations among allies and their objective and subjective foundations (i.e., coinciding interests and a search for points of rapprochement, reciprocal influence and compromise solutions), the role of the political experience of the masses themselves in strengthening such an alliance, etc. We know that for the sake of earning the support of the peasantry in the struggle for power for the soviets and for strengthening it, the proletariat made a major concession to the peasantry by agreeing, essentially, to a "black redivision" and egalitarian land use. However, did this not lead to additional difficulties in the subsequent land utilization, divided into lots, and the assertion of a petty farming system in the agrarian sector?

The most interesting problem of the intelligentsia and the revolution is one of the poorly developed questions. Studies on this topic would be conducted briefly and abandoned. Meanwhile, the Leningrad branch of *Izdatelstvo Nauka*, dragged out the publication of the most interesting monograph by O.N. Znamenskiy on the Russian intelligentsia in 1917 for 6 years. We know that by virtue of exceptional circumstances the revolution was, in the minds of most intellectuals, a real drama and, for many among them, a tragedy as well. However, we must abandon the former rounding up of sharp angles and bring to light this drama in its entire historical truthfulness, and indicate the thorny path walked by the intelligentsia toward cooperating with the Soviet system as

well as the doomed nature of the lives of a high percentage of it who decided to leave the homeland.

Instructive to this day are the lessons of the social creativity of the masses during the period of the revolution. By no means have all of its forms and manifestations been studied as yet. Frequently we feel the influence of stereotypes of bureaucratic thinking, according to which the creativity of the masses is depicted as deriving from the party's leading role. Meanwhile, virtually no studies are being made of the tremendous activities of the party in promoting a socialist awareness and scientific knowledge of socialism among the toiling masses, the working class in particular.

A great deal remains to be done in studying the history of the soviets. We usually study them in terms of the intraparty struggle and of winning the soviets over on their side by the bolsheviks. Yet in 1917-1918 they were the authorities of the revolutionary system and of the people's self-government. It cannot be considered normal that the party composition of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker and Soldier Deputies—which was the constituent congress of the Soviet system—has not been thoroughly analyzed. Changes in the party compositions of many soviets and their executive committees have been poorly studied. As to the social creativity of the democratic masses in the struggle against dislocation and hunger, extensive "blank spots" exist in this area. The eventual result is insubstantial: the masses are proclaimed the makers of history yet a specific picture of their revolutionary creativity does not essentially exist. Nonetheless, this experience in the social creativity of the masses is very important today, when the party has charted a course toward the all-round unfettering of the initiative and autonomous activities of the popular masses!

The economic policy of the October Revolution is one of the problems I would describe as needing thorough work. We have books and articles on various aspects of revolutionary changes in the economy but now we must raise the study of this very relevant problem to a new level. We need, like Lenin, to have a clear vision of the strong and weak aspects of our revolution and, above all, of the difficulties and dangers which must be anticipated in making a social revolution in a backward country. We know that after the end of the Civil War Lenin set a task based on the need to "rework" both the capitalism which had been overthrown as well as our own "rough initial structure" (vol 44, p 464). This entire set of problems needs innovative studies, for they would bring to light the most instructive lessons of the October Revolution.

As to the cost of the revolution. Being Marxists, we naturally knew that any revolution—peaceful or not—is an authoritarian phenomenon, an exceptional form of solving social contradictions. For a long time, however, we considered the problem of the cost of the revolution, if existing at all, only because it was thrown at us by our enemies. And if the cost of the revolution was mentioned

at all, the entire responsibility was shifted to the counterrevolution, something which was unquestionable but not absolute. Let us incidentally note that the social base of the counterrevolution in our country has been studied poorly and that the social and economic policy of the "White movement" has been studied even less.

Lenin and the bolsheviks never made a fetish out of revolutionary violence. As revolutionaries, however, they did not hesitate to use it whenever the overthrown classes tried to regain their power and privileges by force. Meanwhile, let us recall Lenin's statement before the October Revolution on the intention of crushing the opposition of capitalists through revolutionary measures in the area of the economy "bloodlessly" (see vol 34, p 224). The Soviet system, as conceived by Lenin, was prepared to grant "partial concessions (to the bourgeoisie—author)... in the interest of a more gradual transition to the new order" (vol 44, p 203). This did not happen. The revolution grew into a fierce Civil War. Age-old hatred of the oppressors, and the feeling of "savagery" which developed in a segment of the people during the war years as well as anarchic excesses all burst out with tremendous force and, naturally, raised the cost of the revolution. Lenin wrote that the victory of the October Revolution came "at the cost of unparalleled hardships and difficulties and unheard-of pain, with a series of tremendous failures and errors on our part" (ibid., pp 149-150). Obviously, these errors, albeit committed by necessity, and still not brought to light entirely by our historians, also increased the cost of the revolution.

The "blank spots" also include problems such as the October Revolution and the global revolution. It is as though we forgot the fact that a generation of makers and defenders of the October Revolution was inspired by the ideas of a world revolution. The bolsheviks considered the revolution in Russia as the first, the initial stage of such a revolution, as its powerful fuse. The leaders of the Russian bolsheviks considered the global revolution and the political, material and technical aid of the victorious proletariat in the progressive countries a means of solving the difficult dilemmas in building socialism in a backward country. The plans of the bolsheviks were global. "We want to restructure the world," Lenin wrote in April 1917 (vol 31, p 183). There were grounds for such plans, for a revolutionary situation had developed in Europe and it seemed that all that was necessary was a spark for a world revolutionary conflagration to burst out. However, this did not occur although the "Russian example" triggered a powerful revolutionary wave which rolled over all continents between 1918 and 1921 and shook up the foundations of global capitalism. Numerous studies, both in our country and abroad, have been made on the topic of the influence of the October Revolution on the global revolutionary movement. However, the problem cannot be considered exhausted. Why did a global revolution not break out? Obviously, it is not only the "rough Russian logs" that are to be "blamed" for this, as M. Gorkiy wrote in 1918, in his "Untimely Thoughts."

Pretending that the slogan of global revolution did not exist and that the idea of a revolutionary war was not part of the bolshevik arsenal, some historians have begun to claim something which is the direct opposite, namely, that allegedly our party had come to the October Revolution with an already elaborated concept of peaceful coexistence and that, allegedly, the Decree On Peace was its first manifestation. Yet it was only the Brest Peace that provide the "cold shower" which doused the globalist revolutionary feelings of that time. We believe that it is at that point that we must start the countdown on the development of the ideas of peaceful coexistence with capitalism.

A traditional topic, such as the international significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution, also appears in a new light. We cannot agree with those who believe that its influence on global development, including the global revolutionary movement, has abated. Clearly, a different approach must be adopted to the study of this influence and the manifestations of its fluctuating nature—the ebbs and flows—and their causes.

It may be time to return also to the discussion of the biology of socialist revolutions and their historical maturity in terms of bourgeois revolutions. This problem was raised by Marx and discussed by our scientists in the mid-1960s. In my view, its further development could shed some light also on the destinies of socialism in our country and the long-term development of the global revolutionary process.

Let me also mention that we should expand the training of specialists in the history of the October Revolution, the number of which has been diminishing year after year, as has the number of their published works. The public is raising the question of publishing a biobibliographic dictionary on the personalities of the revolution, a problem which must be resolved on a national scale. The need has also appeared of a special publication, such as a "Yearbook On the History of the October Revolution," which would include controversial, research and problem articles.

The only way to enhance the theoretical standard of our studies and to put the scientific knowledge of the great experience of the October Revolution in the service of the socialist renovation of Soviet society is by taking new and promising directions and facing as yet unstudied aspects of these problems and abandoning stereotypes and dogmas.

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**'Erdenet' The Lesson of Joint Enterprises;  
Roundtable Meeting Between the Journals  
KOMMUNIST and NAMYN AMDRAL**  
18020004m Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16,  
Nov 88 (signed to press 25 Oct 88) pp 102-111

[Survey prepared by B. Arkhipov and V. Kremnev]

[Text] The number of joint enterprises is increasing in the various socialist countries. Today they are being created



also with the participation of capitalist firms. As in the past, however, joint socialist enterprises play a special role. Their significance in countries with undeveloped industry greatly exceeds the narrow framework of economic benefits. However, in this case the problems as well are much greater.

The experience of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Mongolia in setting up joint enterprises was the topic of a roundtable study conducted by KOMMUNIST, the journal of the CPSU Central Committee, and NAMYN AMDRAL, the journal of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party Central Committee, held in Erdenet in June 1988.

The practical, critical and self-critical tone of the meeting was set with the very opening statement by B. Ligden, NAMYN AMDRAL editor-in-chief. He noted that today the level reached in the development of the country's production forces and the material well-being of the people are directly related to the help and assistance of the Soviet Union. In Mongolia many enterprises and economic organizations in virtually all economic sectors, such as industry, transportation, trade, and so on, were created on a share holding basis and, subsequently, as they strengthened, became fully owned by the Mongolian People's Republic. They include the Mongolsherst, Mongoltrans, Mongolneft, Sovmongolmetall, Mongolbank and other Mongolian-Soviet share holding societies and associations. The following share holding societies were created in the course of the development and broadening of the initial forms of cooperation: the Ulan Bator Railroad (UBZhD), the Mongolsovtsvetmet Joint Economic Enterprise and the Mongolian-Soviet Ore Mining and Concentration Combine Erdenet, which is one of the biggest of its kind in the world. These enterprises are making a decisive contribution to the development of the country's economy and shaping political and social relations and the spiritual world of man.

Enterprises built with the help of the Soviet Union account for one-half of the national income and 56 percent of the gross industrial output of the MPR. Between 1975 and 1988 basic production capital in the country increased substantially. In terms of power availability the country rose to become one of the leading five countries on the Asian Continent. Nonetheless, in terms of basic economic indicators, Mongolia is on a rather low level compared with the European socialist countries. It is of exceptional importance for the country to reach the level of the other socialist states through the comprehensive utilization of the advantages of socialism. This problem can be solved only by relying on international cooperation. In his report to the 19th MPRP Congress, Comrade J. Batmonh pointed out that the comprehensive rapprochement and consolidation with the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist community are the high road which is firmly followed by the party in the area of foreign economic relations.

Although highly valuing the importance of joint projects, B. Ligden nonetheless believes that an objective view must be taken of the problems of upgrading the efficiency of cooperation. In this connection, he emphasized two crucial problems.

First, in the course of its development the country must not rely on foreign aid in everything. So far the capacity of enterprises and economic organizations built with the technical and economic assistance of the Soviet Union, and its manpower, financial and material resources are still not being used at full capacity.

Second, the high rating of Mongolian-Soviet cooperation is legitimate. We, however, B. Ligden said, by one-sidedly emphasizing merely the positive results of such cooperation, have ignored the difficulties and contradictions in its development. On the one hand, this is a consequence of the deeply established pattern of a dependency-oriented thinking; on the other, possibly, this is related to the false fear that the free and critical exchange of views on problems of cooperation could be perceived as something incompatible with the concept of friendship.

We have taken major steps in laying the material and technical foundations for socialism in the MPR. The need arises to upgrade the economic efficiency of output through the further intensification of the country's industrialization. Today Mongolia can process almost entirely its animal husbandry raw materials using industrial methods. Capacities for the extraction and enrichment of minerals in the ore-mining industry are increasing year after year. However, we must bear in mind that on the world market the prices of equipment and petroleum products are steadily rising while those of raw materials—which are our main exports—are remaining stable or even declining.

We must frankly bring out our difficulties and contradictions, Ligden acknowledged. We must seek ways to surmount the old obstruction mechanism of economic relations between our countries.

The 27th CPSU Congress said B. Arkhipov, responsible secretary of the journal KOMMUNIST, provided a lesson in truth and critical analysis not only of events within the country but also in reciprocal relations among socialist countries. This critical analysis is continuing. A line is being pursued of intensified cooperation, increased equality and reciprocal benefit to the respective countries in this process. We are aiming at this also on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee resolution on the experience gained by joint enterprises. The resolution notes the great achievements of the Erdenet enterprise. However, it also emphasizes the major shortcomings and possibilities of intensifying cooperation. Enterprises must be given greater autonomy in matters

of planning and production marketing. We must perfect the legal regulations governing the activities of joint enterprises and streamline price setting and trade-economic relations as a whole.

Differences may arise among friends. They must be brought to light and openly discussed. Misunderstandings and errors must be eliminated and contradictions resolved. The main thing is to prevent their exaggeration and aggravation, either because of delays in solving them or lack of understanding of the reasons for which they appeared, and of the nature of the contradictions.

### Role of Joint Enterprises In the MPR Economy

Everyone, from D. Molomjamts, MPRP Central Committee secretary, with whom the Soviet delegation met in order to share impressions on the results of the roundtable meeting, to the Mongolian workers who spoke at the meetings, addressing critical remarks to the leadership of the GOK, spoke of the great importance to Mongolia of its cooperation with the USSR, which includes the setting up of joint enterprises. Its significance was brought to light in greater detail and more substantively in the statements by T. Namjim, first deputy chairman of the State Planning-Economic Committee, MPR minister and MPR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and S. Bathuyag, minister of power industry, mining industry and geology.

The party and government of the MPR, T. Namjim said, properly appreciate the major contribution of share holding societies, joint enterprises and economic associations set up by the two countries. The creation of the Mongolovstvetmet Joint Economic Association and the Erdenet Ore-Mining-Concentration Combine, based on the Mongolian-Soviet intergovernmental accords of 1973, marked a qualitatively new stage in the intensification and expansion of economic cooperation between the MPR and the USSR, based on the principles of socialist integration. Erdenet includes more than 20 production and cultural-consumer subunits. The city of Erdenet, which was created on the basis of the combine, has become one of the most important production-cultural centers in the country.

Thanks to the efforts of the parties and the governments of the two countries in the area of economic cooperation, the material and technical base of the MPR national economic sectors has substantially strengthened over the past 10 to 15 years. This has ensured a significant increase in public production. In the past two 5-year periods alone basic production assets increased by a factor of 2.4, the national income increased by a factor of 1.8 and industrial output, by a factor of 2.3. Real population income increased by a factor of 1.3, bearing in mind that the net population increase is 2.6 percent annually and that in the past it was as high as 3 percent. Gross industrial output in the republic increased by a factor of 2.5 over the past 10 years (1976-1986), while ore-mining industrial output increased by a factor of

18.7. Based on 1987 results, the ore mining industry is producing 19 percent more net industrial output and accounts for more than 40 percent of the republic's exports.

In the course of the exploitation of the Erdenet Combine (1979-1987) its annual export earnings averaged 117 million rubles. Bearing in mind the purchasing of the necessary equipment and materials, averaging 45 million rubles per year, and the available profit surplus accruing to the Soviet partner, the combine earned annually 60 million tugriks, after recovering its initial industrial capital investments. However, the foreign trade price of the copper concentrate is below the level of domestic wholesale prices and in order to cover the price differential a state budget subsidy of about 934 million tugriks was necessary.

Estimates made during the period of building the Erdenet Combine indicated that it would significantly increase the export possibilities of the state and make it possible drastically to improve the foreign trade balance and, consequently, help to increase the revenue of the Mongolian state budget and to provide a real opportunity for upgrading the material well-being of the people. This was written in the newspapers and broadcast on radio and television. It is true that the enterprise substantially increased the overall public product and the national income. However, the price-setting system and the level and correlation of foreign trade prices over the past 10 years have weakened the impact of the combine's export possibilities.

T. Namjim and S. Bathuyag justified this state of affairs by referring to the drastic price increase on the global market for petroleum products, machines, equipment, spare parts, metals and various materials, starting with the mid-1970s, which led to the fact that since the start-up of the Erdenet enterprise the foreign trade balance has been worsening rather than improving.

As a rule, the Mongolian comrades relate upgrading the efficiency of joint enterprises to changes in price ratios: increasing the foreign trade price of the products of the joint enterprise and lowering Soviet foreign trade price of goods and materials to the level of Soviet wholesale prices.

Until very recently administrative interference in economic relations both within the country and between the two countries was a habitual phenomenon. However, many socialist countries have abandoned this habit by proclaiming their firm intention radically to change economic management rules, and are already actually implementing such reforms. This does not mean that set prices should not be changed. It is entirely possible that the suggested variant is consistent, to a certain extent, with economic requirements (the prices of Soviet commodities are not always consistent with their quality); nor is it excluded, however, that in some cases the only sensible method for eliminating losses is to close down

some facilities or to switch them into the production of other commodities, as was suggested, for example, by V. Shupikov, chief engineer of Mongolsovtsvetmet, in the case of his association: converting from the production of fluorspar to other valuable metals.

The Soviet participants in the discussion related the not very enviable financial-economic results of the activities of enterprises largely to the high domestic wholesale prices in the MPR of commodities procured from the USSR, including those used by joint enterprises. According to G. Budkov, deputy commercial representative of the USSR in the MPR, the solution is granting such enterprises total economic independence. In particular, this would eliminate the need of mandatorily sharing scarce resources procured from the USSR with other enterprises, which was one of Shupikov's complaints.

### Problems of Joint Enterprises

E. Klimov, general director of the GOK, believes that, although generally successful, the Erdenet experience nonetheless indicates the imperfection of the still undeveloped mechanism for organizing the activities of joint enterprises. The partnership must be equal. This, however, is not the case because of many unclear aspects. It is not clear how to estimate production efficiency: estimated in tugriks it is very high; in rubles, it is low. Consequently, there is pressing need for an assessment method. However, it is extremely necessary to have a convertible currency. According to E. Klimov, this is confirmed by the practical experience of Mongolbolgarmetall, and Mongolchekhoslovakmetall. Furthermore, it is important for the enterprise to know what it is purchasing. It does not have copies of contracts on the basis of which it could trace deliveries and for the past 5 years it has been unable to solve this problem: it cannot systematically control its suppliers. That makes it necessary for the enterprise to stockpile huge inventory worth in excess of 200 million tugriks. Considering the prices after 1986, when they began to be computed in tugriks, something puzzling is occurring in converting them into rubles, for the conversion coefficient fluctuates between 7 and 14.5. The procurement system must be radically reviewed. Direct relations must be established between suppliers and consumers. Supplying joint enterprises outside the USSR must become a target of special attention. Perhaps, the general director suggested, it may be necessary to set up in Moscow, at the expense of the combine and for its own purpose or to serve all joint enterprises, an office in charge of solving such problems. The enterprise needs foreign exchange, and convertible rubles, E. Klimov went on to say, should provide the opportunity to deliver above plan goods to the socialist countries in exchange for needed items. Today the enterprise has a great deal of foreign exchange which, however, is deposited in the Mongolian bank and used to finance domestic projects. However, the combine earns no interest whatsoever from such funds. This does not obey the laws of economics but, conversely, violates them.

A. Tyuryakov, chief of the Zarubezhtsvetmet, made a thorough study of the organization of activities of joint enterprises. He expressed the confidence that the 50 years of activities of joint enterprises have proven the accurate and timely nature of their organization.

Global economic publications consider axiomatic that the management of joint enterprises is a considerably more difficult and complex process than the management of national enterprises. Such is indeed the case. Problems of management exceed the framework of purely economic relations and demand both principled-mindedness and persistence in observing the interests of each side and of the enterprise itself, as well as understanding and respecting the interests of the other side.

The Erdenet management system ensures steady work showing good technical and economic indicators. The enterprise is jointly owned by countries which operate on the basis of equal management rights. The supreme management authority is a council consisting of an equal number of representatives of either side: the USSR Mintsvetmet and the MPR Ministry of Power Industry, Mining Industry and Geology, as well as the Ministry of Finance and foreign economic and other organizations. At its annual meetings it makes decisions on the most important problems of activities, appoints managers, allocates profits, approves plans, and so on. Day-to-day management between sessions is provided by the participating ministries.

Although the rules stipulate that decisions must be made by majority vote, actually they are made by agreement between the two parts of the council. In the case of differences, sensible compromises are found which, without affecting principles, take conflicting interests maximally into consideration. This does not always suit the enterprise entirely, but is it believed that this approach is the only acceptable one.

From the very beginning, the organizers of Soviet-Mongolian enterprises have tried to grant them maximal autonomy even within the framework of the strictly regulatory national economic management systems of that time. They were issued no more than four plan indicators (variety of output, profit, volume of sales and labor productivity). Many domestic restrictions concerning financial problems were not applicable to them: there was no allocation of funds for different purposes (operations, construction, development, etc.). They have at their disposal amortization withholdings and they themselves determine the use of their own funds. The number of their personnel is not planned and accountability has been reduced. Basically, the joint enterprises are financial-economic systems operating on the basis of full cost accounting and self-financing. It is true that individual Mongolian and Soviet departments have tried to apply to them those same "national" principles, under the guise of planning accountability indicators.

The Erdenet experience is used in determining the expediency of creating new enterprises, including some located in other countries. In the area of nonferrous metallurgy alone, 60 projects are now at different stages of development within the USSR and abroad. The Mongolian comrades as well are intensively working in this area.

What is needed most of all in the establishment of such enterprises is a thorough technical and economic evaluation of their expediency, with a clear definition of the interests of the partners. The necessary computations take a great deal of time. For a long time the prevalent opinion was that this could be accomplished simply and quickly.

A clear-cut unequivocal agreement on all legal and monetary-financial problems, obligations of the parties, and so on, is a mandatory prerequisite. The partners should establish in advance and not subsequently the expediency of their participation in this project. Unfortunately, so far a great deal of unfinished areas remain in establishing enterprises, along with vague formulations and postponing agreements "for later." There is no clear definition of monetary and price relations. Problems of taxation remain unsolved and a number of formulation could be interpreted in more than one way.

The building of the Bor-Undur GOK Concentration Factory was a typical example of the lack of preliminary agreement on the prices of the output. This entailed the need for subsequent significant additional payments from of the Soviet share of the profits (starting with 1986).

It is important to determine in advance the extent of autonomy and rights granted to an enterprise. We must not allow the "battle for rights" to begin with the very first days of its existence. The constituent documents must stipulate the correlation among personnel and working and salary conditions, as well as the allocation of the output in such a way that every partner is given the possibility independently to dispose of his share and take into consideration outlays for the development of the social area as a mandatory prerequisite for his activities. We learned this from the experience of the Erdenet and Mongolsovtvetmet Associations.

"Good accounts do not spoil a friendship," A. Tyuryakov said, reminding the others of that old saying. However, this applies only to good accounts and not any and all accounts. An improperly drawn up confused account is bound to spoil things and create suspicion and hurt.

Economic relations, both internal and external, should remain precisely economic, free from any distorting influence, whatever its nature or motivation. Otherwise there would be no clear understanding of realities or of the necessary line to be followed in their development. This does not mean that relations between the two sides

should be strictly economic and based on mutual advantages. It means that one must not confuse different types of relations and that proper consideration must be given to everything.

Joint enterprises made this problem clear on the basis of their own experience, proving the imperfection of internal as well as external economic mechanisms and relations in the most sensitive areas—prices and price setting.

Preliminary strict accounts are particularly necessary, as A. Tyuryakov emphasized, so that later one does not have to start counting losses. If initially the question is solved in principle, which does not require any particularly detailed work, it could turn out to be the most important argument in favor of one project or another or the groundlessness or poor substantiation of something else, which becomes clear after correcting it becomes difficult. The easier it is to make a decision "in principle," the more difficult it becomes subsequently to amend this principle.

Furthermore, Ch. Ulaan, associate of the economic department of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party Central Committee said, it is no secret that long-term programs and plans frequently remain on the level of pious wishes and cannot be used as a base for 5-year or annual plans because of the unrealistic approach in their formulation and, particularly, the excessive enthusiasm for high targets unrelated to the ways and means of achieving the set tasks or a thorough evaluation of the starting level.

Both Mongolian and Soviet representatives favor the opening of new joint enterprises. They are particularly needed by Mongolia, for the Mongolian People's Republic is essentially, S. Bathuyag said, behind in the level of economic development compared to the European socialist countries. The volume of per capita national income generated in Mongolia is nearly one-third that of the European CEMA members, and its consumption fund is lower by a factor of 2.6. Of late this gap has been worsening.

Balancing the economy is a major problem. Imports significantly outstrip exports. Domestic resources account for 60 percent of the national income while the balance comes essentially from aid in loans provided by the Soviet Union. This means, T. Namjim believes, that it is necessary, over the next 15 years, to take radical steps to ensure a substantial growth in the production and export potential of the country and to achieve major structural changes in production, organically interacting with the Soviet economy.

The important task which arises on this basis is to accelerate the pace of economic development and the further intensification of industrialization.

What T. Namjim, S. Bathuyag, B. Ligden and others mean by intensified industrialization is, above all, the intensified processing of the ore, i.e., the creation of a metallurgical production, machine-building and chemical industries in the most productive and "profitable" sectors which yield maximal national income with minimal capital investments. Such is the widespread view supported by simple computations, including references to foreign practices and Soviet publications, to the effect that of the overall amount of capital outlays in the ore mining-metallurgical complex, extraction and concentration account for 65 percent; metallurgical processing for 20 percent and metal processing leading to the production of finished goods, 15 percent, whereas within the overall cost of output of the complex the share of extraction and enrichment accounts for 18 percent; metallurgical processing for 50 percent and metal processing for 32 percent.

The next step in the development of the ore mining industry is undertaking in ore processing the production of pure metals, alloys and metal goods. Should this step be taken at this point? All Mongolian representatives favored it, whereas A. Mironenko, counselor-ambassador of the USSR to the Mongolian Peoples Republic, and Sh. Nadirov, senior associate, CPSU Central Committee, emphasized that the already established facilities must be improved and their fuller and more efficient utilization must be ensured. "The next step" in the ore mining industry would bring greater profits with relatively fewer outlays only when it is truly the next step in the development of overall economic life which has led to it. Unless this exists, and the ore mining industry has moved ahead, its next step would be more expensive and would yield fewer returns than is expected, based on the practical experience of countries whose economy has had a more even development.

In this connection, Sh. Nadirov pointed out that the basic feature in the economic cooperation between our countries was the creation of heavy industry centers in Mongolia: fuel-power, ore mining and transportation enterprises, construction industry centers, etc. These sectors are less economical and less profitable than light industry. Clearly, it would have been easier and more advantageous and more prestigious for the Soviet Union to develop in Mongolia light industry as was done, for example, by England, over long periods of time, in Asian and African countries. The Soviet Union, which sincerely tries to help the Mongolian people to develop its national economy, could not take that path. Although all of this was expensive and not always prestigious from the viewpoint of immediate returns, nonetheless it followed this method in order to establish the initial little islands of heavy industry. This was necessary in a country with age-old nomad animal husbandry.

Our discussion, Sh. Nadirov went on to say, has indicated once again that the Erdenet Combine and other joint enterprises have gained very interesting experience. The CPSU Central Committee analyzed promptly this

experience and drew proper conclusions. The problems which were raised here must be solved. Since we are speaking of efficiency, the solution of the existing problems would help to enhance it. As you know, this combine is tied, hand and foot, by regulations. What is amazing is that, nonetheless, it is still working well.

Last September, E. Klimov and his deputy T. Lhagvasuren discussed their problems with the secretaries of the Central Committees of our parties. This was a cry from the heart. Eight or 9 months have passed and endless meetings and talks are still going on concerning economic conditions of managing joint enterprises. M.S. Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan solved a number of most important problems of world politics within that period of time while we, two fraternal partners, are unable to solve ordinary economic problems. Is this in the spirit of the time, in the spirit of perestroika? It seems to me that this was a manifestation of bureaucratism in its purest aspect, Soviet as well as Mongolian.

The meaningful statements made by Comrades Ligden, Namsray and Ulaan, scientific associate, Higher Party School, MPRP Central Committee, Sh. Nadirov went on to say, indicate that work is taking place in search of solutions through practical action. Naturally, the Mongolian economy cannot be based exclusively on animal husbandry and ore mining. We, Soviet people, are truly interested in having your economy become comprehensive, modern and fully consistent with the interests of the Mongolian people. As to cooperation, we proceed in this case on the basis of existing possibilities, acting within the framework of acquired experience and knowledge. What we need are not pious wishes but precise computations and to determine efficiency and the extent to which this is consistent with the interests of the Mongolian and the Soviet peoples. The computations must not be strictly economic. If you protect your wonderful nature you must consider that you have preserved your main national wealth which you will then pass on to your children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. But if you act in the example of many European countries and harm your nature, which is quite fragile in your country, the damage could become irreversible. That is what must be taken into consideration as well when the desire to build something and to create something else is manifested.

After the roundtable meeting, in the meeting with the Soviet delegation, D. Molomjamts did not emphasize incidentally that today it is particularly important for Mongolia to upgrade the efficiency of existing enterprises in all sectors, including ore mining, which is still extracting ore with a copper content of 0.4 percent, suitable for processing; 83 percent of the copper is extracted from the ore, compared with 92 percent in Norilsk.

### Internal Reserves For Upgrading the Efficiency of Joint Enterprises

A great deal of attention was paid at the roundtable meeting to internal reserves for the efficiency of cooperation. This was discussed by E. Klimov and T. Lhagvasuren, party committee secretaries, Yu. Soldatov and P. Demchigsuren, workers G. Byambaa, Z. Ganbaatar, V. Klimov, Ye. Baraltsev and others.

According to T. Lhagvasuren, possibilities for efficiency may be found in eliminating artificial barriers, changing the narrow departmental and bureaucratic positions held by the central economic authorities of both countries and upgrading the role of socialist democracy and collective self-management at the enterprise and, with it, its efficiency. He classifies as internal shortcomings in the organization of the collective, for example, the disproportionately small percentage of Mongolian middle-level managers. Currently, with 71 percent of Mongolian workers, of 24 heads of shops and structural subdivisions four are Mongolian and among 14 heads of departments and other functional services there are only two. This complicates production management and hinders business relations between Mongolian workers and Soviet management. Furthermore, the frequent change of leading cadres does not contribute to the stable work of the collectives.

At the present time the recalling of Soviet specialists takes place without informing the Mongolian side which believes that the qualitative selection of specialists must be improved. It would also be desirable to coordinate their application with the Mongolian side and not to assign people who have not worked at similar enterprises and are unfamiliar with the specific features of the production process.

**Rejoinder** (A. Tyuryakov): The enterprise has the right to send back insufficiently skilled specialists at the expense of the organizations which assigned them to Mongolia. This right must be exercised.

This topic was also discussed by G. Byambaa, welder at the machine repair plant of the GOK. To begin with, he said, it is mainly Soviet specialists who are members of the management, ranging from brigade leader to chief of section and sector. They show little concern for the life of the Mongolian workers and all they demand of them is to work well. Because of poor knowledge of the Russian language, however, we can poorly explain our needs. Mongolian engineers and foremen are better familiar with this aspect. However, the promotion of Mongolian engineering and technical personnel to managerial positions is slow. Today the majority of our engineers and specialists hold the same positions they held 10 years ago. There are 12 basic production sections in the machine repair plant. Only one Mongolian comrade is section chief.

Second, side by side with Soviet specialists, also employed are many of their dependents who, in their homeland, were employed in different economic sectors. Here, in Erdenet, after working a couple of months alongside Mongolian workers as their students, they are assigned higher grades than their Mongolian instructors. This puzzles the skilled workers.

Third, ever since the construction of the combine was undertaken, the sponsorship movement has extensively developed, thanks to which we have learned a great deal from Soviet trends. Today, however, this movement is not very fruitful. Over the past 10 years the Mongolian workers have mastered new skills and are working successfully. Nonetheless, they are being automatically assigned instructors. We believe that it is both possible and necessary to seek other and more fruitful methods.

Fourth, our Soviet comrades, after completing their assignment, essentially go back home. Some of them extend their tour. This question as well should be coordinated with the Mongolian management and the opinion of the collective should be mandatorily taken into consideration.

The statement by Z. Ganbaatar, head of a combined comprehensive brigade at the filtering-drying department of the Concentration Factory (senior foreman by position and concentration-engineer by profession) was made in the same vein.

The international collective in the department employs 21 Soviet and 84 Mongolian specialists. This is a united and harmonious collective, which is rhythmically fulfilling its production programs with the help of brigade cost accounting. Since 1 April 1987 this combined comprehensive brigade of technologists has used the elements of cost accounting. In itself, however, regardless of how good it may be, according to the speaker, this method is not a guarantee for success. High labor productivity and good economic results are, above all, the result of observing labor, technological and performing discipline.

From the very first day of the creation of the brigade it has dealt with problems of strengthening discipline. During the entire 1987 and the first 5 months of 1988 there has been no single case of absenteeism or violation of public order (in the Mongolian part of the collective violations of labor discipline and public order, according to the party committee secretary of the MPRP, have been reduced by a factor of 3-3.5 in 3 years). They also relate their successes to the enhanced responsibility shown by the Soviet specialists who are training the Mongolian comrades.

The attitude of the people toward the use of equipment and materials has noticeably changed ever since the elements of brigade cost accounting were introduced. Many workers themselves are submitting suggestions on extending the service life of the equipment and the procurement of materials. Training is steadily conducted

in the various shifts, involving the study of economics and progressive labor methods. However, perfecting the brigade form of labor organization is taking place sluggishly and protractedly.

The main feature in material incentives in a cost accounting system is the collective form of wages, according to which all members of the brigade work on the basis of a single order and their labor is paid for on the basis of end results. The most difficult task according to Ganbaatar is the strict observance of the principle of equity in dividing the earnings among the members of the brigade on the basis of their skill, experience, qualifications, and so on.

The rate method does not allow us to determine the contribution of the individual to the common results quite fully. It equalizes the wages of workers of the same grade but performing operations of different difficulty; it introduces differentiation in the wages of workers of different grades employed in operations of identical difficulty. It does not take into consideration industriousness and labor stress. I believe, said Z. Ganbaatar, that in the creation of the brigade form of labor organization the wages of technological personnel of the same grade should be the same. At the present time we are preparing the creation of such a brigade-section consisting of engineering and technical personnel and section fitters.

He then discussed difficulties related to the linguistic barrier and the fact that cadre and consumer problems are dealt with not by the Soviet managers but by their Mongolian deputies (senior foremen, senior technologists and others), that the periodical replacement of Soviet specialists-managers hinders the organization of collective work and, finally, the fact that the possibility of raising the grades of Mongolian workers is small, for virtually all high grades are held by Soviet specialists.

**Ye. Barantsev**, the elected head of an excavator operators brigade, described its work. The brigade consists of 52 people, 70 percent of whom are local. Relations within the brigade are normal and practical. It must be acknowledged, however, the brigade leader noted, that the level of skill of the Mongolian machine operators is relatively low. They handle the excavator well, but must be efficient in repairing breakdowns. Two-week courses for skill upgrading were organized. After the training the certification of the workers took place. The grades of some were increased while those of others were lowered. For a period of 2 months related professions (gas welding) were studied. This significantly reduced the idling of mining equipment. The plans are being fulfilled on a monthly basis. However, the low technical standards of the mining foremen is a hindrance. The management should know this and take measures related to their training. Most of the wages are based on grades and

additional earnings and bonuses, on the labor participation coefficient. A brigade fund for sociocultural activities, consisting of the bonus funds from saving on materials, as been set up. It is used for a variety of projects which contribute to the unity of the collective.

**V. Klimov**, head of a steel smelting brigade, shared his experience on the way in their brigade, consisting of six Soviet and six Mongolian workers, the problem of grades has been solved: the brigade council distributes wages on the basis of labor results and not grades, and a second grade worker could earn as much as a fifth grade one.

"This is a real possibility," said E. Klimov, the general director. "Let the collective itself pay the wages according to the actual contribution of individuals. It is true that, as it has become clear, the enterprise does not have documents which allow it to do so. Consequently, any objection by a worker could entail the rejection of such a wage system. We are absolutely resolved to widen this practice.

**Question:** Could it be that the Mongolian workers who do work based on fifth-grade skills, are paid as second-grade workers and that their grades are not being raised?

E. Klimov: I am unfamiliar with such cases. Generally speaking, we do not hold back grade promotions. Anyone who so desires could submit to a test given by the certification commission, dealing with theory and practical skills and be assigned the grade he deserves. Occasionally, however, there are those who demand a grade increase but are unwilling to take the examination....

Several speakers raised the question of the grades of the Mongolian workers, essentially because the average grade is being raised slowly although, as Demchigsuren reported, over a 10 year period the average grade rose from 2.02 to 3.76 and at the machine repair plant, which was discussed by Byambaa, in the past 3 years it has stayed at a steady 3.35 level.

The promotion of Mongolian specialists to managerial positions and upgrading the rates of Mongolian workers require greater attention than was paid in the past although in this respect as well a great deal has already been accomplished. Erdenet, Mongolsovtsvetmet and other joint enterprises are not only new organizations on Mongolian soil but also represent new skilled cadres of workers, and engineers in a great variety of fields. With the decisive assistance of the Soviet Union, the backbone of a working class and of a scientific and technical intelligentsia for Mongolia has been trained to meet the needs of joint and national enterprises, a personnel who are now capable of independent development. Hence the new problems existing in relations between local and assigned specialists. Let us cite as an example the statement by **S. Bold**, first deputy chief of the Ulan-Bator Railroad:



"The solution of all problems is determined, to a decisive extent, on the proper organization of cadre problems. Whereas at the beginning of the operation of the railroads the main attention was focused on the training and development of national cadres and to providing vocational-technical training on the performing level, today exceptional attention is being to paid to the training of high-level management personnel (starting with heads of services, independent sections or higher). For that reason we are quite concerned with the shortage in senior positions of initiative-minded and capable managers, who can fight routine in the areas of new equipment and production technology under the conditions of the economic experiment and the new thinking."

At that point S. Bold discussed the length of assignment of the Soviet specialists: they should be assigned to the railroad not for 3 but 5 years, for before the person has already begun to be thoroughly familiar with the work, his tour is completed.

Another aspect in the use of Soviet specialists, Ch. Ulaan noted, is that every year thousands of Mongolian workers and young specialists study under Soviet instructors directly at cooperation projects. Their assistance is not always sufficiently used. It is important to put an end to the use of highly skilled Soviet specialists in solving daily petty problems. They are being used as a "shield" in protecting the narrow interests of their sector or enterprise or as a reserve force in solving difficult problems; one should stop hiding behind their backs.

According to Ch. Ulaan, the lower efficiency with which the Soviet cadres are used is related to the fact that the Mongolian organizations continue to invite them to work where they are not needed. At some agricultural and other projects and construction organizations, repeatedly, for periods of more than 10 to 20 years, specialists in the same area are being recruited from the outside instead of training their own.

T. Lhagvasuren described the training of cadres for Erdenet. During the first stage alone more than 400 workers were trained at vocational-technical schools in the USSR or directly at similar enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. At total of 1,380 workers were trained in leading skills at the training center of the enterprise, which is equipped with modern classrooms and facilities. Today Erdenet has a progressive detachment of the working class of socialist Mongolia numbering more than 3,600 working people. Among the personnel with leading skills national cadres account for 81.3 percent. Today the working people in Erdenet have set up at their own enterprise 51 creative groups (there are 15 at Mongolsovtsvetmet), and the question of organizing an independent scientific-production subdivision has been raised.

Computers are used in following the development of cadres at joint enterprises. However, not all problems can be solved with computers. One of them is the

necessary correlation in the numbers of Soviet and Mongolian specialists. It has been established and stipulated in the documents, E. Klimov said, that parity in management will be reached by 1991. In order not to violate this agreement, the number of Mongolian and Soviet engineer and technical personnel, above all heads of shops, and chief engineers, must be periodically set by the Council as the supreme authority of the joint enterprise. Having determined that some Mongolian specialists have acquired their certification, the respective authorities draw up the necessary document. This document must be accepted and ratified by the Council. For example, the chief mine-surveyor should be a Mongolian. At that point this question will no longer be raised at the enterprise.

Cadre problems help to solve the condition of the social area at the enterprise and in the city of Erdenet. This was discussed by T. Lhagvasuren, S. Jigjidorj, second secretary of the MPRP Gorkom, and V. Petrov, USSR consul general in Erdenet.

The joint enterprise is not only an industrial complex but also a wide network of sociocultural projects. It has a splendid palace of culture, a sports complex with a swimming pool, a prophylactic center, a recreation base, a Pioneer camp, a medical-sanitary unit, children's preschool institutions, an auxiliary farm, and others.

Currently more than 70 percent of the Mongolian working people and 100 percent of the Soviet personnel live in comfortable premises; preschool children's institutions are available for 50 percent of the children of enterprise workers. The comprehensive plan for social development calls for providing to all working people in the enterprise comfortable housing by 1992; the need for children's preschool institutions will be met in full by 1994. No other Mongolian enterprise has so successfully solved and is solving social problems. However, this enterprise as well has problems. For example, this applies to the not very pleasant question of the existence of stores for the Soviet specialists to which access by Mongolian Erdenet workers is quite limited and, as far as personnel from other enterprises is concerned, totally denied. It may be considered just for Soviet specialists to maintain their higher living standard for otherwise it would be impossible to find a sufficient number of people who would be willing to go to work in Mongolia which, as it were, is a difficult problem. However, it is not the "national stores" alone that divide the international collective. Such problems worsen ideological and educational work conducted by the party organizations of the CPSU and the MPRP at the joint enterprises.

Yu. Soldatov, and P. Demchigsuren, party committee secretaries, discussed the concerns of party and other social organizations.

Respectively, the CPSU and MPRP organizations number 460 and 430 members; the Soviet Komsomol organization has 140 members while the Mongolian one has

1,150. The party and Komsomol stratum is sufficiently great to exert an influence on the solution of the collective's problems.

Strengthening ties and cooperation between the CPSU and MPRP, trade union and Komsomol organizations is an efficient means of mobilizing the forces of the international collective under conditions in which at a joint enterprise there are two party committees, two trade union committees and two Komsomol committees. The forms of cooperation between them have still not been developed and this requires the methodological aid of the party committees. In the opinion of the combine's management—both the administrative and the party—the number of ideological workers participating in joint enterprises should be increased.

One fact which clearly reflects the influence of the new atmosphere developed by perestroyka is the following: at the end of the first day of the roundtable debates the combine's general director held a special conference with specialists at which corrections were made in the work plans with cadres in terms of upgrading skills and setting grades for workers, Mongolian in particular.

Another problem which may not have come up without an open roundtable discussion was the draft plan for economic conditions for the activities of joint Erdenet and Mongolsovtvetmet enterprises for 1988-1995, drafted by decision of the 33rd Session of the Intergovernmental Commission. These economic conditions call for full cost accounting, self-financing and self-support of the enterprises; establishing annual ceilings for foreign exchange funds for the purchasing of equipment, materials, etc.; assigning at the disposal of the enterprises some of the output (as much as 1 percent of the entire amount) which could be marketed abroad, including against freely convertible currency; granting the joint enterprises the right, through their own efforts, and on the basis of Soviet construction organizations, to perform some construction-installation, start-up and other projects.

A. Tyuryakov and I. Zorin (department chief at Zaru-bezhsvetmet) explained that the signing of this document is held up by the introduction in the stipulations of an additional item on taxing the Soviet share of the profits, which they consider as extraneous to the economic conditions governing the activities of the enterprises (according to S. Bathuyag taxation is an inseparable part of enterprise activities), for the profit has already been earned and belongs to the constituent partners. The second debatable item is that of granting the enterprises the right to perform construction-installation and start-up operations through their own efforts while keeping the money (in rubles) earned as a result in a Moscow bank, to be used in payments to other organizations engaged in filling orders placed by the joint enterprises, to which the Mongolian side did not object (a "ruble" account).

Naturally, the discussion of such problems at the roundtable meeting did not take place in order to oppose some variants of solutions or promote other. It was precisely a question of the terms for the development of the decision which had been made. In the following 2 or 3 days, eventually the parties accepted to sign the conditions. It was on this practical note that the roundtable meeting between KOMMUNIST and NAMYN AMDRAL ended.

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### All-Hungarian MSZMP Conference

18020004n Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 88 (signed to press 25 Oct 88) pp 111-114

[Report by M. Musatov]

[Text] Partywide fora play a special role in the processes of renovation of socialism, which are gathering strength in the majority of the members of the socialist community. In an atmosphere of democratization and glasnost and increased activeness of party members, they have assumed a truly creative nature. They have become open and meaningful. Their fateful decisions are triggering a political upsurge in society and meeting with a broad response throughout the world. The All-Hungarian MSZMP Conference (20-22 May 1988) became such a crucial event to the party workers and all working people in Hungary. The convening and preparations of the conference had a number of specific features related to the development of the country in recent years.

Whereas in the USSR the 19th All-Union Party Conference intensified the trend which developed after April 1985 and which took shape at the recent party congress, ascribing the process of perestroyka a new quality and scale, in Hungary the MSZMP Conference was essentially extraordinary, for it was the first major step toward the renovation of socialism. The targets and the nature of the forum were predetermined by the existing circumstances and requirements of the party members. The purpose of the conference was to make changes in the policy of the MSZMP and to define a program for its action for the period until the new regular congress would meet, and to earmark the basic trends of renovation of economic, political and social structures. At the same time, important cadre problems had to be solved.

The forum of the Hungarian communists was preceded by an extensive and sharp debate within the party and society. It was focused on the study of the difficulties being experienced by the country, their reasons and means of elimination and defining the ways of development of socialism in the Hungarian People's Republic.

The question of the economic and social difficulties had begun to be raised in the party since the end of the 1970s. It had already become clear at that time that a dynamic progress of the economy under the conditions of the new

economic mechanism was being obstructed and encountering the adverse influence of the global market, and was suffering from the wrong decisions made in the area of economic policy. The MSZMP Central Committee took steps to review economic strategy and to intensify the economic reform and the struggle against inflation. However, the implementation of these decisions, which were frequently in the nature of a compromise or were based on mistaken projections, took place in a contradictory manner and did not introduce any radical changes in the situation. In the last 3 years alone the Hungarian foreign debt doubled. There was an ever more persistent idea shared by the various social strata of a slowdown in building socialism and of crisis phenomena in the economy, loss of prospects and a crisis of confidence in the area of politics. Not everyone within the party was ready to accept such evaluations, for there were people under the influence of the old successes.

In November 1986 the MSZMP leadership made an effort critically to analyze the situation and to formulate steps to surmount the difficulties and strengthen confidence in its policies. In July 1987 the MSZMP Central Committee Plenum adopted a political program for socioeconomic development. That autumn the Hungarian government, headed by K. Grosz, obtained the approval of the National Assembly to take steps to stabilize the economy over a 3-year period. The speech by the head of the government openly mentioned the real difficulties experienced by the country and emphasized the need to make sacrifices for the sake of the future.

This view was supported as a whole by public opinion, although there were many ebbs and flows in the expressed feelings. Debates on solving the crisis became even sharper. Naturally, constructive principles predominated, although the party was forced to rebuff demagoguery and the malicious attacks mounted by hostile elements.

The solution of many problems, including the formulation of programs for long-term action, as it became clear, was being held back by the sluggishness and inefficient functioning of the political system, subjectivism and the underdeveloped nature of democratic procedures. It was above all a question of modernizing the ways and means of party activities, and rejecting interference in all areas of social life. The need to revise many of the stipulations of the 13th MSZMP Congress legitimately arose.

It was not only the historical distance covered by the MSZMP but also the experience of the other fraternal parties and, above all, the changes which were gathering strength in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, where perestroika and renovation processes were developing, that provided a significant incentive for thoughts and conclusions.

In December 1987 the MSZMP Central Committee Plenum called for holding an all-party conference. The expediency of holding not an ordinary Central Committee plenum to sum up the results of the work in the

middle of the cycle between congresses but approaching the problem on a higher level—holding an authoritative party forum—was deemed expedient. This would involve the election of delegates and granting the opportunity to participate in it with voting rights of Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission members. The agenda called for discussing the party's tasks and suggestions on the development of the political system and the consideration of cadre and organizational problems.

One-third of the party members participated in the discussion of the Central Committee theses for the conference. Never before had the MSZMP experienced such activeness and sharpness of discussions. A variety of feelings were expressed by the Hungarian party members and the public: time should not be lost, action was needed, the party was able to renovate itself, and it was precisely the party that should take the lead in the process of profound reforms. The demand for a more self-critical analysis of the situation and policy pursued in recent years, and holding accountable leaders who had made errors and blunders, was sounded persistently. The high leadership of the MSZMP was criticized. Therefore, the outlines of the new situation were defined within Hungarian society.

No accountability report was delivered at the conference. The experience in implementing the congress' resolutions and the results of the debates within the party were summed up in J. Kadar's speech. A call was sounded for a renovation of domestic policy. Considerations on the activities of the MSZMP under the new conditions were presented. It was emphasized that, based on achievements in the building of socialism, the party will remain the leading and guiding force of society, acting on the basis of the ideas of scientific socialism and the doctrine of Marx, Engels and Lenin. "We want more socialism, which means more democracy. More democracy also means greater responsibility." These concepts were supported by the delegates.

All in all, 50 people spoke at the conference. One of them was a nonparty member; 231 delegates submitted their views in writing. The debates and activities of the commissions in drafting cadre problems and formulating the resolutions were active, businesslike and frank. For example, more than 600 notes were received concerning the draft resolution. One could say that the discussion dealt with three basic concepts: the need for major changes, including changes in cadres, as the starting point for any change in updating the party's work and restructuring the political system; and that any progress is impossible without the systematic implementation of a comprehensive economic reform.

The delegates believed that in order to achieve a change in politics it is important to adopt a modern approach to the leading role of the party, to update the mechanism of its functioning and to democratize the internal connection and broaden glasnost within the MSZMP and in

society. The ideas of restoring the multiparty system were rejected, as failing to take into consideration the lessons of Hungary's historical development. These approaches were reflected in the resolution adopted at the conference, which emphasized that in the interest of progress and the prosperity of the Hungarian nation a radical change is needed in MSZMP policies, an accelerated reform in all areas of social life, the coordinated renovation of economics and the political system and the active inclusion in such processes of social creative forces.

Having noted the errors and faults in the activities of the Central Committee and the government and the fact that the efforts which had been made to correct the situation had as yet failed to yield the desired results, the party conference instructed the MSZMP Central Committee to set up a task commission which would make a profound study of the country's development in recent decades and expose the reasons for negative phenomena and, on the basis of the outcome of the debates within the party, would earmark a long-term program for building socialism. The new programmatic stipulation of the MSZMP was to be drafted within the framework of this effort.

Problems of perfecting party activities account for a great deal of the documents adopted at the conference. The thought is promoted that the MSZMP must intensify the political nature of its activities. The party should not assume the duties of state, economic and public organizations. It must pursue its policy through the party members and party bodies and organizations. The delegates spoke out in favor of emphasizing in the area of party internal life the development of democracy, and the broadening of the rights and autonomy of the primary party organizations, so that the party members may more actively participate in shaping policy and controlling its implementation. The demand was also supported of improving the decision-making mechanism and asking in advance the view of the party organizations and, in the case of particularly important problems, organizing discussions with the participation of all party members. It was also a question of hearing minority voices.

The delegates were in favor of reducing the cadre nomenclature in the superior party authorities and the decentralization of work with cadres. As was to be expected, the decision was made of electing people to leading positions (from Politburo member to gorkom and raykom secretary) for no more than two terms. It was recommended, in the course of such elections, to broaden the practice of nominating several candidates. The plan calls for completing the new party statutes by the next congress.

The resolution adopted at the All-Hungarian MSZMP Conference stipulated a series of extensive steps aimed at reforming the political system. It was emphasized that socialist pluralism, based on the party's leading role, is a

prerequisite for the exercise of power by the people. This makes it possible, while retaining unity within the main and essential areas, to coordinate different interests and views and to take them into consideration in formulating political wishes.

In Hungary the People's Fatherland Front, the trade unions and the other public organizations and associations are institutions based on socialist pluralism. The most important functions in representing and defending the rights of the working people are those of the trade unions which, at the present stage, are improving their relations with the party and the government. The Hungarian trade unions and the Communist Youth League will hold their conferences in the autumn of 1988.

The need to revise the Constitution was noted in the conference's document, for many of its sections still bear the mark of the obsolete views of the 1940s and 1950s. In sharing the concept of the state based on law, the MSZMP believes that the socialist governmental system must act independently, in accordance with legal standards. It is a question, above all, of refining and separating the functions of the party from those of the government. There must be consistency between the contemporary political requirements governing the ways and means of the party's influence on state life, and a clearer distinction must be established among the rights of the party, the State Assembly, the public representative authorities and the courts. By improving its exclusive right to legislate, the parliament in particular must play a more significant role in coordinating the interests of the public and controlling the observance of the laws and the work of the government.

Through its resolutions the conference stimulated the process of converting the councils into true self-governing authorities, into a rule by the people. This will also be helped by the new law on the local councils, which is currently being drafted. Hungary has an extensive law-making program: the laws on referenda, the freedom of assembly and association, information, rights of national minorities, freedom of conscience and religious beliefs, and others, are to be ratified. The new Hungarian Constitution will settle the system of democratic relations between the state and the citizens and their reciprocal rights and obligations.

The experience acquired in the socialist development in Hungary and other socialist countries confirmed that democracy is inseparably related to social glasnost. The document of the MSZMP conference notes that glasnost contributes to providing fuller information on social life and the manifestation of areas of coincidence and its agreement of interests and of shaping public harmony and exercising public control. Increasing information on the work of the Central Committee and its executive bodies and of the government was deemed urgent.

The economic section of the resolution adopted at the MSZMP Conference is structured on the basis of acknowledging the need for the strict implementation of the program for the stabilization of the Hungarian economy. The main prerequisite for this is slowing down and subsequently stopping the growth of the foreign debt, retaining the capacity to pay, the restoration of state budget balancing, which can be achieved by upgrading the efficiency of economic management, increasing the profitability of exports and making progressive changes in the production and output structure.

The same line is followed in perfecting the economic mechanism and strengthening its legal nature. The resolutions at the party conference are aimed at providing conditions for a planned and regulated socialist market. It is emphasized that a market-oriented economy must play an integrating role in the economy. Wherever market means turn out unsuitable, state regulation must be applied.

Considerable attention was paid to the problem of the correlation between forms of ownership. In the future as well state, collective and cooperative ownership will play a determining role in the mixed Hungarian economy. However, they must function more efficiently. At the present stage in building socialism it is deemed necessary to involve in the economic area the population's funds and foreign capital. The conference supported the suggestion of enterprises based on mixed ownership and broadening the limits of private initiative providing that they contribute to the growth of the national income and to improving the living standard of the population.

Even prior to the party forum, lively discussion were held on the draft law On Economic Societies and Associations and on the political and economic consequences of this draft bill. The conference approved the idea of passing the type of law which would make it possible to stimulate capital transfers and promote joint forms of enterprise and the involvement of foreign investments. Some enterprises will be reorganized into share holding companies with the right to sell stock abroad. The state assembly passed this law last October.

The delegates also favored a more thorough study of the 20 years of experience in the implementation of the economic reform and making amendments in the planning, financial and budget shaping system and the continuing restructuring of the tax system. Difficulties which existed here were noted. The main among them is closing down enterprises operating at a loss, regrouping the manpower and, in this connection, the appearance of unemployment (according to some estimates, ranging up to 100,000 people). Aid to individuals who have temporarily lost their jobs is contemplated. The decision was made to formulate new concepts governing social policy and wages.

The MSZMP Conference not only defined the trends and content of the socioeconomic reforms in the country but also created the necessary cadre and organizational prerequisites to this effect. Elections for the MSZMP Central Committee and Central Control Commission were held. More than one-third of the members of the Central Committee were replaced, such as to include a higher number of representatives of the working class and the scientific and artistic intelligentsia. The Central Committee plenum considered the important organizational problem of introducing the position of president of the MSZMP, to which J. Kadar was unanimously elected. This emphasized the continuity of the party's policy and was an expression of respect for a political leader who has headed the MSZMP for more than 30 years and has made great contributions to the party and the Hungarian people.

K. Grosz was unanimously elected MSZMP general secretary. He earned his high reputation in the course of his work in most important party and state positions. The party's leading cadres were significantly renovated. Suffice it to say that only five comrades from the previous Politburo membership were re-elected.

The resolutions adopted at the conference convincingly prove the party's firm intention of heading and implementing the process of renovation of socialism on Hungarian soil and giving it qualitatively new features. Firmly standing on the ground of reality, the Hungarian communists have reached the awareness that the problems which accumulated in the country could not be approached with the old yardsticks. In order to accelerate socioeconomic development and to preserve and increase socialist gains profound changes are necessary. That is why the important conclusion was drawn on the coordinated implementation of economic and political reforms and on the close interconnection between them. Success in economic changes cannot be ensured without the renovation of social thinking and the restructuring of the system of political institutions. A course was charted toward involving in updating the base and the superstructure of all creative forces within the nation. *Pere-stroyka* was initiated within the party itself, which is rethinking its leading and guiding role and which, after the conference, has been strengthening unity within its ranks and upgrading the activeness of party organizations and members, which is of special significance in preserving and developing the role of the MSZMP as the political leader of society under the conditions of broad democracy and the appearance of new and frequently alternate social structures and movements.

The Hungarian party members, who make use of the political upsurge in the country, are shifting the emphasis to practical action, for resolutions merely offer the opportunity which must be implemented in practical life. A number of Central Committee plenums have already been held. A plan for the implementation of the conference's resolutions has been adopted. Suggestions

on changing the electoral system and broadening glasnost in the party and social life have been approved. Consultative councils under the party committees are being created.

In the view of the MSZMP Central Committee, particular attention should be paid, among the other domestic policy problems, to the economic situation and, above all, to ensuring solvent demand and the struggle against inflation. The country must experience a period of 8 to 10 years of severe trials. Recently K. Grosz emphasized the following: "The question is how to deal with the stresses which will be brought about by the next 10 transitional years. We would like to protect the interests of the working man and implement technical renovations which, in itself, inevitably requires sacrifices. Under such circumstances the task of politics is not only to maintain social stability. We must convince society of the need for active efforts and we can create conditions to this effect by implementing the reform of the political institutions."

The Hungarian communists believe that favorable international conditions exist for making profound changes in the country. This applies above all to the processes of renovation in the USSR, the PRC, Poland and other socialist countries. Actively participating in the activities of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, and making its contribution to the implementation of the peaceful foreign policy aspirations of the members of the socialist community, Hungary is pursuing a course of promoting a dialogue between East and West, increasing the openness of its foreign policy and intensifying trade and economic relations.

The MSZMP pays particular attention to relations with the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the working trip which K. Grosz made to Moscow at the beginning of July. The discussions between the high leaders of the CPSU and the MSZMP indicated that the logic and concepts of perestroika in the USSR and the reform in Hungary coincide, and that despite all the differences between the two countries there exist, naturally, a great deal of common and practical steps aimed at the renovation of socialist society. All of this makes it possible substantially to broaden the base for exchanging experience and comparing views and intensifying Soviet-Hungarian cooperation.

Our country shows a great deal of interest in and sympathy for the creative efforts made by our Hungarian friends. The resolutions of the MSZMP Conference and their orientation toward perestroika and qualitative renovation of political and economic structures of socialism within national frameworks and in accordance with the specific features of the country are proof of the fact that these processes are becoming the basic trend in accelerating the development of global socialism.

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## World Politics Through the Lens of the Mass Consciousness

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[Article by Vilen Nikolayevich Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, vice-president of the Soviet Sociological Association, and Vsevolod Aleksandrovich Marinov, candidate of historical sciences, scientific secretary for the International Barometer for Peace Program]

[Text] The scientific analysis of complex and occasionally conflicting relations between international politics and mass awareness in the different countries and areas is the task of the new study program of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, known as the "International Barometer of Peace." What is the specific content of the program? Most generally, it is, above all, the study of the dynamics of the establishment of the main components of the new political thinking: the attitude of the world public toward problems of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament, and the perception by the masses of the dialectics of mutual and indivisible security based on the principles of equality and universality, the internationalization and demilitarization of political awareness and ways of surmounting antagonistic stereotypes and images of the enemy in relations among countries and, above all, between the United States and the USSR.

We consider the task of the Barometer as being not only to trace such processes but also "to predict the weather" in international relations. The very formulation of the assignment shows the extent of its scope and complexity. For that very reason, from the very start we considered the program as open-ended and a standing forum of scientists working in many specialized fields—sociologists, psychologists, international affairs specialists, economists, or anyone else who could make a contribution.

The study of the way the Soviet people perceive international problems began before the Gorbachev-Reagan Geneva Summit, when the first such survey of the RSFSR population was conducted. Since the new political thinking is based on the idea that universal human values have priority or, to be even more specific, on the survival of mankind, what the sociologists were interested in above all was the type of people concerned with this problem and the nature of their attitude toward it. It was established that this idea is supported by the absolute majority of the Soviet population. In particular, 96 percent of those surveyed (with 1 percent against and 3 percent abstaining) supported the idea that "the interests of the survival of mankind should be above all other." Equally, 93 percent of the respondents agreed that "there are no reasons which could justify the use of nuclear weapons." The overwhelming support of this concept in our country is based on the broadest possible view that "in a general nuclear war there would be no winner" (89

percent agreed) and that "after a general nuclear war human civilization would perish" (agreed by 83 percent of the respondents). These and other data indicate that the attitude toward nuclear war in the political awareness of the Soviet people is quite simple: it is suicidal and can neither be justified nor won. It may have seemed that the equally simple conclusion concerning nuclear weapons should follow. However, no such automatic reaction was noted in the public awareness. There still are many people who sincerely believe in the "peace making" and "restraining" possibilities of nuclear weapons. Approximately 25 percent of our population believe that "nuclear weapons helped to prevent the outbreak of a major conflict between East and West," and that "the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe makes it possible to avoid an armed clash in this continent" as well as the fact that their elimination "would increase the likelihood of nonnuclear conflicts between East and West." Similar views are quite widespread in Eastern Europe. Thus, the "Europe—Our Common Home" survey indicated that 20 to 25 percent of the Czechoslovak urban population holds such a viewpoint. What is nurturing such ideas? Above all, 20 or 30-year old views according to which a nuclear weapon was considered essentially the main means of restraining potential aggressors. More than one-half of those surveyed in our country have expressed the opinion that "the presence of nuclear weapons in the USSR helps to maintain peace" (25 percent disagreed and 20 percent "found it difficult to answer"). Nonetheless, only a few—10 percent—believe that nuclear weapons in Western hands also "contribute to maintaining the peace" (58 percent opposed).

This concept of the "restraining" and "peaceful" nature of nuclear weapons in Soviet hands is based on the profound conviction by the absolute majority of Soviet people (9 out of 10) that "the USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons." Along with the confidence of 10 percent of the people that the United States as well would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, this creates a kind of illusion of the "genie in the bottle," which no one would dare release although for different reasons: because of the peace-loving nature of the socialists countries and the fear of nuclear suicide on the part of imperialism. This view has its own logic which, however, ignores the ever increasing danger of an unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

The majority realize the growing threat presented by nuclear arsenals. On an average, nine out of 10 people agree with the idea that "the stockpiling and improvement of nuclear weapons increases the risk of their accidental use," and that "putting nuclear weapons in space will multiply this risk." Consequently, the absolute majority of the people realize that the dynamics of the arms race inevitably increases the likelihood of their accidental use. Therefore, the same majority of respondents believe that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way of avoiding nuclear war.

Repeatedly, the various studies conducted within the framework of the "International Barometer of Peace"

have included the following question: "Do you deem possible the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world?" Averaging the results, it appears that 50 to 60 percent of Soviet people answered in the positive and that approximately 25 percent found it "difficult to answer." Therefore, 25 percent of those surveyed were skeptical. Similar results were obtained in the course of a parallel "Moscow-Warsaw" public opinion survey; 90 percent of the people in Warsaw believed that "in a global nuclear war there would be no winner." Nonetheless, 20 percent disagreed with the idea that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is attainable.

What is the reason for such pessimism? Speaking of specific arguments, we already considered some of them—the concept of the "restraining" potential of nuclear weapons. Another argument is as follows: Since nuclear weapons have already been invented, their total elimination is impossible. In our country approximately 25 percent of those surveyed agreed with this argument. Other considerations exist as well in support of this view: the reliability of the control mechanism over nuclear warheads ("despite all accidents there have been no explosions"), the unrealistic nature of their 100-percent detection ("a nuclear bomb in a trunk"), or the possibility of illegal manufacturing of nuclear warheads ("even a student could do this"). Based on the Barometer scale, we assessed two of the most extreme reasons. But what is the reason for their popularity in our country where they are obviously not held in honor?

Clearly, the matter lies in the complexity of developing a nuclear-free way of thinking for, having shaped the appearance of our age, for many long years the atom left its imprint on the stereotypes of social awareness. The current nuclear world has become a customary one to a second generation of people on earth. In 40 years society has become accustomed not only to living in the vicinity of nuclear reactors. Many people have silently accustomed themselves also to the fact that somewhere there are tens of thousands of nuclear warheads invisibly aimed at each other. This is explainable, for a lengthy coexistence with danger can dull a natural instinct of fear. The "anesthetizing" idea that we have survived despite nuclear weapons more than a decade and nothing has happened begins to take shape and strengthen in the mind.

This passive type of reaction to an external threat ("chances are it will blow over") is inherent in a minority in our country (between one-quarter and one-third of the people according to our estimates). The majority of Soviet people are quite disturbed by the threat of a nuclear war. Such types of concern stimulates an active type of reaction to the threat. Thus, according to the study made in the RSFSR in November 1986, one-half of the respondents noted that they "frequently discuss within the family problems of war, peace, detente, and disarmament." Four out of 10 do this "occasionally;" 65



percent indicated their participation in the movement for peace by participating in meetings and demonstrations, while 38 percent made contributions to the Peace Fund.

In the mass consciousness the concept of the impossibility of the use of nuclear force does not always and totally agree with the experience of previous generations who knew one thing only: that greater strength ensures victory and, correspondingly, greater safety. The ordinary awareness of the people, furthermore, supported by daily experience, indicates the same. To the overwhelming majority of the population the view of suicide caused by the use of nuclear weapons is (happily) either derived from books or motion pictures.

Therefore, a certain discrepancy may be found in the mass consciousness. On the one hand, there is a quite widespread acknowledgment of the impossibility of making use of nuclear weapons in solving conflicts between the USSR and the United States. On the other, there is the concept which has sunk root in the public mind that "my country should be the stronger." Thus, the viewpoint that militarily the USSR should be stronger than the United States is supported, according to our surveys, by 13-25 percent of the population. Equally, answering the question of the desirable ratio of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, approximately 20 percent believe that the latter should be stronger.

It is indicative that the view that "the USSR should be stronger" was supported in our country by twice as many "fathers" (people 50 or older) compared to "children" (under 30). This preference on the part of the "fathers" for the "power" type of thinking can be explained by their closeness to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, and the fact that their vision of the world was largely shaped during the Cold War period.

As to the United States, based on a Soviet-American survey, 43 percent of Americans favor U.S. military superiority over the USSR. Again those who are over 50 expressed twice as frequently support of this concept compared to the "children." It was also noted that people with incomplete secondary education (in both the USSR and the United States) support the idea that "my country should be the stronger."

The history of recent decades has convincingly proved the erroneousness and futility of seeking security in increasing the military muscle which, in fact, merely weakens the security of all those involved. The impossibility of solving the problem by power means, which is becoming increasingly obvious, has led to the growing understanding that security cannot be achieved by military means and that it must be equal for all sides. This element of the new thinking has become predominant today in Soviet society where, according to surveys,

currently 70 to 80 percent of the population favor parity of strength between the USSR and the United States. This view is supported by 50 percent of the people in the United States.

It was specifically established in the course of the study of the feelings of the Soviet people that 5 to 7 percent firmly believe that the Soviet Union does not have to be as strong as the United States. More specific questions explained the logic of this approach: since the nuclear power of both East and West enables them to destroy one another several times over, on a guaranteed basis, a scrupulously maintained equality of strength makes no sense and could even hinder the disarmament process. Therefore, the opinion was expressed that in order to accelerate this process the USSR should take unilateral initiatives in the area of armament reduction.

We see, therefore, that public opinion is dominated by a recognition of the impossibility of waging a nuclear missile war and, consequently, using nuclear weapons. The fact that this idea has not become a general conviction is a different matter. Nonetheless, there is a certain internal connection between the concepts that "it is impossible totally to eliminate nuclear weapons" and that "my country should be stronger," which are at the base of the contradictions we indicated. It seems to us that they are linked through the customary power approach to problems of security.

Let us consider in greater detail some of the results of the studies conducted jointly with foreign colleagues. The first was a Soviet-American survey of secondary school children on the topic of "Young People and the Future," which was conducted in 1986, in which on each side the views of more than 4,000 adolescents aged 12 to 18, were studied. In particular, the survey indicated the weakness, so to say, of the information base of the young Americans, needed in order to shape a new political thinking. During the time of the survey, for nearly 1 year the USSR had already observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. However, only 8 percent of the respondents in the United States were familiar with this fact. Ten percent of the respondents were familiar with the fact that the Soviet Union alone had ratified the SALT-2 Agreement. It is not astounding, therefore, that the joint Soviet-American survey, which was conducted 2 years later, indicated that 7 out of 10 young Americans (under 30) believed that the USSR is a threat to U.S. security, while 8 out of 10 had a "negative" attitude toward the Soviet government.

It is of interest to note that the majority of American school students (60 percent) erroneously thought that the United States had issued a statement on the nonuse of nuclear weapons first and, together with the USSR, had ratified the SALT-2 Agreement (51 percent). This reaction indirectly reflected the positive attitude which the young Americans had concerning such acts, as well as their patriotic feelings. The study also indicated that in their majority the children and adolescents in both

countries were aware of the fact that there would be no winner in a global thermonuclear war (80 percent in the USSR and 72 percent in the United States). The children perceived such realities through the adults in whom awareness of this tragic truth is today prevalent. According to the survey conducted by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, jointly with the Gallup Poll (United States), in the autumn of 1987, 84 percent of Soviet people and 81 percent of Americans believe that "there will be no winners in a global nuclear war and that the USSR and the United States would be totally destroyed" (respectively 4 percent and 13 percent disagreed). Such data are not accidental: the surveys which had been previously conducted in both countries persistently confirmed that the majority realized the suicidal consequences of a nuclear war. Therefore, we can say that an important "support base" has developed in public awareness in the USSR and the United States, accepting the new political thinking. Another "support base" rests on the understanding shown by the majority in both countries (79 percent in the USSR and 65 percent in the United States) of the fact that "further stockpiling and perfecting of nuclear weapons would provide advantages neither to the USSR nor to the United States."

However, awareness of these truths does not guarantee the automatic acceptance of other principles governing the new political thinking. Barometer data indicated that in the USSR and, particularly, in the United States, by no means is everyone aware of the fact that what directly follows from the thesis of the suicidal nature of nuclear war and the futility of the arms race is another fundamental concept of new political thinking: indivisibility of the security of both countries and the fact that the security of one country cannot be attained at the expense of that of the other.

One of the indicators of the extent to which the new political thinking is implemented in the conduct of national affairs is the level of confidence developed between Eastern and Western countries. Nine percent of the Soviet public believed that "the United States will never be the first to use nuclear weapons." In terms of France, more than one-half of surveyed Muscovites believed this. When both Americans and French were asked the same question concerning the USSR, positive answers were given to it by 21 percent of Americans and 33 percent of the French.

Summit meetings between the leaders of the USSR and the United States provide a considerable impetus to moving the Barometer needle ever higher on the "confidence" scale. Whereas in October 1987, prior to the Washington meeting, 8 out of 10 people surveyed in the USSR believed that U.S. policy threatens the security of our country, in May 1988, immediately prior to the Moscow meeting, the same view was held by one-half of those surveyed.

A certain increase may also be noted in concepts of the weakening of the threat of nuclear war. Whereas in October 1987 37 percent of those surveyed in our country supported the idea that "I frequently think, with concern, of the possibility of nuclear war," by March of the next year this view was held only by 25 percent of those who answered the survey.

Let us note that out of the four summit meetings (Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow) public opinion particularly singled out the last one. More than one-half of those surveyed considered it as the most effective. Second in the "success scale" was the Washington Summit. The study conducted on the basis of the Moscow dialogue indicated that two-thirds of those surveyed believed that relations between the USSR and the United States would improve but only 7 percent assumed that they would remain on the same level. Let us note, for purposes of comparison, that in the autumn of 1987 only one-half of those surveyed hoped for improvements in such relations and that 25 percent assumed that they would remain unchanged.

Instilling the principles of new political thinking in international affairs is inseparable from strengthening the well-wishing and humane perception which nations have about each other, and surmounting the still extant barrier of mistrust which developed over the decades.

For example, the reaction to the question of: What is your attitude toward the Americans? is indicative. Over a period of 3 years 8 out of 10 persistently expressed a positive attitude toward the American people. Thus, according to data of a telephone survey of Muscovites, conducted by the International Barometer of Peace, in May 1988, 8 percent had a "very good" attitude toward the Americans; the attitude of 70 percent was "good" and only 1 percent expressed a "bad" attitude. Similar figures were found to exist in U.S. public opinion. According to data gathered in the autumn of 1987, 63 percent of surveyed Americans expressed a positive attitude toward the Soviet people.

Soviet sociological science has only begun to work on problems of shaping the new political thinking. The initial "Measurements" have been taken of public opinion in different countries within the framework of the "International Barometer of Peace" project. Although the results indicated that instilling the principles of the new way of thinking in the mass awareness is by no means a simple or automatic process, foundations for pessimistic conclusions, in our view, do not exist. Areas in world public opinion in which stereotypes and prejudices of the past are particularly durable have become more obvious. Also clearly earmarked within them are areas in which the new political realities are becoming prevalent. Studies of public opinion on problems of war and peace must be made available to all. It makes a great deal of sense also for the results of such work, obtained in the course of cooperation among sociologists in different countries, to be submitted to the United Nations. The

accessibility of such information should also be considered a form of public popular diplomacy and a characteristic means of communicating among nations and getting them to know each-other.

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### Perestroika and Europe

18020004p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 88 (signed to press 25 Oct 88) pp 119-121

[Article by Erkki Tuomioja, deputy mayor of Helsinki, chairman of the Finnish department of the "Committee of 100" Antiwar Organization, and editor-in-chief of the journal UDIN ("Nucleus")]

[Text] Europe is on the eve of major changes. Its integration, triggered by vital economic requirements, is developing rapidly, creating new problems for substantial population groups and political parties in Western Europe. The leftist forces in Europe are seeking their place in the process of building an all-European home, which is impossible without the participation of the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries. This Finnish social democrat, who attended the international theoretical symposium on "The European Left in the Year 2000," which was held last June in Athens, shares his thoughts on this topic on the request of KOMMUNIST.

If we were to name the most important phenomenon in present-day Europe, with the farthest-reaching consequences to our continent, naturally, it would be the process of reform related to the words "glasnost" and "perestroika" in the USSR.

Naturally, yet another important event was the agreement of reducing nuclear armaments, reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. This agreement as well is largely the product of the new Soviet initiatives taken by M.S. Gorbachev. It is true that during the Nixon-Brezhnev period as well important accords had been reached concerning armament control. Essentially, however, they did not go that far and brought to light the limited nature of their possibilities, as the features of the new Cold War were developing in the 1980s.

The agreement concerning the medium and short-range missiles means the destruction of precisely the "Euro-missiles," the deployment of which provided an impetus for the development of the new mass movement for peace in Europe and the European campaign for nuclear disarmament. Does the concluding of these agreements indicate that henceforth we stand on the threshold of achieving the objectives of the movement for peace: A nuclear free and independent Europe, based on extensive social democracy and respect for human rights?

Clearly, the answer would be in the negative. Although the agreement on medium and shorter range missiles gave the Europeans food for thought concerning the

future of their defense and their security measures, in itself it did not encourage any development in the direction indicated by the campaign for nuclear disarmament, but rather the opposite: an increase in conventional armaments in order to compensate for the diminished importance of nuclear weapons and new forms of Western European cooperation in the defense area to surmount the alleged weakness of the Atlantic Alliance.

The future of European nuclear armaments as well remains unsolved. The British and French governments successfully opposed the inclusion of their nuclear armaments in the INF Treaty. They are unwilling to part with their so-called independent nuclear forces (although in the British case, for example, such independence is clear fiction), whereas some Western European strategists would like to consider them as a foundation of a new independent European nuclear defense system.

Although compared with the nuclear armaments of the superpowers the British and French systems have the advantage that they are quite adequate to support, so to say, a minimal containment, hardly anything good could come out of this type of consideration. It would be horrible if the relative increase of European independence from the United States would result in the growth of conventional armaments and the creation of European nuclear weapons. This would mean that a new European era marked by a negative sign, has been initiated.

The new peace movement and the campaign for nuclear disarmament provide a different alternative. Unlike the objectives of a nuclear-free Europe as such—the value of which would be diminished if nuclear armaments continue to stockpile in any other part of the globe and if the possibility of their proliferation is not controlled, to concentrate detente from below and the requirements of a European-wide policy which would eliminate the present bloc limits would make more sense.

The Europeans intend to make decisions concerning their future defense measures according to the way they conceive of the threat to themselves and their surroundings. Until the 1980s the hostile image of the "Russian bear" and the "Asian hordes," ready to hurl themselves at the West, exerted an influence on the Western European way of thinking. For as we, in postwar Finland, achieved an understanding of the nature of the defensive nature of Soviet strategy (even though it put excessive emphasis on the maximal security of the socialist fatherland), which enables us successfully to structure our relations with our neighbors, Soviet policy was much less understood by the other European countries.

Actually, even the terrible Red Army was depicted in the West as representing the closed nature of the Soviet system and as though acting as an occupation force with its own allies. It was precisely for that reason that, in my view, perestroika will become the most significant new phenomenon for Europe at large since World War II.

In the Soviet Union this process was initiated as an attempt to surmount the sclerosis which paralyzed the entire system. Although the Soviet Union continued to demonstrate outstanding successes in the development of outer space, military technology and sports, accomplishments in virtually all other areas were greatly below the standards set both in terms of competition with the West and the Soviet 5-year plans, as well as the expectations of the Soviet citizens. The point was not only of imperfection in the economy but, rather, the profound crisis which had affected the entire society. One of the manifestations of this crisis was alcoholism and its inferred link with the increased mortality rate in the Soviet Union.

The prime task of perestroika is to upgrade the efficiency of the country's management and economy and the growth of productivity. To the Soviet Union this will mean abandoning any excessively centralized command economy and the bureaucracy needed to manage with the help of such an economy, as well as a greater reliance of market forces. Economic reforms will mandatorily influence the entire Soviet society. This will bring about the elimination of the closed nature of the Soviet system. It was that same system which required people to register copying machines with the security organs, for which reason the advantages of the information society could never be fully applied.

Increased economic efficiency, as the objective of Soviet reforms, does not conflict in the least with the needs related to environmental protection, which were ignored so far. The present Soviet economy is imposing an unbearable burden on the natural environment and is using scarce natural resources with an incredibly low efficiency. The release of market forces here, unlike the situation in the West, could only bring about an improvement in the ecological balance. In this respect, the surmounting of the difficult legacy of the Stalinist period could become a structural component of the strategy of self-preservation needed by all mankind.

Many uncertainties remain related to the process of reform in the Soviet Union. Retreats are possible as well. I, for example, however, would like to believe that as a whole this is an irreversible process. Should it be pursued, it would mean that changes will come within the Soviet political system which would facilitate reciprocal understanding with the Western democracies.

When Gorbachev says that "we need democracy like we need air," he does not mean in the least some kind of parliamentary multiparty governmental system. However, as the reforms triggered by economic necessity acquire their own dynamics, which will not stop at the plant gates, the formulation of alternatives in the future will not be limited by changes within the framework of the party alone.

The majority of observers were already caught unawares by the activeness and dynamism created by glasnost and the appearance of a Soviet civil society with its numerous new formal and informal groups, movements and types of activities. Obviously, there is a tremendous and as yet intact area of creativity and human inventiveness existing in the Soviet Union, which can be successfully used in perestroika and which is bound to help the Soviet Union to solve all of its huge problems. In order to be successful in this case, it is vitally necessary to extend and strengthen the new coalition between reformers at the top of the party hierarchy, and the people expressing their support.

Perestroika will provide new opportunities for European cooperation as well. There are those in the West who think that perestroika is merely a form of "Westernizing" of the Soviet Union and that it has nothing that it could offer the West. Such an arrogant nearsightedness is erroneous. The West, particularly the European left, has to learn as yet a great deal and to borrow from the Soviet experience.

Therefore, we can confidently expect that the Soviet Union will become the most interesting and daring country in Europe in terms of cultural and political development. Those who kept preaching the eternal and unchangeable haughtiness of the Soviet system will experience a great deal of difficulty before they can acknowledge their error. The European conservatives intend to conclude marriages of convenience across the borders for the sake of neutralizing the challenge of perestroika and glasnost.

Although the long-term consequences of the reform could, generally as a whole, be only positive in terms of Europe, problems affecting the immediate future will arise. The other socialist countries in Eastern Europe sooner or later intend to undertake the same reform process. There are no reasons whatsoever to think that this in itself would face European security with problems, providing that the Western governments do not abuse this opportunity to destabilize such countries or else change their security agreements with the Soviet Union.

A great deal is being said today of the expected creation of an European internal market by the members of the EEC in 1992. Like restructuring, this process as well is based on economic necessity, in this case the fear of U.S. and Japanese competition. Compared to the events in Eastern Europe, the creation of an internal market here does not offer to the imagination new and exciting pictures. I, for example, have a great deal of difficulty to imagine how the cause of the liberation of man, international cohesion or the stable development in harmony with ecological needs could be promoted by the creation of a European casino and the total freedom for the

companies to shift currency and capitals and to determine the future of the working people after anything resembling the current internal boundaries among countries within the European Economic Community has been eliminated.

Naturally, both social and noncommercial dynamics are present in the concept of Western European integration. This is acknowledged by the Finnish left which is ready to provide full support to the efforts of the European left in the strengthening of such trends. Nonetheless, I believe that it is even of greater importance to us to avoid any such steps as a response to the common market, be they motivated by commercial or political considerations, should they also bring about a new division within Europe. It is particularly important to take this into consideration now, when perestroika opens new staggering possibilities for a major inter-bloc cooperation and unity within Europe, across the various borders.

This can be achieved not through confrontation with the superpowers but rather through cooperation with them, of a type which would reduce the military presence of the United States while, at the same time, acknowledging the European role of the Soviet Union and encouraging the Europeanization of its internal features.

In the past cooperation between East and West in Europe was limited on the governmental level and contacts among governments and under their supervision. Decentralization as a result of restructuring reforms and the appearance of a viable Soviet civic society will help to increase contacts and to create new forms of economic, social and other cooperation among enterprises, organizations and individuals, bypassing borders. While the truly important problems facing mankind, such as the arms race, the destruction of the environment and the poverty of the Third World, could, in the final account, be solved through intergovernmental actions, the existence of contacts among civilian societies and cooperation could turn out to be a vitally important factor in the implementation of such governmental steps. Obviously, some of the most important types of nongovernmental contacts should include efforts to organize a broad coalition among progressive European social movements, such as socialists, social democrats, communists, and "the Green."...

We, however, should not only consider the development of events within Europe but also acknowledge the decisive significance of relations between Europe and the rest of the world, the Third World in particular. In this sense the growing awareness on the part of the Europeans of the fact that the age of the policy of strength is past has been a positive development. This applies both to relations among great powers as well as the continuing domination over the Third World, aimed at guaranteeing the steady flow of nonrecoverable natural resources going into the First World.

Europe is ready to accept a greater parity of relations with the Third World. Unlike the United States, although having lost their excessive naivete in facing exotic revolutionaries, the European capitalists find it easier to understand the fact that the liberation movement in the Third World as well needs trade and cooperation with the West. This is a good foundation for realistic cooperation in the implementation of the new economic order which, although somewhat old-fashioned, nonetheless remains a worthy objective of international cooperation.

We also need a realistic assessment of the need for ecological adaptation. Here as well the prospects of Europe are better than those of any of the superpowers. The Europeans are more sensitive to the exhaustibility of natural resources. It is to be hoped that perestroika will draw attention to this fact as well and that the Soviet system will begin better to respond to environmental protection requirements.

I realize that the picture of Europe I have presented is still not the reality. If we intend to make it reality we require a more open and truly European left in order to combine the entire wide spectrum of left-wing forces and promote the cause of open, demilitarized and cooperating Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, a Europe which will acknowledge both its variety as well as global responsibility to the Third World and the environment.

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#### Disarmament and Security

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[Review by Major General of Aviation (retired) B. Surikov, candidate of technical sciences, of the book "*Razoruzheniye i Bezopasnost. 1987*" [Disarmament and Security, 1987]. Ye.M. Primakov, responsible editor. A.G. Arbatov, head of the group of authors. Izdatelstvo APN, Moscow, 1988, 800 pp).

[Text] The publication of the yearbook "*Razoruzheniye i Bezopasnost. 1987*," which was started last year as a periodical publication of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, should be considered a serious contribution to the comprehensive study of the most important problems of disarmament and military-political security, which is so greatly needed today. Let us recall that, starting with 1981, the Pentagon has annually published the work "*Soviet Military Power*," in which it blames the USSR for the continuation of the arms race. In turn, a number of works have been published by nongovernmental organizations in NATO countries on the problem of global security and disarmament. They too blame the East for the unjustifiably high surplus of armaments stockpiled by the Warsaw Pact and NATO. For that reason, the publication, in the Russian and English languages, of this

yearbook under review will enable Soviet and Western readers to become acquainted, for the first time, with a considered and comprehensive study of many contemporary problems, written by Soviet experts.

The yearbook discusses in detail the foreign policy activities of countries, the USSR and the United States above all, their allies and the nonaligned countries, on the entire range of problems of restraining the arms race, reducing the level of military confrontation and lowering the threat of war. The authors of the yearbook discuss basic problems of disarmament, such as strategic stability and approaches to the assessment of the military balance, the role and place of the combat control and communications systems in strategic forces in the nuclear missile confrontation of the powers, military doctrines of the various countries, and others. They study the basic international armed conflicts and the trends and prospects of their settlement as they exist at this point.

The development of the Soviet-American dialogue on nuclear and space armaments is a subject of special consideration.

The readers of this yearbook will be given an idea of the nature of the concluding phase of Soviet-American talks on the draft INF Treaty. As the study emphasizes, the constructive position adopted by the Soviet Union, which contributed to a decisive extent to the successful completion of the talks on the elimination of medium and short-range missiles, was shaped under the influence of our entire policy of security after the 27th CPSU Congress. The December 1987 Soviet-American Washington Summit which, essentially, summed up the results of the significant work done in the preceding months, made it possible to show progress also in reaching an agreement on reducing by one-half Soviet and American strategic offensive armaments.

The yearbook deals extensively with the role of the ABM Treaty in the prevention of an arms race in space. The authors justifiably note that the close interaction between extending the effect of this treaty and reducing such armaments by the opposite sides remains a fundamental principle in the Soviet-American talks on strategic offensive weapons. Readers who have followed the television debate between representatives of the American and Soviet publics could not fail to notice the fact that a certain number of Americans continue to trust in the defensive purpose of the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative," i.e., plans for the deployment of weapons in near-earth space. This makes even more important the arguments cited in the yearbook, clearly proving both the offensive and aggressive possibilities included in this program as well as its destabilizing nature in terms of the entire system of military-strategic balance in the world.

As we know, the Soviet Union considers the halting of underground nuclear explosions an important separate step which leads to reducing the level of the strategic and tactical armament race. The yearbook provides interesting data on the first joint Soviet-American scientific experiment which was conducted in Kazakhstan in 1987, the purpose of which was to calibrate seismic stations. In the course of the experiment it was established that low-yield explosions can be properly identified with existing seismic equipment. Furthermore, the proposal submitted by the USSR on limiting the number of allowed nuclear tests to two or three annually, combined with reducing the limit of their power to one kiloton can essentially eliminate the concern shown by U.S. circles who insist on continuing underground nuclear explosions with a view to testing the operational reliability of existing nuclear warheads.

The yearbook analyzes the nuclear programs of other powers, known as "doomsday weapons." It emphasizes that the full implementation of their programs could erect difficult obstacles for any subsequent reduction in nuclear armaments. The destabilizing nature of new models of nuclear weapons being developed in the West under the conditions of a reduction in American and Soviet strategic offensive armaments by 50 percent could face the Soviet Union with the need to take into consideration the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain in determining the strategic balance.

In May 1987 the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee adopted in Berlin a document on military doctrine. The new political thinking, quite understandably, affects most directly military policy as well. Military doctrine, the building of the armed forces and the moral-political spirit of their personnel are all closely linked with sociopolitical, economic, scientific and technical and moral processes in the life of Soviet society which is undergoing perestroika, as well as the processes of renovation in the fraternal countries. For the time being the West, including the United States, prefers to consider this new most important military-political document of the leadership of the members of the Warsaw Pact as nothing but a "propaganda action."

However, reality convincingly proves the significance of the Berlin statement of the socialist countries concerning military doctrine and the conclusions of the Warsaw 1988 Conference of the Political Consultative Committee will play an ever growing role in international relations. In this connection, the reader will find a great deal of interesting facts in this yearbook, which provides a detailed comparison and analytical data of the process of development of military doctrines of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The yearbook reflects the dynamics of the changed views of Soviet military leaders on military doctrine. It emphasizes that on the political level the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact has always been defensive. Meanwhile, the cold war triggered the concept of the possibility of

victory in a nuclear war which, in its time, influenced a number of Soviet works on strategy and operational skills and tactics of combat operations.

The rising levels of armaments and their increased efficiency, as practical experience confirms, cannot secure safety in Europe, for the use of force in solving one contradiction or another is fraught with the destruction of the European continent and the outbreak of an unlimited nuclear war. This means that the main efforts of East and West must be concentrated in this case on eliminating power confrontation. That is why the new Warsaw Pact concept gives priority to the line of limited armaments and to disarmament, and to the development of measures of confidence and the prevention of war. The yearbook pays greatly emphasizes the task of truly lowering the level of military confrontation and, in this connection, the correlation in the size of the land forces and conventional armaments in Europe. For the first time, the Soviet press is publishing data on the structure, categories and readiness of the divisions of the Warsaw Pact, based on their personnel strength. The authors proceed from the fact that with an overall balance, the confronting sides have asymmetrical but, as a whole, comparable forces.

The authors of the yearbook remind us that effective international security presumes also the elimination of reasons for the possible outbreak of war. In this case the ability of the individual countries to settle various conflict situations in one part of the world or another through political means must play a key role. Therefore, limiting armaments and disarmament, on the one hand, and settling regional conflicts, on the other, are two basic components in achieving international security. Hence the attention which the study pays to this kind of conflicts, including the one in the Middle East, and the explosive situations in Asia, Central America and Africa, is understandable.

Last May the Soviet Union began to pull out its limited contingent of troops from Afghanistan. It is comprehensively contributing to ending outside interference and putting an end to the war in that country. We believe that the readers will be interested in the objective assessment of the military-political situation in Afghanistan and the efforts made by Kabul in promoting a course of national reconciliation.

Clearly, the chapter on the development of outer space for peaceful purposes will be of great interest to a wide circle of readers. The work reflects quite fully the results of the implementation of the Soviet space program for 1987 and provides the possible basic trends which can be followed in the peaceful utilization of space and the results of the initial flight design tests of the new powerful "Energia" booster rocket, which can put in permanent orbit more than 100 tons of payload.

As a whole, the yearbook under review is a timely and important initiative. The comprehensive nature of the study provided in the yearbook of the most important problems of disarmament and security and the presentation of the various viewpoints should be considered an accomplishment of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO. This would contribute to the formulation of alternate political suggestions and promote the aspiration to seek solutions to the very difficult problems of ensuring safety in the contemporary world. In this connection we must point out the usefulness of the addenda—the chronology of events in 1987—and the many documents included in the publication, and annotations concerning the latest most interesting publications on problems of disarmament and security. The authors modestly point out on the back of the title page that this yearbook is for specialists. Clearly, one cannot agree with this assumption. Unquestionably, this study is of interest to the broad circles of the Soviet and foreign public, and organizations and departments dealing with problems of limiting armaments. A few good words should be said about the efforts of the editors of the yearbook and the personnel of the Novosti News Agency, whose contribution to this beautifully presented publication is quite significant.

In connection with the planned continuation of such research it seems pertinent to recommend to the authors to broaden in the next yearbook their reconsiderations on the possible trends to be followed in solving problems of disarmament and regional conflicts. Meetings between members of the Soviet and American public, which have taken place of late, have indicated, in particular, that in the United States a position considering the level of the further restriction of Soviet and American conventional forces after the agreement on the 50 percent reduction of such armaments has not taken shape as yet. It would be expedient, in preparing the next yearbook, to pay close attention to this complex problem. In July 1988 the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact formulated in Warsaw another set of new important suggestions on lowering military confrontation in Europe. The official NATO circles reacted to them with a great deal of restraint. The problem of a European "Reykjavik" should be in the field of vision of the IMEMO authors, since the need to lower the military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in this area has become particularly pressing.

We assume that considerations on said problems will be useful to specialists engaged in developing proposals for talks on various disarmament problems. At the same time, let us express the hope that Izdatelstvo APN will find in the future the possibility of increasing the size of the edition of the next yearbook, for there is an urgent need for such research and for making it available to the broad circles of the Soviet and international public.

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### Short Book Reviews

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[Text] Ye.G. Plimak "*Politicheskoye Zaveshchaniye V.I. Lenina. Istoki, Sushchnost, Vypolneniye*" [V.I. Lenin's Political Legacy. Origins, Nature, Implementation]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 142 pp. Reviewed by S. Khizhnyakov]

One of the features of our time is the increased interest shown by the people in V.I. Lenin's theoretical legacy and, above all, the cycle of his last articles and letters which have become Ilich's political testament to the party and the people.

In responding to the live social need, scientists and publicists, step by step, are recreating the historical truth of the complex destiny of these works which, for many decades were presented to the readers with a biased and tendentious interpretation based on the positions of the Stalinist "*Short Course*." Another major task is being implemented as well: the new scientific interpretation of Lenin's political legacy, from the viewpoint of the distance we have covered in our present tasks, aimed at the full implementation of the Leninist concept of socialism, the revelation of its humanistic nature, and turning its face toward man. In our view, the book by Ye.G. Plimak can be considered a successful attempt in this area.

The author rejects the simplistic and dogmatically deadened system of analyzing Lenin's latest articles and letters as being a logically structured and once and for all completed plan for the building of socialism in the USSR. He tries to trace the dynamics and turns of Lenin's thoughts, which are sometimes unexpected in terms of one context or another. He also rejects the traditional "article by article" approach, by detecting the organic interconnection, close interweaving of similarly heterogeneous questions raised in each article or letter within a single conceptual entity. Ye.G. Plimak offers the readers a problem study with broad philosophical-sociological, historical and political aspects, particularly emphasizing the link between the ways and means of socialist reorganizations developed by Lenin and the methods for socialist change, with his concerns and worries about the personality features of party leaders who were given the opportunity to "influence the trend of governmental affairs in a decisive manner" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 351). This constitutes the new feature in the author's vision of this topic.

Unlike many previous studies which, as a rule, merely presented the results of Lenin's thoughts on the laws governing the building of socialism, this book leads the reader into Ilich's creative laboratory itself: we see the way Lenin proceeds toward his innovative concept through the sociological interpretation of the ways of the revolution which occurred in a relatively backward

country and an awareness of the need for industrialization as the only way of survival of the Soviet state inside the ring of a capitalist encirclement, and through the interpretation of the significance of the universal principles of the cooperative, including the peasantry which, at that time, was totally uninvolved as yet, and through the assessment of the characteristics and prospects of the cultural revolution.

By paying attention to a number of details and "petty matters," the author also points out the way Lenin noted the new undesirable trends and the new threats to the cause of the socialist revolution and tried to warn the party about them in his last letters and articles. It is a question of the formulation of steps against a possible split within the party, conditions aimed at preventing excessive centralization of power and the fatal concentration of such power in the hands of individual "leaders," the restructuring of the party apparatus, taking into consideration the unity of its functional and personal aspects, and the inadmissibility of making errors or displaying haste in the approaches to the national problem.

The subtitle of the book is "Sources, Nature, Implementation." The latter—implementation—is the least studied aspect of the matter. The author tries to fill this gap by discussing extensively post-Leninist practices in the building of socialism and expressing considerations on the reasons and consequences of Stalin's violations of Lenin's behests. The essence of the author's premise may be reduced to the following: "...Let us not forget that the building of socialism was an entirely new historical matter which was carried out, furthermore, under exceptional circumstances, in an economically backward and semi-illiterate country...." There were no ready prescriptions for this project. There were no successful examples or tested models. Any leadership would have inevitably made errors and blunders. However, there are errors and errors, and there are blunders and blunders. The objective, which was to eliminate the backwardness of the country, was achieved within the shortest possible historical time. However, it was achieved largely through ways and means which cannot be classified in the least as "justified," "inevitable" or "normal" (p 58).

Ye.G. Plimak does not avoid sensitive and difficult problems of a principled nature: Were the foundations of the new society in the USSR laid by 1936-1937? What kind of socialism was built under Stalin? Did the Stalinist methods not lead to deep deformations in the entire aspect of socialism? Have we already acquired all essential characteristics of socialism? In answering these questions the author, who is a specialist in the history and sociology of revolutions, expresses, in our view, interesting but by no means uncontroversial views. However, the aspiration to raise new questions for public discussion and to gain a better understanding of the problems which, in the final account, lead to the characterization of the contemporary condition in Soviet society and its future can only be welcomed.

Other views expressed in the book could be considered debatable as well: some passages in which the author compares the French Revolution of the end of the 18th century to the October Revolution, claims of the inevitability of the elements of "barracks mentality" along our way, the limits of the "objective aspect" of the existing cult of Stalin's personality, and so on. Nonetheless, as a whole, the book meets the task set by the author: to prove that Lenin bequeathed in his last works the building of socialism which would be justifiably known as socialism and the creation of a society which "with a tremendous speed could develop production forces.... and to prove to one and all clearly that socialism contains within itself gigantic forces and that mankind has now entered a new stage of development with its inordinately brilliant opportunities" (op. cit., vol 45, p 402). The implementation of Lenin's behest to the end is the main content of the renovation of socialism in the course of perestroika. This conclusion crowns an interesting and useful book on Lenin's political testament.

V.A. Vazyulin, "*Logika Istorii. Voprosy Teorii i Metodologii*" [The Logic of History. Problems of Theory and Methodology]. Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1988, 328 pp. Reviewed by V. Golobokov, candidate of philosophical sciences.

This book makes no easy reading even for specialists. It would be no exaggeration to say that only a few years ago such a remark may have proved to be fatal to it. As a serious philosophical work, it demands of the reader his own consistent and painstaking mental work.

Like any meaningful scientific work, this book is paradoxical. The first paradox is that despite its complexity, in some areas it may appear simplistic and even schematic. Furthermore, the attention of the reader is occasionally especially drawn to what appears to be an old familiar feature demanding no close consideration. By restraining the aspiration of a reader's "quick mind" to extract immediately all possible conclusions from any given concept expressed in the book, the author forces him methodically to follow, step by step, logical considerations and leads to anticipatory conclusions precisely whenever and wherever this is required by the inner logic of development of the subject itself. For strict scientific theory also means mental discipline which makes it possible to solve many controversial problems by the very fact that they are formulated at their proper place and in proper connection, within a single conceptual entity.

Nonetheless what new aspect does this book contribute to Marxist science? It is always difficult to answer such a frontally asked question. Let us take as an example the main result of the study made by V.A. Vazyulin: **In the book, and above all in the second main part of it, human society is described as an integral organic system which is in the process of establishment and development.** All of a sudden several questions arise. What kind of society are we dealing with? Is it a society in terms of an abstraction

or a society which is specific, which exists under specific historical circumstances? Anyone reading this book would ask: naturally, in this case we are considering a society in its essential, in its summed up features. This section in the book deals with the structure of a social entity in its necessary aspects, which is present in each historically defined social system. But, as the author himself acknowledges, so far there has been in history no such an entity in which all of these aspects have existed in their developed shape. Such an integral state—communism—is as yet to be reached by society and this will take place under respective historical circumstances. Therefore, this interpretation of "society in general" is based on a historically specific but as yet inexistent social entity, fully developed, of a society which has completed the process of its establishment and reached its maturity.

Having started this review with the paradoxical perception of this book (both complex and simple) we come to a paradox pertaining to the essence of the matter. In order to describe a society on the level of its consolidated aspect, containing all restored basic forms, such a society must have reached a degree of maturity and exist in reality. For the time being, there is no mature communist society. In other words, in order to have an integral and logically consistent reflection of the subject, considered at its stage of maturity, the objective prerequisites to this effect have not been created as yet. It appears as though we have found ourselves in a cognitive impasse (let us immediately note that it is a question precisely of an integral and logically consistent reflection of the object, for its individual essential features, aspects, forms and processes are totally predictable). Aware of this difficulty (see, for example, pp 19-20), nonetheless the author sets himself the task of considering human society as an integral entity (see p 30) and, in our view, achieves a substantial success to the extent to which this is possible today, in solving this problem.

On what are these successes based? The answer is found in two other (first and third) sections in the book.

They are above all the result of the developed logic and methodology applied in the study of integral developing projects, i.e., of a dialectical logic as a system of internally interrelated categories. Precisely 20 years ago V.A. Vazyulin published his book "*Logika 'Kapitala' K. Marksa*" [The Logic of Marx's "*Das Kapital*"], in which an effort was made to break down the logical structure of this classical Marxist work in terms of its correlation with Hegelian logic. Naturally, V.A. Vazyulin was not the only Soviet philosopher who had tried to solve this problem which had been formulated by V.I. Lenin himself. In this work, the author notes the contribution made to the development of the theory of dialectics by scientists, such as M.M. Rozenal, E.V. Ilyenkov, L.A. Mankovskiy and others (see p 9). Meanwhile, the monograph written by V.A. Vazyulin remains virtually unnoticed. The reason for this was not only its very small edition but also its difficult "Hegelian" language which was accessible to specialists only.

As we know, the logic of theory cannot replace the logic of action. Logic acquires flesh and blood as it studies real life. Taking this into consideration makes entirely clear the turn taken by the author in his new monograph to the history of mankind. **In the first section of the book it is precisely the logical foundations for the study of society as an organic integrality that are presented.** Since the entire previous practice of mankind is concentrated in dialectical logic, logic itself can become and does become an objective foundation for the study of the future.

However, dialectical logic is not simply the practice of mankind but the concentration of this practice in the mind, and as such also includes the possibility of escaping reality, the more so when it becomes a question of the future. That is why by necessity it must be supplemented with a follow-up of perhaps the basic points of actual history. In a philosophical study history must be present not only as logic or theory, i.e., in a tight spiral, but also as a wide chain of new basic links. **The tracing of history in its decisive aspect, reflecting the stages of the ascent of mankind to its future, becomes to the author yet another objective prerequisite for the consideration of society as an organic entity. This is the topic of the third section in the book.**

Each of the three sections is a necessary prerequisite of and substantiation for the other two and together they recreate quite a voluminous picture of the leading pattern in history, and an objective prerequisite for its future development. The future must not be forgotten, the author sums up. "Already now the conditions for the future are ripening. The theoretical anticipation of the future society is necessary in order to interpret the practical struggle for it, so that it may not be blind or half-blind but conscious and inspired" (p 319).

The book is saturated with controversial problems and is a type of compendium of such problems, dealing with the social system as an organic entity, the possibilities of the dialectical method in the study of history and its basic forms, the ways, stages and prospects of social development, the dialects of the biological (natural) and the social aspects of man, etc. This very partial list of questions proves that the author has turned his attention to problems which, of late, have been the focal point of lively discussions. However, such is the logic of any truly serious scientific work which is written for the sake of studying what is still unknown, for which reason it also finds itself in the crucible of scientific battles....

This is not a book for light reading. However, having started it, the reader will then repeatedly pick it up, for its strict philosophical thinking is not only complex and necessary but also very fetching.

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### Meetings With the Editors. Chronicle

*18020004s Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 88 (signed to press 25 Oct 88) pp 127-128*

[Text] A meeting with Moscow propagandists was held by KOMMUNIST editors. In the course of a free discussion a wide range of problems related to the participation of the party press and other mass information media in the expansion and intensification of revolutionary changes in the party and society was covered. Great attention was paid to the political, economic and ideological problems of perestroika.

The editors were visited by the noted American specialist on problems of the Soviet Union, University of Vermont history professor R. Daniels. The talk dealt on problems of the interpretation in this journal of various stages in the history of Soviet society.

The editors were visited by a delegation of ideological workers from the Argentine Communist Party. An exchange of views took place on the ideological and political activities of the journals and the way they reflect the course of perestroika, organizing feedback between editors and readers and party organizations.

In accordance with the plans for cooperation, the editors were visited by N. Lundendorzh, representative of NAMYN AMDRAL, journal of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. The visitor's program included meetings and talks with editors of KOMMUNIST, talks at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, and the study of social life in Moscow. The Mongolian journalist also visited the Moldavian SSR.

The editors of KOMMUNIST were visited by a delegation of NOVA MYSL, the theoretical and political journal of the CZCP Central Committee, consisting of P. Gasko, first deputy editor-in-chief, and L. Zaludkova, head of the philosophy department. A discussion was held on the further development of cooperation between the two fraternal journals.

The editors received Sh. Bhatia, deputy editor-in-chief of the Indian newspaper TELEGRAPH. Problems related to the journal's coverage of the history of Soviet society and the activities of the party at the present stage were discussed.

The editors were visited by M. Ozechovski, PZPR Central Committee Politburo secretary. A wide range of problems related to the activities of the journal after the 27th CPSU Congress were discussed. The Polish guest was particularly interested in the participation of KOMMUNIST in the implementation of the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Also discussed was the task of intensifying the interaction between the theoretical and political journals of the two parties on

implementing the stipulations of the Declaration on Soviet-Polish Cooperation In Ideology, Science and Culture. Present at the talk was W. Natorf, Polish ambassador to the USSR.

A delegation of federation secretaries of the Italian Communist Party, headed by E. Ferraris, Italian Communist Party Central Committee member, studied the participation of KOMMUNIST in the implementation of the task of restructuring the ways and means of ideological work at the present stage. The Italian guests were also interested in the role played by the social sciences in shaping the new image of socialism.

Topical problems of interaction between the two fraternal parties and ways of enhancing bilateral cooperation were studied at the meeting between the editors and W. Klimczak, deputy editor-in-chief of NOWE DROGI, theoretical and political organ of the PZPR Central Committee.

The editors were visited by Gunther Baungart, editor-in-chief of the journal SOCIOLOGICAL ARTICLES. The GDR guest was acquainted with the work of KOMMUNIST on the coverage given to perestroika processes taking place in the country. Other problems of cooperation between the two journals were discussed as well.

A roundtable meeting on the social and economic problems of the development of the cooperative movement was held in Naberezhnyye Chelny, sponsored by the editors of KOMMUNIST jointly with the Tatar CPSU Obkom, the ispolkom of the city soviet of people's deputies, the KamAZ Administration and the Interregional Cooperative Federation. The materials of the session will be published in one of the next issues of this journal. The KOMMUNIST associates held a readers conference in Naberezhnyye Chelny and meetings with social scientists from Kazan and members of the Political Club imeni N.I. Bukharin in Naberezhnyye Chelny.

A frank discussion on the tasks facing the mass information media in covering the processes of profound renovation of all areas of life of our society and the participation of the theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee in this important historical matter was held at a meeting sponsored by the board of the Central Club of the USSR Workers in the Arts and the Central Club of Architects, on the one hand, and the editors of KOMMUNIST, on the other.

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